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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to try to answer the question as to how and to what extent the Aristotelian 
wise ruler will intervene in the life of the political community with a view to making people and 
communities better, both when he lives in the best and happiest city and when the polis is far away 
from the ideal conditions. 
I outline what I take to be a plausible account of political activity, in particular from the 
perspective of people in power, in the light of the most relevant ethical issues discussed by 
Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics: happiness, ethical excellence, wisdom, law, 
justice and friendship. The idea of power that I intend to emerge is not that of the power of 
individuals, an exclusive possession of rulers, but of a kind of political activity that requires some 
kind of involvement of the ruled for its full-fledged actualisation. 
In the first half of this work (chapters 1-6) I investigate the aims and methods of the art of 
the lawgiver, mainly with reference to the ideal polis. I begin by treating the issue ')f human 
happiness as the aim pursued by political expertise, and show a possible way in which individual 
conceptions of happiness may be reconciled with such an aim. Then, I introduce the issue of 
phronesis as the faculty enabling those in power to set out what forwards happiness, and try to 
show its relationship with ethical excellence. The issues of law, justice and friendship I treat as 
expressions of political wisdom; but I insist on political friendship as the ideal in the light of which 
a higher kind of justice might be realised in existing political communities. 
In the second half of my work (chapters 7-10) I illustrate how principles of natural justice 
are variably instantiated in existing political communities and how their instantiation affects the 
quality of constitutions. I also investigate the possibility of govemm_ent by wise rulers in imperfect 
communities and the extent to which Aristotle thinks such rulers may bring about a transformation 
within them; special regard will be paid to the 'polity', conceived as the outcome of a wise activity 
of transfomation in bad communities. 
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discussion of the legislative art raises some crucial problems of ethical relevance, 
currently debated in contemporary political philosophy, and makes a significant 
contribution towards an explanation of the role of political communities in the life 
of their members. 
The two main Aristotelian texts I have made use of in my investigation of 
Aristotle's ethico-political thought are the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics. 
As for the Nicomachean Ethics, Broadie and Rowe's edition (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2002) has been extremely valuable and illuminating to me, both 
for the accuracy of the translation and the line-by-line commentary; all the 
passages of the Nicomachean Ethics quoted in this thesis are taken from Rowe's 
translation. In the first stages of preparation of this work I also made use of 
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Natali's edition of the Nicomachean Ethics with translation and commentary 
(Bari, Laterza, 1999), which I found very helpful for the interpretation of many 
Aristotelian arguments. As for the Politics, all the passages I have quoted are 
taken from Barker's translation (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1948). I also 
benefited from both Laurenti's (Bari, Laterza, 1997; 4th ed.) and Rackham's 
(Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1977) translations of the Politics. 
Translations of the other works of Aristotle which I have quoted in this 
thesis are those of the Revised Oxford Translation of the Complete Works of 
Aristotle, edited by Jonathan Barnes (II vols.), 1984 (see Bibliography). 
The lines of the Greek texts I have quoted are those of Bekker's edition. 
The abbreviations which I have used to indicate the Aristotelian and works of 
other authors are the following: 
Nicomachean Ethics: NE Magna Moralia: JvfM Politics: Pol. 
Eudemian Ethics: EE Topics: Top. Rhetoric: Rhet. 
Sophistical Refutations: Soph. El. Metaphysics: Met. Problems: Probl. 
Poetics: Poet. Antigone: Ant. Protagoras: Prot. 
De Anima: De An. Politicus: Pit. Republic: Rep. 
The reader will notice that some Greek words which I have quoted in this thesis have 
been transcripted in their original form, whereas others have been italicised. I have 
transliterated some Greek words so as to draw attention to philosophical concepts 
which I meant to emphasize; I hope that the Greek words left in their original form will 
help the reader to follow better Aristotle's sentences in relation to the English 
translation. 
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We live in a political world, 
Wisdom is thrown into jail, 
It rots in a cell, is misguided as hell, 
Leaving no one to pick up a trail 
We live in a political world, 
The one we can see and can feel, 
But there's no one to check, it's all a stacked deck, 
We all know for sure that it's real. 
Bob Dylan 
Introduction 
Political Expertise and the Aims of the State 
) Aya1tT,cra'tE o1Ka10cruvl1V, 01 KPtVOV'tE~ 'tT,V Yllv 
Old Testament-The Wisdom of Solomon 
This work is intended to shed light on Aristotle's view of the role played by wisdom in 
the exercise of political power, and of the possible ways in which wisdom may be 
expressed in the running of any community. Power might be regarded as one's capacity 
to affect someone else's actions 1, or as a form of intervention in the life of the other 
people which ends up by affecting their behaviour; the notion of power seems to 
include a wide network of concepts which contribute to its formulation: for instance, 
authority, domination, repression, coercion, consent, opposition of the ruled to the 
rulers, and punishment. Such concepts I am not going to handle in my thesis; rather, I 
will concentrate on the activity of the ruler when it is combined with wisdom and 
political science. I do not intend to examine bad forms of power and their political 
effects; reference to corrupt communities will mainly be made in the light of the polis 
truly grounded in ethical excellence. 
Political expertise, which is taken by Aristotle as the ground of the proper 
exercise of political power, enables its possessors to establish the good for the political 
association and its members, presumably both in the ideal polis and in imperfect 
communities2. Such an expertise is based on a particular kind of knowledge, i.e. 
knowledge of the highest good, and operates with a view to its actualisation. 
1 See M. Foucault, 1994, p. 340. 
2 This idea may find some ground in Pol. IV, 1288b22-39, where Aristotle says that it is the business of 
the political science to study not only the best constitution, but also which constitution is adapted to 
1 
In the first part of my thesis (part I: 'The Role of Excellence in Human Happiness') I 
propose to investigate what kind of good is pursued by political expertise and how 
ethical excellence and wisdom may contribute to its actualisation. I will start by 
analysing Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia and the way in which individual choices in 
relation to happiness may tum out to be compatible with the highest good as the end of 
political expertise (cf. Part I, chapter 1: 'Choosing One's Own Life. Individual 
Eudaimonia and Political Expertise'). The highest good which political expertise 
attempts to achieve is of an ethical kind, given that such an expertise deals mainly with 
fine and just things3, and provided that the aim of expert lawgivers is to foster the 
exercise of excellence among the citizens4 . 
Political expertise, conceived as the science of the ultimate good, is concerned 
with the direction of men towards a rational life5; good human activity, i.e. eupraxia, 
requires a deliberative process leading to decisions: a process in which phronesis, in 
combination with excellence of character, is deeply involven. In the second chapter of 
my thesis, then (Part I, chapter 2: 'Relationships between Arete and Phronesis. Huw do 
They Come into Being?'), I will try to explain how education to such aretai takes place, 
and how they interact in the deliberative process forwarding human action. 
Wisdom in the rulers, although not differing in kind from wisdom in the ruled, 
pursues a wider goal than individual happiness, since it aims at the good of the whole 
polis. Political wisdom expresses itself in the form of laws or, in other words, of an 
appropriate system of justice capable of educating citizens to virtuous behaviour. The 
instantiation of justice in political communities is not only a matter of the lawgiver's 
which people and what is appropriate to the majority of cities, given that for many of them it is 
impossible to attain the best constitution. 
3 See Aristotle, NE I, 1 094b 14-15. 
4 See Aristotle, NE I, 11 02a7 -10. 
5 See E. Barker, 1959, pp. 243-4. 
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phronesis, but also requlres some kind of virtuous disposition of character on the 
citizens' part. This will be the object of the second part of my work (Part II: 'Law and 
Political Justice: Between Individual Arete and Human Interaction'), where I will 
suggest that the law, conceived in the Aristotelian sense, expresses the ethical values 
which determine a just disposition of character, and, in its turn, a just character will be 
the source not only of the individual good, but also of the good of other persons, both in 
private and in public interactions. 
In chapter III (Part II, chapter 3: 'Lawfulness and Justice in the Nicomachean 
Ethics'), which introduces the second part of my work, I intend to show that when 
Aristotle, taking up a commonly held belief, says that the just is what is lawful6, he 
does not seem to be alluding to an uncritical obedience to law. Rather, it seems that the 
lawfulness Aristotle has in mind is the obedience of people to a kind of law that 
prescribes activity according to ethical excellence and contributes in this way to the 
happiness of the whole of the community, i.e. a law established according to the true 
lawgiver's art. 
That the ethical values pursued by wise individuals iJ I their private life ought to 
be instantiated also in political life through obedience to good laws is implied by NE V, 
1129b30-3, in which Aristotle, while dealing with the notion of justice as lawfulness, 
claims that justice prescribes complete excellence of character to the highest degree, 
since the person who possesses it exercises his excellence in relation to other people, 
and not just by himself; such a view finds support in the common belief that justice is 
an allotrion agathon7 . I shall deal with the notion of justice as 'allotrion agathon' in 
chapter IV (Part II, chapter 4: 'The "Other-regarding" Aspect of Universal Justice'), 
6 See Aristotle, NE V, 1129a34~ here Aristotle introduces also a second sense in which justice might be 
understood: justice as 'to taov. 
7 See Aristotle, NE V, 1130a3-6. 
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which concludes the second part of my thesis. In this chapter I intend to investigate the 
relationship between the kind of justice which might be called 'universal' -insofar as it 
enjoins the whole of ethical excellence-and the 'particular' justice represented by the 
notion of justice as isotes. My view is that a virtuous act is made into an act of justice 
only when the agent is an isos person, i.e. when he or she does not grasp for the share 
of goods due to his or her fellow-citizens; in other words, as I believe, isotes is the 
disposition of character that causes an ethical excellence to become a good performed 
with a view to other people. 
However, the justice which lawgivers try to actualise in political communities is 
not a sufficient condition for its happiness, unless some kind of friendship is established 
among the citizens; friendship, which in Book VIII of the Nicomachean Ethics is 
described as a substantial ingredient of individual happiness8, turns out to be a vital 
condition for the correct functioning of political communities, since the trust and 
mutual well-wishing involved by friendship among citizens is a guarantee of order and 
stability in the polis. As Aristotle suggests, political friendship is not established 
without the intervention of expert lawgivers, whose task is to promote friendship even 
more than justice in the city9. I will handle the issue of political friendship in the third 
part of this thesis (Part Ill: 'Political Friendship: a Path to Authentic Justice'); in the 
first section of this part (Part Ill, chapter 5: 'Between Advantage and Ethical 
Excellence. The Relevance of Friendship in Political Theory'), I will suggest that, in 
Aristotle's view, a stable and good politike ph ilia consists of a sort of shared-advantage 
friendship pursued according to excellence and resembling friendship of goodness in 
some of its particular aspects, such as love of the other, living together and reciprocal 
trust. 
8 See Aristotle, NE VIII, 1155a4-6. 
9 See Aristotle, NE VIII, 1155a23-4. 
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The form of mutual and intimate love that exists in a friendship based on ethical virtue, 
and does not exist in the friendship between the citizens of a community, might be 
replaced by activity according to justice, which, although impersonal, guarantees a 
good degree of homonoia. In chapter VI (Part ill, chapter 6: 'Relationships between 
Political Friendship and Justice') I will attempt to show that such a justice will vary 
according to the degree of ethical excellence of citizens: in bad communities, for 
instance, it might be mere prudential justice, where fear of punishment prevents people 
from committing injustice; by contrast, in communities in which lawgivers try to guide 
citizens to intrinsically virtuous behaviour, justice will be the disposition of character 
according to which one acts according to one's inherent ethical values. 
The instantiation of justice by lawgivers will vary according to both their 
personal conception of common happiness and the existing conditions of political 
communities. Notwithstanding the existence of a wide variety of cities, there will be 
general principles of political organisation with which every community should 
comply. In Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics, in the context of his discussion of 
political justice, Aristotle introduces the notion of natural justice, which, unlike the 
conventional, has the same force everywhere and does not depend on any human 
decision to accept it or not 10 . 
Natural and conventional justice will be the objects of the fourth part of my thesis 
(Part IV: 'Nature and Convention. Instantiating Natural Justice in Political 
Constitutions'). In chapter VII (Part IV, chapter 7: 'A Justice in the Making. Natule and 
Convention in Political Justice') I propose to investigate the relationship between 
natural and conventional justice, and argue that natural justice consists of indeterminate 
rules of social expediency and ethically-relevant principles which, if established 
wrongly, might compromise the social order of the polis. The power of wise lawgivers 
10 See Aristotle, NE V, 1134b18-25. 
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will consist in finding the appropriate way of instantiating principles of natural justice 
in their polis, by taking into account its particular conditions and needs. In this respect, 
even principles of natural justice will involve some kind of conventionality, in that they 
will be carried out in the form of legislative enactments that differ from community to 
community. 
In chapter VIII (Part IV, chapter 8: 'The Changeability of Natural Justice') I will 
attempt to explain in what sense Natural Justice may be regarded as changeablel1 , with 
a view to showing that natural justice seems to be conceived by Aristotle as an 
attainable ideal, not detached from conventional norms, but destined to be instantiated 
more or less perfectly in existing political communities according to both the capacity 
of rulers and the existing conditions of the polis. I hope to argue that the best 
constitution 'by nature' is not a transcendent ideal of a constitution, but, simply, the 
constitution which manages in the best way possible to attain the common happiness 
for its members through a widespread exercise of ethical excellence, on the part of both 
rulers and ruled. 
The conditions of an imperfect polis and the values underlying its system of 
justice seem to put severe constraints on the exercise of wisdom; the work of a good 
ruler will undeniably be affected by the quality of the constitution he governs, given 
that the task of the ruler is not only to be good, but also to be loyal to his constitution 
and be capable of preserving it12 : in a corrupt community, for instance, not only would 
he be unable to bring about the kind of justice proper to the ideal polis, but he might 
even be regarded as a bad ruler in case he tried to modify the existing constitution 
according to his ethical values. 
11 See Aristotle, NE V, 1134b32-3. 
12 See Aristotle, Pol. V, 1309a34-5. 
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In the last part of my thesis (Part V: 'Political Phronesis in Action'. The Power of The 
Wise Lawgiver') I will try to demonstrate that a wise ruler might govern in an 
imperfect constitution without changing its substantial character, while still 
transforming it to some extent towards a better condition. In chapter IX (part V, chapter 
9: 'Political Phronesis: Aims and Methods') I will attempt to outline the difference 
between the good citizen and the good ruler, with a view to showing that, unlike any 
good citizen, whose goodness is relative to the constitution in which he lives 13, a good 
ruler will be such by virtue of phronesis14 : a kind of wisdom which not all the citizens 
might possess, unless we think of an ideal polis in which all the citizens possess the 
whole of ethical excellence and know how to apply it in practical life. Final~y, in 
chapter X (part V, chapter 10: 'Wisdom in an Imperfect Community: Polity and The 
Power of the Many') I propose to describe the Aristotelian 'polity' as the kind of 
constitution which mostly represents the power of a wise ruler to actualise the interest 
of the whole polis; in the polity wise lawgivers will be capable of balancing the 
interests of both the rich and the poor, and also of giving rise to a kind of political 
friendship capable of ensuring some kind of stability. 
'Ruling Wisdom', then, will be an indispensable element of the power of rulers; 
their possession of ethical excellence will support the exercise of deliberative activity in 
political life: through their phronesis, excellent lawgivers will try to realise what 
forwards the virtuous ends established by them. 
13 See Aristotle, Pol. III, 1276b30-1. 
14 See Aristotle, Pol. III, 1277aI4-5. 
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Part I 
The Role of Excellence in Human Happiness 
IIoAAqJ -ro rppolleill ev6azJ1ollia~ 1CPW-rOll mapxez 
Sophocles 
Chapter I 
Choosing One's Own Life. Individual Eudaimonia and 
Political Expertise. 
1.1: Introduction 
In Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle raises a question of great relevance for 
the development of his ethical and political theory: what is the best life for a man to 
lead? Such a question will not be answered unless we turn to contemplate the issues of 
human good and happiness. A modem reader might be tempted to treat the Aristotelian 
concept of happiness exclusively in terms of individual wishes, ambitions and 
preferences~ but Aristotle is not adopting any "apolitical" approach to the issue of 
happiness, and his concern for political expertise and its role in the education of 
individuals with a view to a happy life is not to be downplayed. 
However, the notion of happiness is ~ taken up in Book X, the last of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. Here, Aristotle engages in a persuasive apology of theoretical 
activity as the one allowing human beings the best and most perfect life 1, which seems 
to suggest that the account of eudaimonia provided at the beginning of the 
Nicomachean Ethics will be completed and therefore amenable to a full understanding 
only after having ascertained of the role of theoria in his thought. Even more, by 
handling the issue of happiness precisely at the beginning and the end of the Ethics, 
Aristotle seems to conceive eudaimonia as a congenial frame for the exhibition of the 
theories expounded in this work; happiness, in other words, might be taken as the 
1 See Aristotle, NE X, 1177a12-1178a8. 
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philosophical horizon in the light of which the rest of the Issues treated In the 
Nicomachean Ethics can be understood. 
The concept of happiness as set up by Aristotle has been a matter of vigourous 
debate among scholars. Besides the much controverted problem of a supposed 
continuity between Book I and Book X2, the general lack of a unilateral approach to the 
various aspects which shape this notion has engendered in the past a plethora of 
interpretative difficulties and continues to do so in the present, which has probably been 
the source of a wide-and dismaying, perhaps-variety of readings. 
In Book I, for instance, the highest good is described as the object sought by 
political expertise3; such an expertise sets out which of the other expertises are needed 
for the well-being of the polis4 and, in Aristotle's view, the task of lawgivers who 
possess such an expertise is to foster the exercise of excellence among the citizens5 
with a view to both their personal happiness and the happiness of the whole of the 
community. 
On the other hand, happiness seems to be a matter of individual choice, since 
different people will have different beliefs as to what a happy life is; vulgar people, for 
2 The problem of the continuity between Books I and X of the Nicomachean Ethics will be treated in the 
course of this chapter. Among the scholars who supported the view of continuity, see S. Broadie, 1991, 
pp. 370-3~ lM. Cooper, 1987 (where he engages in a revision of the position assumed in lM. Cooper, 
1975, [see below])~ D. Devereux, 1981~ T.B. Eriksen, 1976, pp. 135-6~ R.A. Gauthier and lY. Jolif, 
1970, vol. II, pp. 891-6; W.F.R. Hardie, 1980, p. 364~ R. Heinaman, 1988, p. 32~ A. Kenny, 1992, pp. 29-
31 (although at p. 36 he detects a lack of continuity between Books I and X with reference to the notion 
of self-sufficiency)~ D. Keyt ,1983~ R. Kraut, 1989, pp. 4-5; A.a. Rorty, 1980; lO. Urmson, 1980, pp. 
14-15~ l Whiting, 1986. Conversely, doubts about the consistency of Book X with Book I have been 
lodged by lL. Ackrill, 1980; A.W.H. Adkins, 1978; D.l Allan, 1970, p. 139~ lM. Cooper, 1975, pp. 
156-64~ W. Jaeger, 1948, pp. 439-40; 1. Moline, 1983~ lD. Monan, 1980, p. 114~ T. Nagel, 1980, p.7~ M. 
Nussbaum, 1986, pp. 373-7~ W.D. Ross, 1923, pp. 233-4~ N.P. White, 1981, pp. 242-3~ and K.V. Wilkes, 
1980, pp. 351-2. 
3 See Aristotle, NE I, 1094a25-8. 
4 See Aristotle, NE I, 1094a28-b2. 
5 See Aristotle, NE I, 1102a7-10. 
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instance, might suppose happiness to be pleasure or honour6, whereas people of quality 
might go for a life of excellence, e.g. a life devoted to political activity or to activity of 
reflection 7 . Again, the human good can be identified by reference to the ergon of 
human beings8, i.e. a typifying activity in virtue of which men are distinguished by the 
rest of living creatures; as we are going to see, such an ergon is identified with activity 
of reason, so that to anthropinon agathon will be achieved when a human being 
performs his own ergon well, i.e. according to some kind of excellence. Last, but not 
least, as I have already said, in Book X the highest form of happiness is identified with 
a life devoted to theoretical activity, i.e. activity performed according to the divinest 
part of the human soul in us9; a conclusion which, taken at a face value, would end up 
ruling out any possibility of achieving happiness for those who wish for a different kind 
of life. 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia in 
the Nicomachean Ethics by examining the role of political expertise in the actualisation 
of individual happiness, and the extent to which the highest good pursued by expert 
lawgivers for the well-being of the political community is compatible both with 
individual choice as to how to live one's own life and with the idea of a human ergon. I 
will try to provide evidences for the idea that the highest good which expert lawgivers 
seek to actualise in the polis is mainly of an ethical kind; a good which, as I propose to 
demonstrate, will be perfect and complete only when grounded in and supported by 
theoretical activity. 
I will also suggest that happiness, in Aristotle's thought, is not a matter of a 
systematic composite of different ends, but of the possibility of chOOSing between two 
6 See Aristotle, NE I, l095a22-3. 
7 See Aristotle, NE I, l095b18-19. 
8 See Aristotle, NE I, l097b22-1098a20. 
9 See Aristotle, NE X, 1177a13-17. 
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different kinds of excellence for the sake of a happy life: the ethical and the intellectual. 
I intend to demonstrate that men can choose either or both as desirable in themselves , 
and I also hope to show that, even when the ethical good pursued by political expertise 
is not sought by individuals as a good of intrinsic value, it is an indispensable 
component of the human good. Virtuous people may have different conceptions of 
happiness, whose constitutive components, therefore, will vary according to individual 
cases. My view is that, although in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle stresses 
the importance of political expertise and of the well-being of the polis, political 
excellence is not the only kind of excellence conducive to happiness; intellectual 
activity too may be another possible candidate as the focus of a happy life, as long as it 
is practised within a political context. In other words, if the chosen life is the 
intellectual, each individual should make sure that such a choice is compatible with the 
'ethical' good pursued by the political expertise. 
1.2: The Highest Good: Between Political Expertise and Individual 
Wishes 
Two different aspects contribute to the formulation of Aristotle's theory of happiness as 
the highest good: on the one hand, happiness is treated in terms of values, wishes and 
ambitions pursued by single individuals, depending on various conceptions of what a 
good life might be; on the other hand, the highest good is presented as the object of 
political expertise, which plays a substantial role in the setting out of the other kinds of 
expertise needed for the well-being of the polis. 
Aristotle's concern for the role played by political expertise in the pursuit of 
human happiness is expressed in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics. He begins by 
claiming that 
11 
i. e., as Rowe translates, 
«Every sort of expert knowledge and every inquiry, and similarly every action and 
undertaking, seems to seek some good. Because of that, people are right to affirm that 
the good is 'that which all things seek'»10. 
As Aristotle explains, there is a certain difference among ends: some are 
activities, whereas others are products over and above the activities themselves, by their 
nature better than the activities from which they springll. Goods are not necessarily 
related to each other; for instance, health, which is the end of medicine, will not have 
anything to do with the art of shipbuilding and its products, i.e. ships, nor will victory, 
which is the end of generalship, relate in any way the end of household management; 
however, there are cases in which some activities fall under some single capacity: the 
craft of bridle-making, for instance, falls under horsemanship insofar as bridles are 
tools employed in the latter form of expertise, and horsemanship, in its tum, falls under 
generalship and will be employed in the art of war 12 . 
As Aristotle says, 
10 Aristotle, NE I, l094al-2. 
11 See Aristotle, NE I, l094a3-6. 
12 See Aristotle, NE I, l094a8-14. 
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1.e. 
«in all activities the ends of the controlling ones are more desirable than the ends under 
them, because it is for the sake of the former that the latter too are pursued» 13. 
As we can see here, Aristotle is significantly trying to reduce the multiplicity of 
the ends, but he has not yet explined the reason why some things are more desirable 
than others, nor the reason of their being worth pursuing. In that case, as Broadie 
explains, 
«we are not yet entitled to conclude to a supreme good. A 'further good' would be 
supreme only if (1) it underpins the goodness of every one of the specific ends; (~) it is 
unique in having this funtion (3) there is nothing on which it in tum depends for its 
value as others depend on it» 14. 
These features will be treated in the rest of Aristotle's argument, where the highest 
good is hypothesized as something wished for because of itself and, at the same time, 
the cause of our wishing the other things: 
13 Aristotle, NE I, 1 094a 14-16. 
14 S. Broadie, 1991, p. 11. 
13 
£111 'tCx,ya90v Kat 'to ap1<J'tov», 
. 
1.e. 
«If then there is some end in our practical projects we wish for because of itself, while 
wishing for the other things we wish for because of it, and we do not choose everything 
because of something else (for if that is the case, the sequence will go on to infinity, 
making our desire empty and vain), it is clear that this will be the good, i.e. the chief 
goOd»15. 
This passage seems to imply that we cannot speak of the goodness proper to those 
expertises, acvitities, choices etc. which are pursued for the sake of a higher end unless 
we hypothesize a final end as the point to which all of them must halt; without such an 
end, every pursuit would be 'empty' and 'vain,16. 
At NE L 1094a26-b2 Aristotle introduces the notion of political expertise, i.e. the 
expertise to which the highest good belongs, by stressing its 'architectonic' character: 
15 Aristotle, NE I, 1094aI8-22. 
16 See S. Broadie, 1991, p. 13: «What Aristotle is trying to say here is that, unless we have some ultimate 
end for the sake of which we pursue 'the others', but which itself is pursued for its own sake, our desire 
would be 'empty and vain', since the pursuit would go on to infinity. My desire must settle at some point 
because until it does I do not actually desire anything for the sake of which I then desire the things 
through which I can accomplish it. If I shift along the series discarding each as an ultimate objective in 
favour of the next, then not only do I form no desire for a particular objective, buy my general desire for 
good (whatever the good may be) is 'empty and futile' -not because it cannot be implemented to the 
maximum, but because it cannot be implemented at all unless I fix on some given objective as good, and 
set about acting for the sake of it» 
14 
1tCA-Eat, , Kat I 1tota~ , Kat 
Ota'taaaEt», 
. l.e. 
«It [the highest good] would seem to belong to the most sovereIgn, l.e. the most 
'architectonic' [ expertise]. Political expertise appears to be like this, for it is this 
expertise that sets out which of the expertises there needs to be in cities, and what sorts 
of expertise each group of people should learn, and up to what point». 
The highest good seems to be 'architectonic' in relation to the other goods in the same 
way as a controlling activity is 'architectonic' in relation to the others. 
Political expertise employs the other expertises needed in cities and, presumably, 
includes them in the organisation of the political community as components of the 
goods at which it aims. The highest good is not realised by means of expertises which, 
once the good has been achieved, are dismissed; on the contrary, they are permanently 
employed in political life-as we might read Aristotle's claim that the architectonic 
expertise 'makes use of the practical expertises that remain' 17 -so that they will turn out 
to be a vital part of the organisation of a political community. Accordingly, the end of 
the most 'architectonic' expertise, i.e. 'the human good,1S, will contain those of the rest. 
17 Aristotle, NE I, l094b4-5. Rowe's reading retains '1tpaK1:tKa'ic;' at l094b4. 
18 See Aristotle, NE I, l094b7: '1:avSpro1ttvov aya86v'. 
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That the highest good belonging to the political expertise contains the ends of the goods 
pursued for its sake seems to show that it is a comprehensive good, i.e. containing the 
others. Goods like health, for instance, might be desirable in themselves and therefore 
be regarded as complete goods; but they will not include goods of other kinds, like 
victory, which is the end of generalship. The highest good, by contrast, is thought to 
embrace all the different ends pursued by human beings. 
Apparently, such a picture of the highest good has very little to do with the idea 
of a good wished for and chosen by individuals, i.e. an idea which is suggested in the 
already mentioned NE I, I094aI8-19, where Aristotle introduces the notion ofa ''tEAOC; 
[ ... ] 'tcDV npaK'tcDv " 01' au'to J3ouA6~Eea'; but in the remainder of his argument 
he will take up the idea of individual wishes, and try to provide an account of the 
highest good in which these playa substantial role. 
Aristotle is also keen on stressing two features belonging to the highest good: 
completeness and self-sufficiency. As for completeness, at NE I, I097a28-30 he speaks 
of a good which is more complete than others, and so most complete: 
. 
l.e. 
«if there is some one thing alone that is complete, this will be what we are looking for, 
and if there are more such things than one, the most complete of these». 
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Completeness, here, is introduced in relation to what is worth pursuing for itself and not 
because of something else: 
«Now we say that what is worth pursuing for itself is more complete than what is worth 
pursuing because of something else, and what is never desirable19 because of something 
else is more complete than those things that are desirable both for themselves and 
because of it; while what is complete without qualification20 is what is always desirable 
in itself and never because of something else»21. 
This passage takes up what Aristotle has just mentioned at NE I, l094a18-22; but the 
notion of desirability, just hinted at by Aristotle in that passage, is here employed in 
relation to the idea of completeness. Such a notion also appears in the second attribute 
attached to the highest good: self-sufficiency, which makes life 'desirable and lacking 
in nothing' 22 . 
When Aristotle speaks of the 'completeness' of the highest good, we might be 
tempted to think that he is referring to the end of an impersonal political expertise, in 
the shape of a pre-established composite of goods provided by all the other practical 
undertakings, rather than to the end wished for by individuals; again, the notion of self-
sufficiency is introduced with reference to man as a part of a political organisation 
rather than as an individual with personal wishes, given that, as Aristotle says, 
19 dtpEWv. 
20 a1tAci)~ 'teAEtOV. 
21 Aristotle, NE I, l097a30-4. 
22 See Aristotle, NE I, I097b14-15: «'to 0' a:u'tapKE~ 'tt8EJlEV 0 JlOVOUJlEVOV dtPE'tOV 1tOtE1 WV 
J3WV Kat JlTJOEVO~ EVOEa». 
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«by" self-sufficient', we do not mean sufficient for oneself alone, for the person living a 
life of isolation, but also for one's parents, children, wife, and generally those one 
loves, and one's fellow citizens, since man is by nature a civic being»23. 
Moreover, saying that the highest good is the most desirable and self-sufficient one 
does not make it clear what kind of good it is. 
One possible suggestion might be to read Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics in 
the light of Book A of the Metaphysics, where Aristotle introduces the notion of sophia 
in relation to the highest good; understanding the highest good constituted by sophia 
might be useful towards understanding how the notion of highest good is employed in 
the Ethics. It is interesting that in Book A sophia is described as the most divine and 
honourable among the various forms of epistemaP4, and as a good desirable because of 
itself, given that people do not seek after it for the sake of something else25 . 
Again, at Met. A, 982b4 sophia is described as apXtKCD'tcX'tll O£ 'tcOv 
E1ttO''tTU1cDV and, similarly to political expertise in the Nicomachean Ethics (which is 
described as an architectonic form of expertise26), is regarded as 
1tpa K1:EOV EKaO''tOV» 27, 
23 Aristotle, NE I, l097b8-1l; cf. Pol. I, 1253a3-4. 
24 See Met. A, 983a5, where Aristotle describes sophia as '8Eto'ta:tll Kat 'ttJ.ltO)'teX.'tTf, 
25 See Met. A, 982b24-8: «8ilAOV ouv mc; 8t' oU8EJ.ltaV ai.>'tllv ~ll'tOUJ.lEV xpe'tav E'tEpav [ ... ] 
\ f/ «- f/ I' J.l6vll yap amll au'tllC; EVEKEV E<J'ttV». 
26 See Aristotle, NE I, l094a26-8. 
27 Aristotle, Met. A, 982b5-6. 
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i. e. as ruling over the other sciences that depend on it, given that it knows the end for 
the sake of which everything is done in nature. As Aristotle goes on to say, the end of 
each thing is the good, and, in nature as a whole, the end is the highest good: 
nacrn» 28 • 
The highest good in which sophia seems to consist is surely intellectual, given that at 
Met. A, 982b7 -10 sophia is said to speculate on the first principles and the causes. If so, 
should we suppose that the highest good pursued by sophia is the same as that pursued 
by political expertise? Now, it is easy to notice some similarity between the 
Nicomachean Ethics and that of the Metaphysics, even in their start, given that at Met. 
A, 980a21 Aristotle says that 
and the idea of 'tending' that emerges here is similar to that expressed at NE I, 1094a1, 
where it is said that every sort of expertise tends to some good29; it might be supposed 
that such a similarity reveals that Aristotle intends to speak of the highest good in the 
same terms in both works. 
However, it seems to me that, unlike in the Metaphysics, in the Nicomachean 
Ethics Aristotle's main interest is not the highest good conceived as a search of causes; 
as a matter of fact, in the Metaphysics nowhere does Aristotle say that the highest good 
28 Aristotle, Met. A, 982b6-7. 
29 The verb employed in the Ethics to indicate the activity of 'tending to something' is 'e$tEcr6at'. 
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is sought after by political expertise, nor in the passages of the Nicomachean Ethics 
analysed so far does he mention sophia with reference to the highest good. It seems that 
the exercise of political expertise involves the employment of the other kinds of 
expertises needed for the well-functioning of the polis, among which are generalship, 
household management, rhetoric3o , unlike intellectual activity, which, rather, might 
presuppose the knowledge of disciplines like mathematics, astronomy and geometry. 
As the whole of the Nicomachean Ethics shows, ethical excellence and practical 
thought seem to be the main focus of Aristotle's investigation; that he devotes so much 
space to issues like ethical excellence, wisdom, justice and friendship reveals that the 
aspect of the highest good he has in mind is mainly of ethical nature. Although a 
virtuous state might promote intellectual activity as an important ingredient of its 
happiness, intellectual activity per se will not determine the self-sufficiency of the 
community. More specific evidence in support of the idea that the highest good pursued 
by political expertise is of an ethical kind is that at NE I, 1102a8-9 Aristotle suggests 
that that the aim of the true political expert is excellence: 
. 
1.e. 
«the true political expert will have worked at excellence more than anything». 
Although Aristotle does not openly say on which kind of excellence the lawgiver 
is working, the kind of excellence Aristotle seems to have in mind here is ethical, given 
that what the political expert wants is 
30 These kinds of expertises are mentioned at NE I, 1 094b3. 
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KtOUC; 1toAl:tac; aya8ouc; 1tOtUV Kat 'tcOV VOJ-lrov U1t11KOOUC;», 
1.e. 
«to make the members of the citizen-body good, and obedient to the laws»31. 
Given that (as we are going to see in chapters III-IV of this thesis) laws are established 
with a view to the promotion of justice in the polis, it seems that the highest good 
pursued by political experts is mainly ethical. 
Again, a passage that seems to confirm such a be1ief may be found at Pol. III, 
1280b7 -10, where it is said that 
«OEt 1tEpt apE'tllC; E1ttJ-lEAEC; Elvat 'til y' roc; aA 11ScOC; bVOJ-lU~OJ-lEVn nOAEt, J-lr, 
AOYOU Xaptv· ytVE'tat yap " KOtVroVtU crUJ-lJ-lUXtU, 'tcOv aAArov 'tonq;> 
Otu<j)Epoucra J-lOVOV 'tcOV a1tOSEV crUJ..lJ-laXCDV», 
i. e., as Barker translates, 
«any polis which is truly so called, and is not merely one in name, must devote itself to 
the end of encouraging goodness. Otherwise, a political association sinks into a mere 
alliance, which only differs in space from other forms of alliance where the members 
live at a distance from one anotheD). 
31 Aristotle, NE I, 1102a9-10. 
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Although Aristotle does not specify the kind of arete for which the state should 
have concern, it seems clear that the arete in question is ethical; it would be unlikely 
that lack of intellectual excellence would make a community an alliance rather than a 
true state. By contrast, lack of ethical excellence and justice might cause fellow-citizens 
to lack reciprocal well-wishing and trust, as though they did not belong to the same 
community (I will return to this passage in chapters V-VI of my thesis, where I will 
treat the issue of ethical excellence in relation to the concept of political friendship). 
Although this passage is not directly connected to the context of human happiness, still 
it seems to show the main concern of true political experts and, as we know from Book 
I of the Nicomachean Ethics, happiness is pursued by political expertise. 
Now, having suggested that the end of political expertise is mainly of an ethical 
kind, how shall we understand Aristotle's appeal to desirability with reference to the 
highest good? Or, in other words, how might the idea of the desirability of the highest 
good be reconciled with the object of a political expertise that supervises the exercise of 
the other activities? The aim of expert lawgivers is to educate people to wish for such a 
good as a component of human happiness; still, this might not be the only ingredient of 
individual happiness. I will now deal with happiness under the perspective of individual 
choice, and then take up the importance of political expertise as the source of the 
highest good for the community. 
At NE I, 1095a20 ff. Aristotle introduces various views held by people about the 
highest good sought by political expertise. Both ordinary people and people of quality 
identify the highest good with happiness, but there is a general disagreement on the 
nature of happiness. Ordinary people usually identify happiness with things like 
pleasure, wealth or honour, and pick out many other things depending on particular 
individuals and circumstances; for instance, when a man falls ill, he will seek after 
health, whereas a poor man will wish for wealth as a source of happiness. 
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By introducing such a variety of conceptions of happiness, he shows his awareness that 
people actually choose how to be happy. Their choice will depend on the quality of 
people. The most vulgar individuals suppose it to be pleasure, which is the reason why 
they favour the life of consumption32; but, besides that, two other outstanding kinds of 
life are mentioned: the political life and the life ofreflection33 . In this section of Book I, 
the idea of preference and choice seems to be more prominent. For instance, vulgar 
people 
«decide34 in favour of a life that belongs to grazing cattle» 35, 
whereas 
«those who tend towards a life of action, go for honour»36; 
Aristotle explains that the values pursued by such people are superficial in that 
they are not complete and self-sufficient. Honour, for instance, 
«seems to be located in those doing the honouring rather than in the person receiving it, 
and our hunch is that the good is something that belongs to a person and is difficult to 
take away from him» 37. 
32 See Aristotle, NE I, 1095b14-17. 
33 See Aristotle, NE I, 109 5b 17 -19. 
34 1tpoatpoUIlEVOt. 
35 Aristotle, NE I, 1095b19-20. 
36 Aristotle, NE I, 1095b22-3. 
37 Aristotle, NE I, 1095b24-6. 
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As he says in the following lines, excellence is of greater value than any unspecified 
honour38. It seems that, when at NE I, l095b23 Aristotle claims that honour is pretty 
much the end of political life, he is probably referring to a common belief or, in other 
words, to the reason why most people decide to engage in political activity, but not to 
his personal view of political life as a kind of life based on the exercise of E-thical 
excellence. 
What Aristotle is looking for, which is at the same time what political expertise 
should look for, is a good worth desiring, i.e. a good which is the cause of the goodness 
of the other things pursued by human beings; in that case, a good like wealth, for 
instance, will never be the highest good: the life of the money-maker is chosen under 
compulsion of need, and wealth is looked for, for the sake of something else39 . When 
Aristotle describes the highest good as the end of political expertise, he does not seem 
to regard it as an exclusive possession of political experts, given that he devotes wide 
attention also to what people generally wish for40; however, given that the highest good 
must be the same for each individual and for the polis as a whole, it seems that 
individual choice of the highest good will not be arbitrary, in that there might be 
individual conceptions of happiness which do not accord well with the well-being of 
the state. 
In that case, if we want to preserve the view that people might identify their 
personal happiness with the highest good, we must assume that the end of political 
expertise should at least be part of their good, if not the whole of it. It might be thought 
that, in Aristotle's view, the function of political expertise is simply to protect the 
individual in his personal pursuit of the good, whatever this good is; however, this does 
38 See Aristotle, NE I, 1095b30-2. 
39 See Aristotle, NE I, 1 096a5-7. 
40 Cf. G. Santas, 2001, pp. 224-5, who calls 'orectic' the good seen under the perspective of human 
desires. 
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not seem to be a fundamental concept in his argument on the highest good41 , given that 
he is not saying that such an expertise confines itself to providing the conditions for the 
individual realisation of the highest good~ rather, Aristotle claims that the highest good 
is the end itself of political expertise, and such a good is produced through the well-
functioning of the polis by means of the other skills involved in the political 
organisation. This requires that, as Hardie puts it, 
«the thinking required for a man's arrangement of his own life is of the same kind, 
although on a smaller scale, as the thinking of the statesman» 42. 
If we take Hardie's suggestion as plausible, as I do, to see what the main value 
for the political expert is will enable us to understand what the good for any individual 
is. As we have already seen in the passage at NE I, 1102a7-10, Aristotle claims that the 
task of the true political expert is to work at excellence so as make the citizens good 
and obedient to the laws, and, as I propose, such a kind of goodness is an 'ethical' one. 
Aristotle is not saying that some degree of ethical activity is required of citizens fC)r the 
well-functioning of the whole polis; rather, what he intends to show is that happiness is 
realised only when the citizens are made good individuals through the laws, presumably 
laws which prescribe a virtuous behaviour. If the happiness of the community is the 
same as the happiness of its members taken individually, exercise of ethical excellence 
turns out to be an indispensable aspect of human happiness. 
This conclusion, as I will try to show in the next section of this chapter, does not 
seem to be incompatible with the idea that theoretical activity allows the best and the 
most complete life; nor-as I think-does it conflict with the thought that there might be 
41 See S. Broadie, 1991, pp. 16-17. 
42 W.F.R. Hardie, 1980, p. 17. 
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different individual preferences as to what the highest good should be. That ethical 
activity is an indispensable ingredient of human happiness does not necessarily entail 
that it is its only ingredient. Some people, for example, might go for intellectual activity 
as intrinsicably preferable to ethical activity, provided that the pursuit of it is 
compatible with the ethical good of the polis or, at least, does not undermine it. As I am 
going to explain in the following section, my view is that-in Aristotle's thought-even 
when activity according to ethical excellence is not regarded by everyone as the highest 
good in all its completeness, ethical good should always be part of human eudailuonia, 
and it might even be desirable in itself, without this preventing intellectual activity from 
being pursued because of themselves. 
1.3: Two candidates/or Human Happiness: Theoretical and Ethical 
Excellence 
We have seen how Aristotle, after describing the highest good as the end of political 
expertise, shifts his attention to an idea of happiness which seems to be more connected 
to human wishes and choices. Under this perspective, the highest good might be viewed 
as the end in the light of which human choices can be explained and valued43 . 
43 See A. Kenny, 1992, p. 3: «To explain a choice, an agent will have to specify the good pursued. In 
doing so, he will show how is action is related, directly or indirectly, to an ultimate end. Asked to give a 
reason for an action, an agent may either explain that the action is a means to some end, or say that it is 
valued for its own sake». Cf. R. Kraut, 1989, p. 201: «To determine which goods are for the sake of 
which others, we must go beyond purely causal questions about which goods produce which others~ we 
must ask what the appropriate norms are for regulating our activities»~ and p. 208: «The only way to 
make decisions about the relative weights of various ends is to use that highest good as the target of all 
our actions. So it is not merely the best of all goods-it is also the standard by which we fix the value of all 
else». 
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So far, the Aristotelian notion of happiness has been examined in the light of three 
formal properties: (i) its being the ultimate end of all actions and pursuits; (ii) 
completeness and (iii) self sufficiency; now we need to see what ingredients are 
constitutive of the highest good. In this section of the chapter I will try to complete the 
Aristotelian account of the highest good by introducing his view of happiness as 
activity according to some kind of excellence. It seems that, in Aristotle's thought, two 
excellences might be chosen as desirable in themselves with a view to a happy life: the 
intellectual and the ethical, the latter including both the activity of common citizens and 
the political activity of true political experts, who need to make use of all the ethical 
excellences in their exercise of power. 
In order to argue for my thesis, I will start by showing that the completeness and 
self-sufficiency proper to the highest good are not a matter of including all the other 
goods, but, rather, of intrinsic desirability and, to some extent, of individual choice. In 
that case, he highest good would be something indeterminate in Aristotle's view. 
A passage which I believe is indicative of some indeterminacy is NE I, 1 097b 1-6, 
where Aristotle claims: 
«this [happiness] we do always choose because of itself and never because of 
something else, while as for honour, and pleasure, and intelligence, and every 
excellence, we do choose them because of themselves (since if nothing resulted from 
them, we would still choose each of them), but we also choose them for the sake of 
happiness, supposing that we shall be happy through them. But happiness no one 
chooses for the sake of these things, nor in general because of something else». 
As I read this passage, Aristotle here mentions honour, pleasure, intelligence and the 
other excellences only as possible examples of things with which people may identify 
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their own happiness, and not as fixed ingredients of it. The idea of a certain k:nd of 
indeterminacy might also be supported by NE I, 1095a20-6 and 1095b14-b23, where-
as we have already seen-Aristotle illustrates different kinds of life and of dominant 
values varying according to the quality of people. But (as I have already suggested, 
without developing this hypothesis), such beliefs he intends to dismantle, with a view to 
showing that the highest good-differently from what people of a certain quality might 
believe-is activity of reason according to some kind of excellence, even if we admit, as 
I do, that-in Aristotle's view-individuals of whatever kind aim at happiness44. 
When I claim that Aristotle's concept of happiness is to some extent 
indeterminate, the indeterminacy to which I refer is not concerned with the idea that 
people of different quality may have different conceptions of happiness. Rather, the 
indeterminacy I would like to stress has to do with the possibility of choosing between 
a life in which either ethical/political or theoretical activity plays a dominant role. I 
hope my point will emerge more clearly in the last part of this section, where I will try 
to reconcile the idea that the highest good is mainly ethical with the Aristotelian view 
that the best life is activity in accordance with practical reason. 
Let us now take up NE I, 1 097b 1-6, and examine a second difficulty. It is 
interesting that the goods pursued for the sake of the highest one do not seem to be 
mere means to its achievement, since they are chosen at the same time because of 
themselves. It might be wondered how some things are pursued both because of 
44 Whether eudaimonia is the end for whose sake all action is undertaken (which is called by 1. 
McDowell 'indicative thesis'~ see 1. McDowell, 1980, p. 1) or that for whose sake all action ought to be 
undertaken ('gerundive thesis') is a question still open to debate. See for instance A. Kenny, 1977, who 
supports the gerundive thesis, vs 1. McDowell. See 1. McDowell, 1980, p. 2: «Aristotle himself has a 
specific view about what kind of life constitutes eudaimonia. He certainly does not hold that everyone 
aims to lead that kind of life. But this yields no argument against attributing to him a thesis like (i) [i.e. 
the gerundive]». At p. 1, with reference to NE I, 1102a2-3 (where Aristotle says that «it is for the sake of 
happiness that we all do everything else we do»), he suggests that «there seems to be no prospect of 
taking this to express a gerundive thesis». 
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themselves and for the sake of a higher good. In my view, this is possible if and only if 
such goods are components of the highest good; in other words, the goods desired for 
the sake of the highest one would not be merely instrumental to it, but they would 
contribute to shaping it, in the same way as the activities pursued for the sake of 
political expertise are not instrumental to it but are included as parts of political life and 
determine its organisation. 
The absence of a list of specific goods belonging to human happiness has puzzled 
scholars, who have proposed different solutions to the problem; still, two main lines of 
thought might be identified: the inclusivist and the 'monolithic' or 'dominant'45. As 
Ackrill explains, those who embrace the first tendency assume that the Aristotelian 
highest good includes a compound of values and activities of different kind, as he 
himself does in thinking that eudaimonia necessarily includes every valuable activ ity46; 
on the face of it, those who support the idea of a dominant end suppose the highest 
good to consist of just one valuable activity or good: either intellectual47 or practical 
. . 48 
actIVIty . 
I believe that both views on human happiness are in a way incorrect. On the one 
hand, were we to follow the inclusivist view as Ackrill conceives it, we would probably 
do violence to the Aristotelian view of happiness. Nowhere in the Nicomachean Ethics 
45 The tenninology which distinguishes 'inclusive end' from 'dominant end' was introduced by W.F.R. 
Hardie, 1965, p. 291. 
46 See J.L. Ackrill, 1980, p. 22; cf. D. Devereux, 1981: T.H. Irwin, 1985 and 1986; M. Nussbaum, 1982; 
A. W. Price, 1980. 
47 Among the representatives of the 'intellectualist' view see A.W.H. Adkins, 1978; J.M. Coope., 1975 
(but he will support a fonn of inclusivism compatible with the idea of a dominant end in J.M. Cooper, 
1987); W.F.R. Hardie, 1965 (but he will slightly revise his theory in W.F.R. Hardie, 1979, p. 42, where 
he points out that to acknowledge the 'dominance' of a single end is not incompatible with an inclusive 
view); R. Heinaman, 1988; A. Kenny, 1977 (cf. A. Kenny, 1992, where he attempts to argue that in the 
Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle proposes a dominant view of happiness, whereas in the Eudemian Ethics 
an inclusive view); D. Keyt, 1978; R. Kraut, 1989; G.R. Lear, 2004; T. NageL 1972. 
48 See J.O. Unnson, 1989. 
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does Aristotle seem to list the valuable goods included within happiness49 ; moreover, 
happiness would be achieved only in the case that all the goods it supposedly includes 
are pursued over an entire life. 
A lucid refutation of Ackrill' s arguments is provided by Kraut, who, in his work 
Aristotle on the Human Good criticizes his belief that 
«happiness should not be identified with any single good such as ethical activity, or 
contemplation, or honor, or pleasure. For any such good is just one among many, and 
no matter how desirable it may be, it is always less desirable than the combination of 
that good and some othen> 50. 
As Kraut points out, those commentators who, like Ackrill, support an inclusivist view, 
try to justify their position by appeal to the attributes of completeness and self-
sufficiency attached to the highest good in NE I, 1097bI4-20, where happiness is 
described as choiceworthy and in need of nothing51 . But if we assumed that happiness 
is something desirable in itself and lacking in nothing, even the lack of one good T\¥ould 
make its achievement impossible for any individual. Even more, we would not be able 
to explain the reason why Aristotle resorts to the notion of a human ergon in order to 
explain what the human good is, and his praise of the superiority of contemplative life 
with reference to the concept of eudaimonia in Book X would tum out to be pointless. 
The 'dominant' view, on the other hand, precludes the possibility of taking more 
than a single good or activity as desirable in itself. For instance, were happiness 
49 See S. White, 1990, quoted by A. Kenny, 1992, p. 28. 
50 R. Kraut, 1989, p. 267. 
51 See R. Kraut, 1989, p. 267. See also A. Kenny, 1992, p. 24. According to the majority of supporters of 
the 'dominant' view, the notions of completeness and self-sufficiency contribute to show the inherent 
perfection of intellectual activity. 
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determined by a single, prominent ingredient like contemplation, we should exclude 
ethical activity as an essential component of happiness. Again, according to the 
dominant view, the so-called 'external' goods (e.g. health, wealth or good luck), which 
might be taken as ingredients of a happy life (although not in the same way as virtuous 
activity)52, would surely be ruled out from the notion of eudaimonia. 
As I believe, the so-called 'function argument', (which has been the subject of 
broad disagreement among commentators53) turns out to be crucial in our attempt to 
find out what the highest good really is. At NE I, 1097b25-8 Aristotle expresses his 
intention to investigate happiness as a human good; in his view, the definition of 
happiness will come about only once the function of human beings has been 
established. By 'function' (ergon) he seems to mean a typifying activity, based on some 
kind of expertise or excellence, which expresses the nature of particular individuals or 
things; he mentions as examples of specific functions those of the flute-player, the 
52 The role played by external goods in the pursuit of a happy life in Aristotle's thought is not clear, and 
still open to dispute. Supporters of the inclusivist view hold them to be components of a happy life (see 
for instance J.L. Ackrill, 1980; J.M. Cooper, 1987; T.H. Irwin, 1985; and M. Nussbaum, 1986. 
Conversely, those commentators who subscribe to a 'dominant' view of happiness take external goods as 
conditions of, rather than ingredients of happiness. A different position is held by 1. Annas in Sherman 
(ed.), 1999. Annas maintains that Aristotle fails to reconcile the role played by external goods in the 
pursuit of happiness with his own theory of eudaimonia, whose core is represented by virtuous activity. 
My personal view is that, in Aristotle's theory, external goods are necessary conditions of, but not the 
core of happiness. See for instance Aristotle, EE I, 1214bI4-17, where it is claimed that, just as being 
healthy is not the same as the things without which it is not possible to be healthy, so living well is not 
the same as the things without which living well is impossible. 
53 A list of commentators who tried to analyse this argument is provided by G. Santas, 2001, at p. 236. 
Santas mentions J.L. Austin, 1967, and 1.M. Cooper, 1975, who believe that Aristotle engages in an 
unnecessary and too abstract argument, whereas T.H. Irwin, 1985, and W.F.R. Hardie, 1980, are 
presented as supporters of the view that the function-argument is devised by Aristotle just to express 'his 
own view' of happiness; finally, G. Anagnostopoulos, 1980, and D. Keyt, 1983, maintain tnat the 
function argument is a central piece in Book 1. The same position, to which I subscribe, is maintained by 
Santas, 2001, and R. Kraut, 1989. 
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sculptor and any expert, but also the function of each part of the body54. In the same 
\vay, he is looking for the specific function that belongs to human beings qua human 
beings: as he says at NE I, 1 097b25-33: 
<~ust as for a flute-player, or a sculptor, or any expert, and generally for all those who 
have some characteristic function or activity, the good-their doing well-seems to reside 
in their function55 , so too it would seem to be for the human being, if indeed th~re is 
some function that belongs to him. So does a carpenter or a shoemaker have certain 
functions and activities, while a human being has none, and is by nature a do-nothing? 
Or just as an eye, a hand, a foor, and generally each and every part of the body appears 
as having some function, in the same way would one posit a characteristic function for 
a human being too, alongside all of these?». 
The human function will not consist either in taking in nutriment and growing, 
which is typical of plants, or in a kind of life of perception, which is proper to 
animals 56. The sort of life that remains as characteristic of human beings is the life of 
what possesses reason; of this, as he says, one element 'possesses reason' insofar as it 
obeys reason, whereas the other actually has it57. 
The Aristotelian argument so presented raises some essential problems: how can 
men have functions? Are they designed for a purpose? And, even if they did, how 
would this coincide with what is good for them58? A Reasonable answer to the first two 
questions is provided by Santas, who maintains that the idea of a human function is 
54 See Aristotle, NE I, 1097b25-6; 1097b30-1. 
55 tv 1:cP £prO) OoKEt 1:aya80v Elvat Kat 'to E\). 
56 See Aristotle, NE I, 1097b33-1098a3. Cf. De An. I, ch. 1; De An. II, ch. 4; De An. III, ch. 9. 
57 See Aristotle, NE I, 1098a3-5. 
58 See J. Whiting, 1988, p. 33. 
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indebted to Aristotle's biological and psychological investigations. On Santas' view, 
the human function is not to be understood in terms of roles and occupations but, rather, 
in terms of characteristics, capacities or potentialities of an object; for example, the 
notion of function is applied in Aristotle's biology to organs of animals without ever 
making any appeals to a designer of animals or their parts59 . 
I also suggest that the notion of' ergon', expressing some kind of functionality, is 
connected to Aristotle's concern for human activity, and not for excellence as a mere 
possession. As he points out at NE I, 1 095b31-1 096a2, when he speaks of the different 
kinds of life chosen by different people, 
«excellence [too] appears somewhat incomplete: for it seems to be possible actually to 
be asleep while having one's excellence, or to spend one's life in inactivity, and 
furthermore to suffer, and to meet with the greatest misfortunes; and no one would call 
the person who lived this kind of life happy, unless to defend a debating position». 
Given all this, it seems that Aristotle is moving here from the notion of 'human 
ergon' to that of 'human good'; what he is going to show in the remainder of his 
argument (which will enable us to answer the third question formulated above) j~ that 
the human good will be achieved only when the distinctive function of human beings is 
practised well. As I believe, the idea of a human ergon is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient condition for the understanding of what the human good is60. As Aristotle 
points out at NE I, l098a7-8, the function ofa human being is 
59 See G. Santas, 2001, pp. 241. 
60 For a similar view see A. Gomez-Lobo, 1989~ at p. 171 of his article he criticizes Wilkes' view that the 
ergon of a man has itself the criterion for determining the value of actions and/or persons (cf. K.V. 
Wilkes, 1980, p. 343). Conversely, at p. 176 Gomez-Lobo maintains that «in order to identify a good F 
(or the goodness for Fs) two logically distinguishable steps must be taken: first, the ergon of Fs has to be 
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«activity of soul in accordance with reason, or not apart from reason» 61, 
and only at NE I, l098a16-18, where it is claimed that: 
«'to uv9ponttvov uyu90v 'VUXTlC; EVEPYEtu ytVE'tU1 KU't' apE'tr,v, E1 OE 
. 
l.e. 
«the human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with excellence (and if 
there are more excellences than one, in accordance with the best and the most 
complete)>> . 
It seems that, when Aristotle claims that the human function is activity according 
to excellence, he is not confining himself to investigating a feature that makes mankind 
different from the rest of living creatures; rather, he seems to be looking for the highest 
degree of excellence achievable by men just by virtue of their human nature, while 
being conscious that many individuals are engaged in inferior kinds of occupation. 
However, such a definition does not provide any further details as to what kind of 
excellence should be pursued in order to live a happy life, nor does it explain what 
Aristotle means by 'completeness' when he says that happiest will be the life according 
to the most complete excellence. 
ascertained in a non-evaluative manner, and then, an evaluative judgement as to what counts as a good 
perfonnance of that ergon has to be passed. TIlls latter judgement is equivalent to finding the arete or 
aretai corresponding specifically to the class of Fs. The ergon and the good are not strictly identical». 
61 EvEpyEtcx. Kcx.'teX. 'J...OyOV f] Jl" aVEt> 'J...6yot>. 
34 
Two kinds of excellence-in Aristotle's view-might be regarded as mostly desirable in 
themselves and self-sufficient: the intellectual and the ethical; both kinds of excellence 
seem to accord with the human function. As he explains at NE I, 1103a3-7, these kinds 
stem from the two rational aspects of different kinds that are proper to human soul: a 
part which participates in reason and another which possesses reason fully. 
As for theoretical excellence, that it might be identified with human happiness is 
explicitly said at NE X, 1177a12-17, where it is also described as an excellence of the 
highest kind: 
«But if happiness is activity in accordance with excellence, it is reasonable that it 
should be activity in accordance with the highest kind62 and this will be the excellence 
of what is best. Whether, then, this is intelligence or something else, this element that is 
thought naturally to rule and guide, and to possess awareness of fine things and divine 
ones, -whether being, itself too, something divine, or the divinest of the things in us, it 
is the activity of this, in accordance with its own proper excellence, that will be 
complete happiness». 
It is interesting that, when he introduces theoretical excellence, he explicitly refers to 
what was said earlier (npoElprU1Eva t 3, as though he meant to establish some 
continuity between Book I and X of the Nicomachean Ethics; that this is his real 
intention is confirmed by the following lines, where-once again-he says that haplJiness 
is not a disposition but a kind of activity, and that it is desirable in itself and self-
sufficient. As Aristotle explains at NE X, 1177a17-22, theoretical activity is the 
62 Kcx:td 'tllV KpaitO"'tllV. 
63 Aristotle, NE X, 1176a32-3. 
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highest64 because intelligence too is the highest of human things, and its objects are the 
highest knowables~ moreover, it is taken as the most continuous65, probably because, 
more than practical activities, it involves a minimal physical effort66 . 
It might be concluded, then, that Aristotle believes the most complete happiness 
to be activity accordance with intellectual, and not with ethical activity, which in Book 
X is regarded to bring about the 'second happiest' life67. As he explains, just things and 
all the other kinds of things we do according to various ethical excellences appear to be 
human, and many of them require the body rather than the highest part of the soul; 
moreover, ethical excellence seems to be bound up with the affective states rather than 
with the nous68 . Again, theoretical excellence seems to be more self-sufficient than 
ethical activity, since the latter involves decisions or doings, as is required by a fully 
human life69, whereas the former might be practised in isolation and does not need the 
cooperation of other human beings. 
Shall we conclude, then, that Aristotle takes intellectual activity as the only, 
dominant end in human life? According to my reading, that intellectual excellence is 
taken as the best and the most complete, and the one capable of guaranteeing the best 
life, does not allow us to claim that he does. After all, at the beginning of his account of 
eudaimonia he presents his inquiry on the highest good as 'political,70, and, as we have 
seen, the highest good is the object of political expertise, the aim of those who possess 
such an art being to make the citizens ethically good and obedient to the laws. Again, 
64 1(p<:X. 'tlcr't1l. 
65 crUVEXE'tO.'t1l. 
66 Cf. Broadie's commentary of the passage, p. 442. 
67 See Aristotle, NE X, 1178a9: ~EU'tEp(l)C; 0' b KCX'teX. 'tt,v a'A'A1lv apE't1lv. 
68 See Aristotle, NE X, 1178al 0-16. 
69 See Aristotle, NE X, 1178a34-b7. 
70 See Aristotle, NE I, 1 094b 1 0-1. 
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there seem to be some ingredients of happiness, e.g. friendship 71, which are strictly 
related to ethical goodness and do not have to do with contemplation. 
To the alleged superiority of intellectual to ethical activity one might object that, 
when Aristotle asserts the superiority of theoretical activity to the ethical/practical in 
relation to a happy life, he seems to be stressing more the divine character of theoretical 
activity than the human character of the highest good72 . To this hypothetical objection it 
might be replied the nature of man is to make himself similar to the gods as far as 
possible, just in virtue of his capacity to engage in contemplative activity. 
Moreover, although in Book X theoretical activity is claimed to be more self-
sufficient than the practical, since the person engaged in reflection does not need the 
things necessary to carry an action through, it seems that even in practical activity a 
degree of self-sufficiency will be provided; political expertise, which sets out which of 
the other expertises are needed in the polis, might make life of each member of the 
community self-sufficient through a fair distribution of functions according to each 
individual's competence, and to this self-sufficiency also activity of citizens according 
to justice will contribute. In other words, although individuals by themselves are not 
self-sufficient, still their belonging to the political community will provide them with 
the necessary sources for their pursuit of ethical excellence. 
In that case, ethical excellence, just like the intellectual, might be constitutive of 
human happiness, although in a different way from the theoretical. As for political 
activity, which I take as a form of 'activity according to ethical excellence', that it is the 
activity to which the highest good belongs shows that it has to do with the most 
complete among practical goods; moreover, that at NE I, 1 094a26-7 it is defined as the 
71 See NE VITI, 1155a5-6, where Aristotle says that nobody would choose to live without friends. 
72 See Aristotle, NE X 1177b30-1. 
37 
most sovereign expertise, i.e. the most 'architectonic' 73, might lead us to think that it 
falls under the notion of 'most complete activity' introduced in the definition of human 
happiness. That political activity is more complete than other activities is confirmed at 
NE I, 1 094b8-1 0, where Aristotle says that to achieve the good for a whole city is 'finer 
and more godlike' than doing it for one's own good. 
Likewise, even without being political experts, common people might practise an 
ethically virtuous life and live according to the most complete: i.e. justice. That justice 
is regarded by Aristotle as a more complete excellence than others is confirmed at Book 
V of the Nicomachean Ethics, where he suggests that it is 
«complete excellence, only not without qualification but in relation to another 
person» 74. 
As he goes on to say at NE V, 1129b30-3, justice is regarded as the mightiest of 
excellences: 
«it is complete excellence to the highest degree because it is the activation 75 of 
complete excellence; complete, too, because the person who possesses it has the 
capacity to put his excellence to use in relation to another person as well, and not just 
by himself». 
As we see, Aristotle describes justice as a disposition capable of 'activating' the 
rest of the ethical excellences, as he confirms at NE V, 1129b29-30 when he quotes the 
73 lC'UpW:>'tcX:tl1 lCat JlaAt<Yta Cx.pXt't€.lC'tOVtlC1l. 
74 See Aristotle, NE V, 1129b25-7. 
75 XP1lcrt c;. 
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saying 'justice gathers in excellence entire'. In this respect, activity according to justice 
will be more complete than activity according to just a few of the ethical excellence it 
includes; when at NE I, 1 098a 16-17 Aristotle says that happiness is activity of soul 
according to excellence, we might suppose him, then, to be referring to some individual 
excellence like courage, generosity etc.; but then, when immediately he adds that 'if 
there are more excellences than one, in accordance with the best and the most 
complete', it might be justice that he has in mind, insofar as it includes all the ethical 
excellences and not just few of them. 
If so, what is happiness? Should it be identified with a life whose dominant 
character is the intellectual, or with a life devoted to ethical/political activity? Or, 
finally, does it consist of a life in which both kinds of excellence are practised as 
intrinsic goods? I believe that the solution to this problem lies in the indeterminate 
character attached by Aristotle to the notion of happiness: happiness seems to be a good 
which involves human choice. That in Book I neither the contemplative n0r the 
practical excellence are explicitly introduced as 'the most complete excellence' -besides 
being due to the provisional character of the account of the highest good provided at the 
beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics-might entail that a margin of freedom is given to 
us as to which life is desirable to lead because of itself. 
Confirmation of the indeterminate character of happiness may be found in Book 
VII of the Polities, where Aristotle engages in an investigation of the best state, i.e. the 
state that should promote the happiest life. At Pol. VII, 1324a23-5 he says: 
«There is one thing clear about the best constitution: it must be a political organization 
which will enable all sorts of men to be at their best and live happily»; 
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but, as he goes on to say at Pol. VII, 1324a25-9, there seems to be disagreement as to 
what kind of life is the most desirable: 
«But if that is clear, there is another point on which opinions diverge. Even those who 
agree in holding that the good life is most desirable are divided upon the issue, 'Which 
way of life is the more desirable? The way of politics and action 76? Or the way of 
detachment from all external things-the way, let us say, of contemplation77, which some 
regard as the only way that is worthy of a philosopher?'». 
Even here Aristotle restricts himself to explaining that the most desirable life is, 
according to some people, a life devoted to the political affairs, while according to other 
people it is a life devoted to theoretical activity and detached from political 
commitments, without claiming the superiority of one of the two kinds of life over the 
other78 . 
It may be interesting to notice that in Book VII of the Politics Aristotle draws a 
sharp distinction between kinds of life, which might suggest that people devoted to 
contemplative activity will not have any concern for ethical excellence and vice versa; 
however, it seems to me that, in his view, the two kinds of life are not mutually 
exclusive. Activity according to ethical excellence, for instance, is described as an 
indispensable component and a condition of a good life in the community; without it, 
76 b 1roAl'tlKOC; KUl1CPUK'tlKOC; J3'1OC;. 
77 010V 8EO)Pll'tlKOC; 'tlC;. 
78 As he will try to explain at Pol. VII, 1325a16-b32, some people think that the life of the free man is 
more desirable than the life of politics, whereas other people believe that those who do not take part in 
political life are not performing any activity. As Aristotle points out, the first are wrong in supposing that 
the life of people involved in political activity is not an activity of 'free-man'~ on the other hand, those 
who believe that people detached from political life are inactive are wrong, insofar as active life is not 
necessarily lived in relation to other individuals. Still, not even here does Aristotle express his judgement 
on the possible superiority of an activity over the other. 
40 
the capacity of the polis to provide stability and a good life will be compromised. As 
Aristotle says at Pol. VII, 1323b21-3: 
, 
Kat , ,... I \ Kat 'tOl) npa't'tEtv Ka'ta )I Ea'tco 
1.e. 
«We may [ ... ] join in agreeing that the amount of felicity which falls to the lot of each 
individual man is equal to the amount of his goodness and his wisdom, and of the good 
and wise acts that he does». 
However, some people might take a life of contemplation as preferable to a life 
based on the exercise of justice or of political excellence, and in this respect they might 
do everything for the sake of it. They might simply perform their work in the polis well 
so as to have the necessary resources for a good life and devote themselves to the 
activity of reflection; again, they might behave justly with a view to avoiding conflict 
with other people and having the harmony required by their favourite activity 
compromised. 
Therefore, even when in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle speaks of a person 
engaged in theoretical activity and not committed to an ethical life as the most valuable 
kind of life, he does not seem to be thinking of an individual isolated from the world 
outside; theoretical excellence must be practised within a political context. In other 
words, contemplative activity does not exclude the application of ethical values in one's 
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life, just insofar as a person pursuing such an activity is a member of a political 
community, even when ethical activity is only a restricted part of one's happiness, or 
something which is not desirable in itself; after all-if my reading of the Aristotelian 
concept of eudaimonia is plausible-even when an activity is pursued for the sake of 
another such an activity will not be without any value at all, but, rather, it will be a 
good included in human happiness. On the face of it, some people might go for a life in 
which ethical excellence is the cause of their doing all the rest; they might express their 
human nature through a kind of non-theoretical excellence and lead a happy life in this 
way. 
Given all this, human happiness seems to be a matter of choice, although only to 
some extent, since some goods like ethical excellences should always be pursued by a 
good man, even when he does not wish for them just because of themselves. We have 
seen that, apparently, in Book vn of the Politics Aristotle is drawing a stark distinction 
between a life grounded in ethical/political excellence and a life grounded in theoretical 
activity, as though the two kinds of life were mutually exclusive. However, it seems 
that to wish for a kind of excellence because of itself does not necessarily mean going 
for and maximizing it for an entire life. 
In other words, within the Aristotelian account of eudaimonia, it seems plausible 
to admit an alternation between different patterns of life, provided that they are activity 
according to excellence. In that case, choosing how to be happy will not entail that 
one's happiness is exclusively contemplative or practical activity; for instance, a person 
might be devoted to political activity and then decide to give up in order to engage in 
contemplation. Contemplative activity, just like political activity, is a kind of life, not a 
life, so that a kind of activity like the theoretical might contribute to making a human 
life happy only when it is chosen as a constituent of happiness without the exclusion of 
ethical activity. 
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But a question is still left unsolved: what does Aristotle mean when he suggests tnat, if 
there is an excellence which is better and more complete than others, this will be the 
excellence according to which one ought act with a view to one's own happiness? I 
would suggest that-in his view-the 'best and the most complete' activity is the 
intellectual. This seems to be confirmed in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics (see NE 
X, 1177a12-22), where he explains that, if eudaimonia is activity in accordance with 
excellence, it should be activity in accordance with the highest kind, i.e. the theoretical. 
Again, his claim at NE X, 1178a9 that 'second happiest' is the life according to 
ethical excellence reveals that such a life is less complete than a life devoted to 
contemplative activity, if we assume, as I do, that in Aristotle's thought theoretical 
activity does not exclude or, we might even suppose, in a stronger way, involves 
activity ln accordance with ethical excellence. Nothing in Aristotle's account of 
happiness precludes a person devoted to contemplative activity (i.e. philosopher) to be 
a good man; even more, contemplative activity might prompt a wider awareness of the 
need to act justly; the importance of activity according to ethical excellence in human 
life, for instance, might be understood more fully only after having grasped the essence 
of human nature and contemplated the position that human beings occupy in the 
cosmos
79
. 
However, notwithstanding the allegedly superiority of intellectual excellence 
over the ethical, it should be reminded that, in order to find out the human good, 
Aristotle ultimately resorts to the function-argument, which, per se, does not suggest 
that happiness is confined to activity according to intellectual excellence80 . This would 
entail that both ethical and intellectual excellence might be regarded as ingredients of 
79 See J. Lear, 1988, p. 8: «The project of understanding the world lies at the bottom of who we are». 
80 See TD. Roche, 1988, p. 183, and A. Kenny, 1992, p. 29. 
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cildaimonia, although only intellectual activity will ensure the best and most complete 
happiness. 
This assumption seems to accord well with the idea that the highest good is the 
object of political expertise, and that such a good is mainly ethical. The idea that we 
can choose which excellence is desirable towards happiness does not entail that an 
entire life is to be lived in accordance with an exclusive pattern; in fact, nowhere does 
Aristotle state that one kind of life should be assumed as precluding another one. To act 
according to arete in a complete life, then, does not necessarily amount to acting 
exclusively according to a single, most complete excellence. As it seems, in Aristotle's 
view the nature of happiness as the highest good is not supposed to be something 
already settled. 
1.4: Conclusions 
The notion of happiness seems to playa substantial role in Aristotle's ethical theory; it 
is introduced at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics as the highest achievable 
good, and it is taken up in the last book after the treatment of ethical excellence, 
friendship, intellectual activity and pleasure. In this way, eudaimonia turns out to be the 
philosophical context in relation to which which the rest of ethical issues might be 
understood. Happiness is the goal of human activity and, all the same, what gives sense 
to it. 
As we have seen in the Nicomachean Ethics the highest good is handled , 
according to two different perspectives: on the one hand, as the end of the most 
'architectonic' expertise, i.e. the political one; on the other hand, as something which 
individuals wish for according to their personal preferences. In this way, Aristotle 
shows that the political community is involved in some way in the actualisation of the 
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happiness of its citizens, although it cannot impose on each of them a pre-established 
conception of what a happy life is. As a matter of fact, different individuals will have 
different values and thoughts as to how to be happy, and it seems quite implausible to 
suppose that expert lawgivers will be the only ones responsible for the eudaimonia of 
their fellow-citizens. 
In this chapter I have tried to argue how, in Aristotle's view, political expertise 
and individual purposes might converge towards a shared aim, i.e. a life of excellence 
in a well-governed state. I have attempted to demonstrate that happiness, in order to be 
the real human good, must be actualised only under the conditions provided by political 
expertise. Individual happiness will coincide with the good of the polis when it is not at 
odds with political activity for the good. The task of expert lawgivers will be to 
orientate the citizens to kinds of activities consonant with excellence, mostly of an 
ethical kind; after all, behaviour according to justice will create a condition of order and 
stability in the polis, so that people will be required to act with respect to their fellows. 
The role of political expertise in the actualisation of individual happiness will be 
not only to direct and organise the single expertises involved in the running of the 
community, but also to foster a behaviour that contributes both to individual happiness 
and the happiness of the whole of the community. In order to make sure that the 
happiness of a single person coincides with the happiness of the polis, lawgivers will 
promote activity according to excellence as the ground of human happiness. A Efe of 
consumption or a life of injustice does not deserve to be called 'a happy life', just 
insofar as it would be a life incapable of contributing to the happiness of the whole of 
the community. 
However, although happiness is not an arbitrary good and ethical excellence is 
the condition for a happy life in the polis, men are allowed to choose how to be happy. I 
have stressed the indeterminate character of the highest good as it is presented in Book 
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I of the Nicomachean Ethics, and I hope to have shown that such an indeterminacy, 
besides its being mainly due to the provisional character of the account of happiness in 
Book I, might also reveal Aristotle's intention to show that the good life is chosen by 
individuals-although only to some extent-according to their beliefs and wishes. 
It seems that two human excellences seem to fall under the concept of a 
'complete' arete, either taken exclusively or alternating with each other over an entire 
life: the ethical and the intellectual. I suggested that the former is best exemplified by 
justice in the polis, which in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics is alleged to be the 
most complete and authoritative excellence, or by political expertise, which aims at 
promoting the good of the polis. In a different way, in Book X of the Nicomachean 
Ethics, Aristotle identifies the theoretical life as the best and most self-sufficient life, 
which might lead us to think that, when in Book I he defines happiness as activity of 
soul according to excellence, the excellence to which he is referring is the theoretical. 
In some cases, an ethical life will not be the most desirable kind of life, and a 
theoretical life might be preferable; still, the political dimension of men is one which 
Aristotle is keen on stressing despite individual preferences: a life entirely devoted to 
contemplation might not be desired by everyone, nor would it ensure by itself the well-
functioning of a political community. Ethical excellence turns out to be the ground of 
human activity in the community, and also the indispensable condition for the 
actualisation of individual happiness, happiness being the human good. 
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Chapter II 
Relationships between Arete and Phronesis. How do They 
Come into Being? 
2.1: Introduction 
As we have already seen, in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle defines 
happiness as anthropinon agathon, and as activity of soul according to excellence; still, 
this definition does not provide any indication as to what kind of human excellence 
contributes to a happy life. Only at the end of the book will he draw a preliminary 
distinction between intellectual excellences, i. e. excellences of the part of human soul 
possessing reason in itself, and excellences of character, stemming from the non-
rational part which nevertheless participates in reason1;phronesis (commonly translated 
as 'wisdom' or 'prudence') is included in the former group of excellences, ethikai 
aretai in the latte~. 
1 See Aristotle, NE I, 1103a4-7. 
2 Such a distinction appears also in EE II, 1220a5-13, where Aristotle claims that excellence is of two 
fonns: ethical and intellectual. Differently from the Topics and the Magna Moralia, where the word 
'arete' is used exclusively with reference to 'ethical excellence', in both Ethics the meaning of 'arete' is 
extended also to episteme, nous and sophia (cf. C. Natali, 1984, pp. 58-9). However, as Rowe suggests 
(see C.l Rowe, 1971a, pp. 63-72 and C.lRowe, 1971b, pp. 73-92), the distinction between ethical and 
intellectual excellences is not always maintained in the Eudemian Ethics; rather, when he mentions 
phronesis, Aristotle does not seem to envisage any substantial difference between theoretical and 
practical thinking, which might be the reason why he makes use of the word 'phronesis' to indicate both. 
Rowe's position is criticized by C. Natali, 1984, p. 70, footnote 32. Natali argues that an evidence against 
Rowe's view is given at section I of EE VIII, where Aristotle attempts to demonstrate thatphronesis is 
not episteme. I believe that, although in this section of the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle makes it clear that 
phronesis is not episteme, Rowe is right to stress the absence of a marked distinction between ethical and 
intellectual excellences when he mentions phronesis (the same absence might be identified in Aristotle's 
early works, e.g. the Protrepticus). 
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At NE VI, 1144al-2 phronesis is described as an activity desirable in itself, and 
involved, just like sophia, in the actualisation of happiness, which fits well with the 
definition of eudaimonia provided in Book I; but-unlike sophia-whose objects do not 
make a human being happy3, phronesis has to do with things which 'produce' human 
happiness. The issue of phronesis is explored in the Nicomachean Ethics within the 
context of practical thought, i.e. the kind of reasoning which causes people to make 
decisions and act accordingly; the way in which people behave and live is a matter of 
strong concern for Aristotle, not only in terms of individual conduct, but also in relation 
to a political context. 
That in Book VI wisdom is taken as the same disposition as political expertise 4 is 
the proof that their object is the same: the highest good, i.e. the end of political 
expertise, will also be the end of individual wisdom. Since, as the already mentioned 
passage at NE I, 1102a7-10 shows, the aim of expert lawgivers is to make the citizens 
virtuous and the excellence with which they are mostly concerned is of ethical kind, it 
seems that phronesis, just like political expertise, will pursue ethical excellence. 
The aim of this chapter is to make sense of the way in which phronesis intervenes 
in the development of ethical excellence of individuals, and also to shed some light on 
the spe'cific contributions provided by ethical excellences and phronesis in the 
actualisation of human happiness. Although excellences of character and wisdom are 
regarded as different kinds of excellence, they are both necessary to the deliberative 
process forwarding the action; as Aristotle says at NE VI, 1145a4-6: 
3 See Aristotle, NE VI, 1143bI9-20. 
4 See NE VI, 1141b23-4, where Aristotle points out that their being is not the same. At NE VI, 1141b29-
31 he explains that wisdom relates most of all to oneself as an individual, whereas at 1141 b31-33 he 
mentions different kinds of wisdom, like household management, legislation and political expertise, 
which relates to the whole community. 
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i.e., as Rowe translates, 
«a decision will not be correct either in the absence of wisdom or in the absence of , 
excellence; for the one causes us to act in relation to the end the other in relation to , 
what forwards the end». 
Even when both ethical excellences and phronesis are considered per se, (i.e. not in the 
light of the decisional process) they tum out to be mutually dependent: 
«obX ol6v 1:E uya96v Etval KUptCOC; aVEU <\>POVr,crEcoC;, obOe <pp6V1J.LOV aVE'\) 
1.e. 
«it is not possible to possess excellence in the primary sense without wisdom, nor to be 
wise without excellence of character» 5, 
which means that possession of the ethical excellences will be indispensable for wise 
behaviour and vice versa. 
In the present context I will attempt to answer the following questions: why 
cannot arete exist without phronesis? And why does phronesis need arete? As a 
5 Aristotle, NE VI, 1144b31-2. 
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starting point, I propose to investigate the concept of ethical arete by asking myself 
how a person may become virtuous if he or she is not yet wise. I will try to show that 
virtue in an individual initially springs from external causes, e.g. from an agent who is 
already in possession of excellence; the external agent may be represented either by an 
individual or a community, whose task would consist in providing every citizen with a 
minimum degree of excellence. Phronesis of a virtuous, external agent might lead 
people who are not yet virtuous by appeal to their sense of shame or of fear. In this 
way, as I believe, affections and impulses of such people, which belong to the non-
rational part of soul sharing in reason, might be 'educated' to listen to a wise reason, 
and, as a consequence, such individuals might develop a rationality of their own. 
Then, I propose to make sense of II, NE 1 I06b36-1I07a2, where arete IS 
described as 
cP <Xv b <t>pOVtI-lOC; bPtO"EtEV», 
1.e. 
«a disposition issuing in decisions, depending on intermediacy of the kind relative to 
us, this being determined by rational prescription and in the way in which the wise 
person would determine if». 
I will concentrate on the concept of logos, which occurs both in the above quoted 
description of ethike arete and also at the beginning of Book VI, where Aristotle, taking 
up what has said in Book II about ethical excellence, specifies that 'to I-lE<JOV, i.e. what 
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is intermediate, is me; b Aoyoe; b apaoe; AEYEt, i. e. 'as the correct prescription 
prescribes' 6 . My thesis is that ethical excellences and wisdom, although belonging to 
different parts of human soul, share the same orthos logos, which turns out to be the 
trait d 'union between them. As I claim, that is what brings about the two kinds of 
excellence at the same time, and that is also why ethical excellences are not conceivable 
without phronesis and vice versa. 
2.2: Excellence o/ClJaracter: a Mindless Disposition? 
I shall now discuss the paradox of ethical arete conceived as an excellence come about 
from a non-rational process like habituation, but still provided with some sort of 
rationality: an excellence which, as we will see, together with wisdom will be the core 
of the practical thought underlying good decisions and actions. Only after such a 
discussion will I try to argue that the kind of rationality in which ethical activity is 
rooted is 'phronetic', or, in other words, that a fully developed ethical excellence 
contains the rationality needed to engage in deliberational activity: the same rationality 
proper to phronesis. 
As Aristotle explains at NE I, 1102a28, in the human soul two different aspects 
might be found: one non-rationae and another possessing reason8. Of the non-rational 
aspect of the human soul, one grade has to do with growth and nutrition, and does not 
share in reason in any way; it seems to belong not only to human beings, but also to 
plants and animals9, given that they all possess the capacity for taking in food and the 
6 See Aristotle, NE VI, 1138b19-20. 
7 'to a'Aoyov. 
8 'to ')J)yOV EXOV. 
9 See Aristotle, NE I, 1102a32-b3. 
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natural function of increasing in size. But this is not the kind of function Aristotle is 
looking for as peculiar to human beings, especially because it seems to be most active 
when things are asleeplO, which surely does not match the idea that human happiness is 
activity of soul according to excellence. By contrast, the distinctively human grade in 
the non-rational aspect of soul participates in a way in reason ll ; it has to do with human 
appetites and is called by Aristotle 'epithumetikon' 12. In the human soul, opposite 
impulses often fight each other; nevertheless, they can be made obedient and capable of 
listening to rational prescriptions; in that case, whoever possesses ethical excellence 
will be able to find an ideal balance in actions and passions; presumably, this requires 
some sort of rationality according to which excellence of character might inspire good 
actions. 
That at NE I, 11 02b 14 Aristotle mentions both the 'enkrateis' and the 'akrateis' 
(i.e. those equipped with and deprived of self-control) with reference to the aspect of 
the non-rational part of soul sharing in reason is indicative of the power of reason to 
direct and encourage individuals towards what is best, but also of the presence of 
impulses in the human soul which might move in opposite direction and fight against 
reason, in this way preventing people from acting well. 
As Aristotle claims at NE I, 1103a3-5, to the distinction between a rational part 
and a non-rational part sharing in reason seems to correspond a second distinction: that 
between ethical and intellectual excellences: 
10 See Aristotle, NE I, 1102b5-6. 
11 See Aristotle, NE I, 1102b13-14: «JlE'tExo'OOa ')...oyo'\)>>. With reference to these lines, see S. Broadie, 
1991, p. 62: «He [Aristotle] means that in human beings the functioning of the desiderative part is to be 
defined by reference to its relation to the strictly rational function [ ... ] Ethics, then, for Aristotle is 
concerned with the well-functioning of the rational side of the soul, 'rational' being meant broadly so that 
not only the strictly rational part, but also the reason-responsibve part, is dignified by the title». 
12 See Aristotle, NE I, 1102b30-1. 
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«Excellence too is divided according to this difference; for we call some of them 
intellectual excellences, others excellences of character» 13. 
Ethical excellences, as Aristotle shows in Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics do 
, 
not accrue to us by nature, but we possess the capacities to develop them through some 
training; so that they differ from senses like sight and hearing, which are not acquired 
as a result of repeated acts14. Unlike intellectual excellence, which comes into existence 
as a result of teaching, ethical excellence originates from a process of habituation, as is 
shown by the term ethos from which the adjective ethike stems15. This makes it clear 
that the latter kind of excellence does not come into being by nature, given that, as 
Aristotle points out at NE II, 1103aI8-19, 
«no natural way of being is changed through habituation»; 
13 This passage seem to contain an illicit move. As Broadie explains in S. Broadie, 1991, pp. 69- 72, the 
distinction between a non-rational desiderative part responsive to reason and a rational part which 
prescribes to the fonner does not coincide with the distinction between excellences of character and of 
intellect, although Aristotle writes as if they do. As she says at p. 71: «Coincidence fails because the 
prescriptive part turns out to be desiderative in its own right, as well as cognitive and ratiocinative. The 
virtues of character are virtues of the desiderative: that is to say, they are virtues of the reason-responsive 
part of the soul, but also of the prescriptive part qua desiderative. Consequently, any strictly distinct and 
contrasting virtues of mind or intellect would have to do with the latter's ratiocinative and cognitive 
aspects only». It seems that, while drawing a distinction between ethical and intellectual excellences, 
Aristotle does not take desire as an aspect of good action, but rather as an impulse or emotion which 
could preclude good action. 
14 See Aristotle, NEIl, 1103a26-31. 
15 See Aristotle, NE II, 1103aI7-18. 
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for instance, the stone, which by nature moves downwards, will never move upwards 
by itself, not even if someone throws it upwards innumerable times, nor will fire be 
habituated into moving downwards 16. By contrast, 
«01)'t' apa ¢ucrEt OU'tE napa ¢ucrtV EYYlvov'tat at apE'tal, aAAa nE¢uKocrt 
1. e. 
«the excellences develop in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature, but because we 
are naturally able to receive them and are brought to completion by means of 
habituation» 17, 
which suggests that human beings have the capacity to learn how to be virtuous and of 
transforming their behaviour in the direction of excellence. 
As happens in the case of technical skills, there is a time when these are not fully 
possessed, and they are apprehended by doing the same things that the possession of the 
art should enable us to do: 
«we acquire the excellences through having first engaged in the activities, as is also the 
case with the various sorts of expert knowledge-for the way we learn the things we 
should do, knowing how to do them, is by doing them. For example people become 
builders by building, and cithara-players by playing the cithara; so too, then, we 
16 See Aristotle, NE II, 1103a20-2. 
17 Aristotle, NE II, 1103a23-6. 
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become just by doing just things, moderate by doing moderate things, and courageous 
by doing courageous things» 18; 
In other words, to engage repeatedly In some kind of activity will develop the 
corresponding skill. 
However, mere activity will not be sufficient to develop ethical excellence, if one 
is not yet aware of how to act justly and one is not provided with any sort of indication, 
in the same way in which those who are expert at a particular skill will have received an 
appropriate instruction in order to apprehend their domain of knowledge. As Aristotle 
points out at NE II, II03b6-12, an action might be performed in a good or in a bad way, 
so that from the same things and through the same things activities of different quality 
will come about; repetition of similar actions, then, is not a guarantee of success ~n the 
development of ethical excellence. 
Not by chance does Aristotle introduce in the following lines the role of 
lawgivers in the promotion of ethical excellence. Their task and aim is to make the 
citizens good through habituation; as Aristotle points out, some of them might do it 
badly, others correctly: this is what makes constitutions different from one another19. 
So, when Aristotle goes on to say that dispositions come about from activities of a 
similar sort, it seems reasonable to assume that the goodness or the badness of such 
dispositions will be determined, at least to some degree, by political activity. If those in 
power, by setting out a system of justice grounded in good laws, manage to infuse a 
widespread awareness of sound ethical values in the community, individual education 
to such values will likely be successful. 
18 Aristotle, NE II, Il03a31-b2. 
19 See Aristotle, NE I~ l103b3-6; cf. Pol. VIII, 1337alO-18. 
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A more direct and intimate source of education might be the teaching prescribed by a 
father to his son; that the relationship father-son is introduced at NE I, 1102b31-3 as an 
analogy to the power of reason to persuade the epithumetikon might be indicative of its 
relevance in the activity of education of young people to good conduct: the fatherly 
practice of admonishing and encouraging the young might be the source of their ethical 
development. The kind of teaching prescribed by a father to his son is a matter of 
concern also in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle debates the 
importance of both paternal and political education. As it seems, paternal education 
might be more effective because of the intimate bonds of affection subsisting between 
father and son, and also because offspring are naturally predisposed to obey a father's 
prescriptions20; furthermore, individual treatment will be superior to a generalised one: 
lawgivers will be unable to know individual cases and intervene in each21 . 
Now, it is true that education of a young person under the supervision of his or 
her father might replace the education provided by the community, once the laws 
established by lawgivers and their personal behaviour have failed to indicate how to 
behave justly; still, fatherly education does not guarantee a successful acquisition of 
ethical excellence unless the father has universal knowledge of what applies to all cases 
or to specific situations22 . In a good political community, the activity of education 
undertaken by lawgivers with a view to the happiness of citizens will be more reliable, 
insofar as it is grounded on their political expertise; even more, law has a compelling 
power, 
20 See Aristotle, NE X, 1180b3-7. 
21 See Aristotle, NE X, 1180b7-13. 
22 See NE X, 1180b13-16, where Aristotle says that the best supervision will be provided by people 
equipped with an universal knowledge, e.g. by doctors, or athletic trainers. 
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«being a form of words deriving from a kind of wisdom and intelligence»23. 
In this way political expertise, although unable to supervise individual cases, would 
provide the values at the basis of a good individual education24. 
However, whether we claim the superiority of fatherly education to the political 
or vice-versa, it is undeniable that some people become just and others unjust according 
to the way in which they have acted in dealings with other human beings; again, they 
might become courageous or cowardly according to their behaviour in frightening 
situations, and, likewise, in situations relating to the appetites or with temper, some will 
become moderate and mild-tempered, whereas others self-indulgent and irascible, the 
former as a result of behaving in one way in such circumstances, the other as a result of 
behaving in the opposite way25. In all these cases, some kind of external 'authority' will 
be fundamental for a succesful education to ethical excellences. 
We may now proceed to investigate how an external rationality is interiorised by 
the not-yet-virtuous, and how it can be changed into an autonomous, rational stat\;. The 
person who learns how to become virtuous is initially unaware of the reasons why he 
should act in a way rather than in another; still, this person will gradually start to 
recognize not only just behaviour, but also the reasons of its rightness26. The task of 
those committed to educating individuals is to lead them to do actions and to feel 
desires consonant with excellence of character; their aim will be not only to make them 
23 Aristotle, NE X, IIS0a21-2. 
24 See S. Broadie, 1991, p. 59. 
25 See Aristotle, NE II, 1l03b14-21. 
26 Cf. NE I, 1095b2-13, where Aristotle provides methodological indications as to how undertake our 
investigation of happiness. It is interesting to notice that the starting point of any human investigation 
should be the 'that', i.e. the acknowledgment 'that a thing is so', this suggesting that the 'why it is so' 
belongs to a successive stage. Aristotle points out that, if the 'that' is sufficiently clear, he will not in 
addition have a need for the 'why'. See also NE I, 109Sa33-b4. As for the distinction between the 'that' 
and the 'why', see M.F. Burnyeat, 1999, pp. 207-9. 
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understand that ethical behaviour is right, but also to cause them to want to exhibit such 
behaviour and to practise it with a view to their own happiness. 
Aristotle's allusion to the practice of admonishing, encouragIng and 
reprimanding people at the end of Book I seems to reveal the importance of the role of 
persuasion in the educational process. Moreover, such an allusion contributes to 
explaining how the non-rational part of soul sharing in reason interacts with practical 
rationality~ in this respect, it ceases to be a mere term of analogy or a metaphor27 . What 
does Aristotle mean when at NE I, Il02b33 he says that the non-rational is 'in a way 
persuaded by reason'? Given that the non-rational at issue is the 'non-rational sharing 
in reason', it will be in some way capable of listening to the prescriptions issued by 
reason. Since any activity of listening presupposes an understanding of what the 
speaker says, the part of soul which partakes in reason and reason itself will need to 
share the same 'language'. 
As I believe, that the non-rational part in question is capable of listening to 
reason is only partially due to natural inclinations, if by 'natural' we mean 'not 
modified by habituation'. Now, it might be supposed that the sharing in reason of the 
non-rational part of soul is exclusively due to the constant repetition of virtuous actions 
under a wise external supervision: habituation, in that case, would put one in the 
condition of making one's non-rational impulses listen to the trainer's reason and 
successively obey its prescriptions, with a view to developing a rationality of one's 
own; however, although habituation, as I understand it, involves not simply a 
mechanical repetition of actions, but, rather, a process of training of affections and 
passions under the guide of reason, that does not seem to be what specifically enables 
non-rational impulses and affections to listen to and comply with reason. 
27 See S. Broadie, 1991, p. 63. 
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My personal solution to this problem is that, in Aristotle's theory, recalcitrant impulses 
begin to 'listen' to reason only when reason manages to move them through an 
appropriate 'language': that-in the present case-the activity of persuasion is undertaken 
by reason does not necessarily imply that reason expresses itself by means of 
sophisticated rational explanations as to how it is right to behave. Rather, just as a good 
teacher might speak in a way which he knows will have a strong impact on the 
emotional sphere of the learner, reason might 'address' the epithumetikon by appealing 
to affections and impulses in a way which will make them consistent with rational 
thought. 
The arguments generated by reason with a view to persuasion of the non-rational 
will be arguments which the reason of a wise teacher will bring forward in order to 
move impulses to virtuous action, although such arguments do not involve the true, 
deeper reason as to why it is right to act virtuously. In other words, in order to address 
the epithumetikon of people who are not yet virtuous towards rational activity, a wise 
trainer, e.g. a father or a lawgiver, will resort to arguments by which his own reason by 
itself would never be moved to action; these arguments, then, would be introduced by 
the wise trainer, only because he or she realises that, thanks to these, he will draw the 
'attention' of the impulses and affections of the learner; only after having caught the 
'attention' of the learner's epithumetikon will rational activity able to 'persuade' it to 
act in accordance to its dictates. 
I hope to make my point clearer by introducing two examples which I believe are 
extremely significant: 
1) When the teacher appeals to the sense of shame of learners. 
2) When the teacher leads people to act in the way they should by fostering their 
sense of fear. 
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As I am now going to show, the two cases above mentioned match respectively people 
of two different qualities: the well-brought and the base. At NE X 1179b4-10 Aristotle 
suggests that only people with good upbringing will find his ethical discussion useful 
for the development of ethical excellence. If words were sufficient in themselves to 
make people decent28, any kind of people would understand the importance of 
becoming virtuous; by contrast, words 
«appear to have the power to tum and motivate those of the young who are civilized, 
and to be capable of bringing about possession by excellence in a character that is noble 
and truly loves the fine, but to lack the power to tum the majority of people towards 
refinement of excellence» 29. 
It seems, then, that people of good upbringing will be directed towards ethical 
excellence through a different approach from the base; unlike the base, potentially good 
people are those whom Aristotle is addressing in the Nicomachean Ethics, given that 
they will be capable of listening and understanding the substantial objects of his ethical 
enqUIry. 
As Aristotle believes, in order to encourage potentially good individuals to such 
objects through appeal to their non-rational part, lawgivers might appeal to their sense 
30 h . of shame, which base people do not possess . People w 0 are not yet VIrtUOUS, 
although being people of good quality, will not be led to behaviour according to ethical 
excellence by simply being told 'that' the fine and the just are good in themselves, nor 
will they be able to catch immediately the relationship between these goods and the true 
28 bttetKetc;. 
29 Aristotle, NE X, 1179b7-10. 
30 See Aristotle, NE X, 1179b 11-13. 
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human happiness. Since their practical rationality is not still well-shaped, a good 
teacher will persuade them not by appeal to their reason, but to their emotive aspect, 
'emotive' here referring to non-rational impulses and affections; in this way, the trainer 
will educate the impulses of the non-rational part of the learner's soul to some kind of 
activity which the agent will recognize as just and fine only once having developed full 
ethical excellence. 
With reference to the idea of shame, two different words are used by Aristotle: 
atocbc; and atcrxuvll As he says at NE II, 1108a32, atocbc; is not a real disposition 
of character: 
rather shame seems to be some kind of affection connected in some way to virtuous , 
actions, as Aristotle suggests at NE IV, 1128b 1 0-11 : 
«IIEpt OE a100uc; roc; 't1VOC; apE'tTlC; ou npocrT,KEt AEYEtV· naSEt yap I·L<XAAOV 
. 
1.e. 
«a sense of shame is not appropriately talked about as a kind of excellence: it rese'l1bles 
an affection rather than a disposition». 
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At NE IV, 1128bll-12 shame is described as a kind offear31 : 
<!>6!3cp 1tapa1tA T,O'tov», 
i. e., as Rowe translates, 
«at any rate it is defined as a kind of fear32 of disrepute, and has an effect comparable to 
that of fear in the ordinary sense». 
It seems to me that, when Aristotle defines shame as a kind of fear, the kind he is 
referring to is not of the same as, e.g., fear of fighting in the battlefield or fear of 
punishment, given that these examples of fear do not seem to be caused per se by any 
form of 'external' judgment; by contrast, the kind of fear proper to shame seems to be 
caused by the expectation of a negative opinion which other people might have of a bad 
behaviour. 
31 It is interesting that at Top. IV, 126a8-9 shame is described as belonging to the !ogistikon, i.e. the 
rational faculty of the soul, fear to the thumoeides, i.e. the 'spirited' faculty. In this section of the Topics 
Aristotle is dealing with the relationship between species and gender; as he explains at Top. 126a4, 
«what contains the species (£tOoC;) contains the genus (yevoc;) as well». As he goes on in the following 
lines (Top. IV, 126a4-6), «what contains white contains colour as well, and what contains knowledge of 
grammar contains knowledge as well». If so, when one says that 'shame' is 'fear', the species and the 
genus will not exist in the same thing (Top. IV, 126a6), given that they belong to two different faculties 
of the soul. I do not think that the idea of shame as belonging to the !ogistikon is incompatible with its 
being an affection proper to the non-rational part of the soul which shares in reason. Shame, expressing 
concern for other peole' s beliefs on the good and the bad, might involve a higher display of reason than 
fear and be regarded as a less 'instinctive' feeling than the latter. 
32 Cf. Aristotle, Prohl., 905a6: «Kcit'tOt Ka1.. il dt8roC; 4>6J30c; 'tlC; £O''ttv». 
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Wise trainers might educate people of good upbringing to ethical excellence by 
fostering in them a sense of fear sui generis, i.e. fear of being badly regarded by other 
people. That shanle-as Aristotle goes on to say at NE IV, 1128b15-16-is typical of 
young people matches the case of individuals who are not yet virtuous and need to have 
their affections directed towards good behaviour: 
«for we think that young people should have a sense of shame because they live by 
emotion and so get many things wrong, but are held back by a sense of shame» 33. 
Since people who are not yet virtuous are more usually moved by affections than by 
reason, and also more inclined to making mistakes with respect to the way in which one 
should behave34, wise educators will speak to them by insisting on adoxia as the worst 
consequence of bad conduct, their real thought being that bad actions are such in 
themselves, and not because of the dishonour which might follow from them. 
Given that the sense of shame is more linked to fear for other people's op;nions 
than to an effective understanding of the intrinsic badness of an action, it seems that 
education to ethical excellence will have been completed only when one's concern for 
the judgments issued by other people with regard to one's behaviour will be replaced 
by a deeper concern for the intrinsic value of a good action. 
Shame is also treated in Book II of the Rhetoric; once again, Aristotle's account 
takes up the idea of an affection concerned with bad things and involving people in 
discredit. As he says with reference to a'tcrX uVll, 
33 Aristotle, NE IV, 1128bI6-18. 
34 See M.F. Bumyeat, 1999, p. 215. 
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«Shame may be defined as pain or disturbance in regard to bad things, whether present, 
past, or future, which seem likely to involve us in discredit; and shamelessness as 
contempt or indifference in regard to these same bad things» 35. 
Again, at Rhet. II, 1384a24-27 shame is described as 
«the imagination36 of disgrace, in which we shrink from the disgrace itself and not from 
its consequences, and we only care what opinion is held of us because of the people 
who form that opinion, it follows that the people before whom we feel shame are those 
whose opinion of us matters to US»37. 
The idea that one might be discredited in the eyes of the people who one esteems seems 
to be extremely relevant for Aristotle's pedagogical purposes: that one might be held 
back from bad behaviour simply by fearing the contempt of those one cares for will 
make tutors initially insist on the sense of shame rather than on the quality of actions 
themselves. 
However, if a sense of dishonour enables human affections to listen to a wise 
reason, this might open a path for correction of bad actions with a view to the pursuit of 
ethical excellence as desirable in itself. That at Rhet. II, 1384b22, among the persons 
before whom one should feel ashamed, Aristotle mentions also those who will reveal 
his faults to one seems to stress the need for correction of mistakes in practical , 
conduct. The shame of people who are already virtuous might lead to contempt for bad 
35 Aristotle, Rhet. II, 1383b14-17. 
36 cpav'tacita. 
37 See also EE III, 1233b26-9, where Aristotle, after describing dlOcbC; as a middle state between 
shamelessness and bashfulness, says that the man who pays regard to nobody' s opinion is shameless, 
whereas the one who regards the opinion of those who appear good is dtOTlJ,WJV. 
64 
actions per se, rather than being reduced to a mere sense of fear of being disregarded by 
those they care for; in that case, although shame is always 'shame before someone' 
besides being 'shame before oneself, a fully virtuous person will pay attention to the 
goodness itself of his actions more than to the honour which might spring from them. 
By contrast, when it comes to base people who do not possess this sense of 
shame, lawgivers or wise men in general might try to direct them towards good actions 
by fostering their sense of fear, i.e. a fear of different kind from that possessed by those 
who feel a sense of shame. Rather, they might be led to good behaviour by being made 
liable to some kind of punishment which might be applied when one commits bad 
actions, e.g. the kind of punishment prescribed according to public laws when some 
transgression is made. Such people will not obey laws by being told that the values they 
prescribe are virtuous in themselves and constitutive of human happiness, in that they 
have a base conception of the highest good: for instance, if we consider the issue of 
happiness from the point of view of its desirability, they might wish for and be led to 
action by different motives from those which compel virtuous people to act. In that 
case, the only way to make them listen to the wise reason of an hypothetical trainer will 
be to appeal to their sense of fear, which will make them imagine a threat: fear for the 
punishment consequent on bad actions will be the main mover of their non-ra~ional 
impulses towards the better. 
As Aristotle suggests at Rhet. II, 1382a21-2, where fear is defined as a kind of 
pain or disturbance caused by the imagination of an imminent evil, many people will 
not be afraid of becoming unjust, presumably because they do not take it as an evil or 
as a source of pain. In this case, a wise educator will try to present people the phantasia 
of the evil that springs from a transgression of law and the following punishment. 
Aristotle recognizes the substantial contribution provided by pleasure and pain to 
the development of human dispositions of character. As he says at NE II, 1104b8-11, 
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«1tEpt r,oovac; yap Kat A u1tac; eO"'ttv r, 118tKl1 apE't"· oux JlEV yap 'tT]V 
r,Oovr,v 'to, <j)auAa 1tPU't't0flEV, Ota oE 'tl1v A U1tl1V 'tcOv KCXAcOV a1tEXOJlE8cx», 
1.e. 
«excellence of character has to do with pleasures and pains: it is because of pleasure 
that we do bad things, and because of pain that we hold back from doing fine things»; 
in that case, education to the development of good dispositions of character will also 
have to do with pleasures and pains, and operate so as to cause people to act justly or to 
feel affections in the appropriate way. That is why, as Aristotle goes on at NE IT, 
1104bll-13, 
«we must have been brought up in a certain way from childhood onwards, as Plato 
says, so as to delight in and be distressed by the things we should; this is what the 
correct education is». 
Given that ethical excellence has to do with affections and actions which, in their 
tum, are accompanied by pleasure and pain38, individual education might be arr~nged 
so as to enable people to associate their bad behaviour with some kind of pain, for 
instance that which springs from various forms of punishment. In this respect, I think, 
to speak to base people by fostering their sense of fear may be an acceptable way of 
educating them; not by chance does Aristotle introduce at NE II, 11 04b 16-17 the 
38 See Aristotle, NE II, 11 04b 13 -16. 
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example of forcible correction, which bad individuals undergo by the initiative of 
people who intend to point them in the direction of a good conduct. 
Aristotle seems to be skeptical about the possibility of a base man turning into a 
fully virtuous one; but, if we admit this case, on his way to the acquisition of ethical 
excellence fear for punishment will be replaced by a more substantial concern for the 
goodness and badness of actions; or in some cases, these people might develop a sense 
of shame in imagining a disgraceful action, maybe involving fear of personal discredit. 
As we are going to see in the third part of this thesis, justice is truly fine only when it is 
a disposition of character according to which one performs fine actions: justice as mere 
obedience to law out of fear of punishment will not make an individual or even his 
actions just. 
Having said this, let us try to answer our original question: what enables the non-
rational part of soul to listen to reason and act accordingly? My answer is that reason 
will appeal to feelings and affections belonging to the non-rational part, i.e. feelings 
which, although not equipped with the correct prescription which only a virtuous 
person possesses, are conducive to ethical excellence. Repeated exercises will bring 
about a process of habituation which will enable potentially good people to obey good 
rational prescriptions. The impact exerted by reason on affections like the sense of 
shame and fear will move impulses in the direction of reason, even if the reasons 
prompting such a movement in the non-rational part of soul will be initially different 
from the reasons according to which reason pursues the fine and the just. Repetit:on of 
virtuous actions in the appropriate circumstances will not only develop a sense of how 
to act in specific situations, but also shape non-rational impulses in accordance with 
reason. 
If fear and shame enable reason to communicate with the non-rational in us, it is 
only thanks to habituation that learners will start to act according to their own reason 
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instead of their teachers' one. Perhaps, when at NE I, 11 02b 14-28 Aristotle explains 
that the impulses of people lacking in self-control move in contrary directions and fight 
against reason, whereas those of people with self-control are able to listen to th~ right 
encouragement of reason, his thought is that the impulses of akratic people have not 
been trained at all to listen to reason or have been badly trained. 
In the process of the achievement of arete, 'external' rationality will gradually be 
replaced by the reason of the agent, who later on will acquire his own autonomy of 
action and will perform actions voluntarily and knowing in what context and how to 
display different excellences of character, as required by concrete circumstances. There 
might come a time in which people's actions and passions will be practised and felt 
almost spontaneously, as though they were immediate reactions to external 
circumstances. This process is supposed to take place gradually, and it seems 
impossible to establish with mathematical certainty when a disposition of character has 
been acquired and to what extent; for instance, it would be absurd for us to wonder 
whether we have already acquired arete or not while performing any single action; but 
once a good disposition of character has been acquired, the agent himself will set out to 
perform certain kinds of action without asking someone else for advice. To be virtuous 
means acting according to choice and a fixed hexis, not merely performing a virtuous 
According to what has been said so far, ethical excellence is in a way 'rational', 
in that impulses and desires are shaped by reason with a view to performance of good 
actions; that such an excellence belongs to the non-rational part of soul does not mean 
that rationality is something completely external to it. As I am going to show in the next 
section, the characteristic intermediacy of excellence of character depends on some 
39 See NE II, 1105a26-b2, where Aristotle draws the difference between ethical excellence and technical 
skills: unlike in ethical excellence, the outcome of productive skills is considered good even when it 
comes about by chance of under someone else's promptings. 
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kind of rational prescription, presumably the same as that proper to the wise man. The 
relationship between ethical excellence and wisdom will emerge more clearly in the 
treatment of deliberative activity. 
2.3: Orthos logos: its Role in Ethical Excellence, Wisdom and 
Deliberation. 
Ethical excellence has been treated so far as a kind of disposition which comes about 
from a process of habituation, i.e. a process in which people gradually acquire a degree 
of knowledge about the way they should act and in what specific circumstances; but no 
mention has been made of its characteristic mesotes and the nature of its supposedly 
inherent rationality. I propose to show how wisdom is involved in the actualisation of 
the mesotes peculiar to each excellence of character. 
At NE II, II06b36-1107a2 (already quoted in the introduction to this chapter), 
ethical arete is described as 
«a disposition issuing in decisions, depending on intermediacy of the kind relative to 
us, this being determined by rational prescription40 and in the way in which the wise 
person would determine it». 
Such a claim reveals that wisdom determines excellence of character in some way. 
Evidence of the closeness between the two things is found at the beginning of Book VI, 
which takes up what has been said about excellence of character and its typical mesotes 
in Book II: 
40 J....6yor;. 
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«Let that then stand as our way of marking off justice and the rest, i.e. the excellences 
of character. Since we have said earlier that one must choose what is intermediate not , 
excess, and not deficiency, and that what is intermediate is 'as the correct prescription41 
prescribes', let us delimit this» 42. 
It might seem odd that the successive arguments developed in Book VI aloe not 
concerned with orthos logos as the rational prescription which defines the typical 
intermediacy of ethical excellence: only phronesis is taken into account in relation to 
the right prescription. However, given Aristotle's explicit suggestion that the correct 
prescription of arete is going to be investigated, it seems reasonable to suppose that the 
orthos logos which makes an individual phronimos will explain at the same time the 
role of orthos logos in the hitting the intermediate proper to ethical excellence. 
The intermediacy on which excellence depends is defined by logos, as is claimed 
at NE VI, 1144b21-5: 
«. .. everybody when defining excellence describes the dispo~n.~ul£ ~nd what it relates to, 
and then adds 'according to the correct prescription'; and the correct one is the one in 
accordance with wisdom». 
That possession of ethike arete involves phronesis is clear when, at NE VI, 1138b21-5, 
Aristotle draws the reader's attention to the issue of intermediate states of character and 
the ways in which these might be reached: 
41 b A6yor; b bpe6r;. 
42 Aristotle, NE VI, 1138b18-20. 
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«F or with all the dispositions we have discussed, just as with everything else, there is a 
target, as it were, that the person with the prescription has in view as he tenses and 
relaxes, and a kind of mark that determines the intermediate states, which we declare to 
be in between excess and deficiency, being as they are 'according to the correct 
prescription'» 43. 
But to talk like this, as Aristotle himself recognizes at NE VI, 1138b25-35, 
«is not at all illuminating; for in all other spheres of concern, ones involving specialized 
knowledge, while it is true to say that one shouldn't apply oneself, or slacken one's 
effort, either too much or too little, but just to an intermediate degree and as the correct 
prescription lays down44, if this were the only thing a person knew he would be no 
further on [ ... ] in relation to the dispositions of the soul too what we need is not mere I y 
to have said this and said something true; we need also to have determined what 'the 
correct prescription' is, and what the determining mark45 of this is». 
It seems that in Book VI, which is devoted to the issue of intellectual excell~nces, 
Aristotle intends to explain how rational prescription might define the nature of a non-
intellectual arete: as he suggests in the passage above mentioned, the correct 
prescription needs to be 'investigated in relation to the dispositions of the soul'. My 
belief is that the process according to which arete hits upon the intermediate is based on 
the same orthos logos which makes a person phronimos; as I propose, the orthos logos 
43 On the relationship between phronesis and ethical arete see R. Demos, 1961-62, pp. 154-155. Demos 
suggests that the dependence of phronesis on ethical virtue is not causal; rather, as he claims, «phronesis 
consists of some aspect of virtue». 
44 'ta Jlecra Kat roc; b bp90C; A6yoc;. 
45 0poC;. 
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underlying ethike arete is the same as that on which wisdom depends, and comes about 
from human experience, experience being the development of an autonomous 
rationality in the process of habituation to good behaviour. Under this light, phronesis 
will appear as a form of practical reasoning according to which experience-data are 
connected and re-elaborated with a view to the decisional process and to action. 
Aristotle begins his account of phronesis by putting it in relation to the activity of 
deliberation with a view to what is good in general. As he says, 
I.e. 
«it is thought characteristic of a wise person to be able to deliberate well about the 
things that are good and advantageous to himself, not in specific contexts, e.g. what sort 
of things conduce to health, or to physical strength, but what sorts of things conduce to 
the good life in general» 46 . 
Again, at NE VI, 1140b4-6 wisdom is described as 
. 
1.e. 
46 Aristotle, NE VI, 1140a25-8. 
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«a true disposition accompanied by rational prescription, relating to action in the ~phere 
of what is good and bad for human beings». 
This suggests that wisdom must be related to ethical excellence in some way, since it 
has to do with human things, i.e. things about which it is possible to deliberate47, and 
the activity in which it is involved requires a view of the good and the bad life that only 
ethical excellence is able to pro~de 48. On the other hand, it seems that ethike arete will 
not be fully possessed without wisdom, provided that excellences of ethical kind 
detennine the intermediate between excess and deficiency in affections and actions 'as 
a wise man would do it'. It might be hypothesized that one's ethical aretai and wisdom 
come to a full-fledged realisation at the same time and, once they have been fully 
achieved, they will display their reciprocal relationship in the process of deliberation 
leading to human action. 
As we have already seen at NE II, II06b36-1107a2, ethical excellence is defined 
as an E~l<; 1tpoalpE'tlKi}, a disposition issuing in decisions; but at NE II 1106b14-16 
Aristotle also describes it as 
«effective at hitting upon what is intermediate». 
What does Aristotle mean when he says that ethical excellence is ''tou ~eaou 
O"'t0Xa O"'tlKll'? And how does this property contribute to the decisional process? As 
Urmson suggests, rather than being a disposition towards mean or intermediate 
47 See Aristotle, NE VI, 1140a31-3. 
48 As for those commentators who pronounced upon the role of ethical excellence and phronesis in good 
deliberation and action, see D.l. Allan, 1977; 1M. Cooper, 1975, p. 53; W.W. Fortenbaugh, 1964; T. 
Engberg-Pedersen, 1983, pp. 160-87; see also footnote 64 of this chapter. 
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emotions and actions, ethical excellence seems to be an intermediate disposition 
regarding emotions and actions49 . However, it seems that the intermediacy proper to 
ethical excellence will not be an unspecified one. Since ethical excellence has to do 
with affections and actions which might present excess, deficiency and intermediacy 
between them 50, the intermediate Aristotle is referring to will be applicable to single 
actions in relation to what any specific situation requires. 
One might be affected too much or too little, but what presupposes ethical 
excellence is the capacity to be affected as one should. As Aristotle makes it clear at 
NE II, 11 06b 18-24, 
«it is possible on occasion to be affected by fear, boldness, appetite, anger, pity, and 
pleasure and distress in general both too much and too little, and neither is good; but to 
be affected when one should, at the things one should, in relation to the people one 
should, for the reasons one should, and in the way one should51 both intermediate and 
best, which is what belongs to excellence»; 
the same, as he goes on in the following lines, will hold true of actions, which might be 
performed according to excess or deficiency. In both affections and actions the 
intermediate will be object of praise, whereas excess and deficiency will belong to 
badness52 . 
As we can see, Aristotle resorts to expressions like 'has dei' and 'hote dei' in 
order to indicate a precise and non-arbitrary way in which actions ought to be 
49 See lO. Unnson, 1980, p. 161~ cf. W.F.R. Hardie, 1977, pp. 34-5. 
50 See Aristotle, NE VI, 1106b24-6. 
51 01:E SEt Kat £¢ , ole; Kat1tpOe; oue; Kat OU EVEKa Kat <be; Su. 
52 See Aristotle, II 11 06b26-7 . 
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performed and affections felt53 ; this seems to match the idea of a rational prescription 
which determines the intermediate states. In other words, the 'right prescription' typical 
of ethical arete seems to consist in one's power to establish when, how and in what 
circumstances one should act: it is the logos of wisdom which indicates to us how to act 
and how to moderate one's affections in particular situations. Human activity requires a 
capacity of assessment of the particular situation in relation to the right way of acting, 
which seems to be the same skill as that employed by a wise man when deliberating on 
the correct way of achieving good desired ends54. Given that the wise man is capable of 
deliberating on what is good in general, he will be equipped with a general view of 
what is good, which presupposes a knowledge of how to act and how to moderate one's 
affections on specific occasions. As Sorabji suggests, phronesis 
«enables a man, in the light of his conception of the good life in general, to perceive 
what generosity requires of him, or more generally what virtue and to kalon require of 
him, in the particular case, and it instructs him to act accordingly. A picture of the good 
life will save him from giving away too much, or too little, or to the wrong causes, in 
. I . 55 particu ar InstanCes» . 
The orthos logos according to which ethical excellence hits the mean in actions 
and affections is a form of rationality acquired through habituation and training; still 
habituation and training do not seem to be the specific sources of such a rationality, 
although they might surely contribute to its development. I believe that the real source 
53 Cf. NE II, 1107b27~ NE Ill, 1119b16-18~ NE IV, 1125b5~ NE IV, 1125b8, where the expressions 
quoted at footnote 40 are used in relation to the single excellences of character. 
54 On the capacity of assessment proper to ethical excellence and phronesis in see W.W. Fortenbaugh, 
1964. 
55 R. Sorabji 1980, p. 206. 
75 
of wisdom is experience. By 'experience', in this context, I do not mean an equivalent 
of habituation, although it seems plausible to suppose that the two concepts are 
mutually related; rather, I mean the process of perception and re-elaboration of various 
aspects of reality according to which one formulates universal principles of conduct, 
applicable when the situation requires them. In that case, even an excellence of an 
intellectual kind like phronesis would rely in a way on some kind of non-rationa1 data, 
which are only later elaborated by reason. 
The notion of 'experience', corresponding to the greek 'empeiria' is introduced 
by Aristotle at the beginning of the MetaphYSiCS, where human beings are said to live of 
crafts and reasonings, unlike the other animals, which partake of empeiria very little: 
The comparison drawn by Aristotle suggests that technai and iogismoi have to do with 
empeiria in some way. At Met. A, 980b28-981al Aristotle explains that in human 
beings empeiria comes about from memory, given that many memories of the same 
thing produce the effect of a single experience57. As he goes on to say at Met. A, 981aS-
7, a techne comes about when, after many observations of experience, a universal 
judgement is formulated with reference to all the similar cases. 
When it comes to practical activity. a phronimos man will be one who possesses 
the necessary experience for engaging in just and fine behaviour. A confirmation of this 
may be found at NE II, 1142all-20, where phronesis is described in terms of an 
56 Aristotle, Met. A, 980b25-8. 
57 ytYVE'tat 0' EK 'tile; JlVTUl 1le; EJl1tEtpta 'tOte; Cx.v81tc01tote;· cit yap n6AAat IlVllJlC)'.t 'tot> 
au'tOu 1tpaYfla'tOe; flt<ie; EJl1tEtptae; ouvaJltv Cx.1tO'tEAoOOtV. 
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intellectual virtue which, unlike sophia, is achieved through activity of reasoning and 
experience. As Aristotle explains, while geometricians and mathematicians develop 
their skills when young, wise persons will never develop their intellectual excellence in 
a short time, since the objects of phronesis also include particulars, which come to be 
known only through empeiria58 ; empeiria, in its tum, requires a long time to be 
achieved: that is why the young cannot be experts. That experience is introduced here 
as the indispensable condition of knowledge of particulars seems to fit well with the 
idea that empeiria is the source of phronesis. 
At NE II, 1142a25-30 phronesis is described as having as its own object the last 
and contingent, of which there is not episteme but aisthesis (contrary to nOllS, which has 
as its own objects the definitions of which there is no logos). As Aristotle points out at 
1142a27-30, perception does not mean 'sense-perception': 
«not perception of the sensible special to each sense, but like that by which we grasp 
that the last element in mathematical analysis is the triangle~ for things will come to a 
halt in that case too (However, this is more a case of perception than of wisdom, but a 
different kind of perception from the one of the special sensib les 59)>>. 
What Aristotle probably means here is that the kind of perception proper to wisdom 
does not grasp particulars in the same way as they might be immediately perceived by 
senses like sight and hearing; rather, Aristotle seems to be referring to a 'rational' kind 
of perception, i.e. perception of particulars under a peculiar light, e.g. in the light of 
good action. As Nussbaum puts it, 
58 That experience is knowledge of particulars is suggested by Aristotle in Met. A, 981a15-17; techne, 
instead, is knowledge of universals: «t, ).ltv E).l1tEtp1.a 'tffiv KaS' £Kcx,cr't6v Ecr'tt yvOxn<; " Oe 
'tE.XV11 'twv Kae61ou». 
59 aAA' am" JlCiAAOV atcrS"crt<; fl <t>p6VTlcrt<;, EKEtVTl<; 0' aAAo E100<;. 
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«practical insight is like perceiving in the sense that it is noninferential nondeductive· , , 
it is an ability to recognize the salient features of a complex situation» 60. 
By 'empeiria' Aristotle means a process according to which men grasp 
particulars on various occasions and come to formulate a universal judgment. Although 
in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle does not explain how from the particular case it is 
possible to grasp the universal, we may suppose that this takes place thanks to a process 
of inference; it is also plausible that, once experience has been acquired, men act and 
judge on the basis of it, without repeating the process of abstraction through which they 
came to the formulation of the universal premises. In this respect, wisdom might be 
taken as a sort of habit, provided that wise men are familiar with contingent particulars 
and know how to employ them in relation to universal principles with a view to human 
decisions and actions. 
At NE VI, 1141 b 15-18 Aristotle says that people who know particulars without 
knowing universals will act better than those who do know universals but not 
particulars61 ; although, in order to be phronimos, it is necessary to know both aspects, 
familiarity with particulars will be preferable. Experience endorses a general view on 
the right way to act and will consequently develop the needed rationality. All the same, 
60 M. Nussbaum, 1999, p. 165. Nussbaum proposes that more than one faculty intervenes in the process 
of practical reasoning: besides the rational, imagination seems to play an important role. As she says at p. 
168, phantasia «is a more inclusive human and animal capability, that of focusing on some concrete 
particular, either present or absent, in such a way as to see (or otherwise perceive) is as something, 
picking out its salient features, discerning its content. In this function it is the active and selective aspect 
of perception». On the role of imagination in human activity see also J.L. Labarriere, 1984; and M. 
Schofield, 1979. This aspect of practical reasoning will not be developed in this thesis. 
61 Cf Met. A, 981a13-24, where Aristotle explains that those who possess empeiria (ot £J..ln£tpot) may 
succeed more than those who have theory without possessing experience, given that, experience is 
knowledge of particulars. 
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it seems that the same experience which engenders the orthos logos will contribute to 
hit the mean in actions and affections according to ethical excellence. 
The closeness of the two kinds of excellence is mostly evident in the activity of 
euboulia. Euboulia is excellence at deliberating; as Aristotle says, it is 
1. e. 
«correctness as to what one should achieve, and the way in which, and when, all in 
accordance with what is beneficial» 62. 
Good deliberation presupposes both excellence of character, which makes the 
end of deliberation correct, and intellectual excellence, thanks to which deliberative 
activity lands to the choice of the best option63 . In other words, what one should 
achieve is established by ethical excellence, presumably insofar as it has to do with 
affections and impulses which, if correctly oriented, will lead to good action, whereas 
the way in which and the occasion on which actions should be performed will mainly 
be determined by wisdom: 
62 Aristotle. l\TH' \,T. 1142b27-8. 
63 See Aristotle, NE VI, 1144a7-9; cf. NE VI, 1144a20-2 and NE VI, 1145a5-6. On the role of both 
ethical arete and phronesis in good deliberation see R. Bodeiis, 2004, pp. 50-63. See in particular p. 60: 
«II semble que, pour Aristote, une intelligence non discursive intervieIll1e au principe de Ia deliberation 
pour mettre dans l'esprit Ie genre d'action souhaitable (Ia fin) et qu'elle intervieIll1e aussi, au terme de Ia 
deliberation, pour cloturer celle-ci, dans la vision de I' action particuliere (Ie moyen) qui correspond au 
genre recherche». 
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«if it is characteristic of the wise to deliberate well, deliberative excellence will be that 
sort of correctness that corresponds to what conduces to the end, of which wisdom is 
the true grasp» 64. 
In deliberative activity, wisdom depends on ethical excellence insofar as its 
goodness relies on the goodness of the object desired by ethical excellence. Wise 
actions will not be perfonned without a stable disposition of character, nor will any 
deliberation be excellent unless wisdom pursues good ends established by ethical 
excellence. Should wisdom find what forwards any end whatever, no matter whether 
such an end is good or not, wisdom might turn out to be the grasp of a non-virtuous 
end; in that case, phronesis would be mere cleverness65 . 
It is true that phronesis, conceived as an intellectual excellence per se, is not 
dependent on ethical excellence; still, notwithstanding its being an excellence 
autonomous from the ethical, when it comes to euboulia, wisdom cannot operate in 
absence of ethical excellence. At NE VI, 1 1 44a29-b 1 Aristotle explains in what respect 
phronesis relies on arete: 
«This eye of the soul fphronesis J does not come to be in its proper condition without 
excellence, as has been said and as is clear in any case; for chains of practical reasoning 
have a starting point-'since the end, i.e. what is best, is such-and-such' [ ... J and this is 
64 Aristotle, NE, 114 2b31-3. This passage has puzzled commentators: some of them believe that, in 
Aristotle's view, wisdom is the true grasp of what conduces to the end, whereas others believe that 
wisdom is the true grasp of the end itself. According to my reading of the passage, Aristotle is 
concentrating on wisdom as the excellence which grasps what leads to the end, as he shows in the 
passages I have quoted at footnote 45; cf. P. Aubenque, 1965. Aubenque introduces the view of scholars 
like Jaeger, Tricot, Dirlmeier, as opposed to Gauthier, according to which phronesis is knowledge of the 
end. 
65 The difference between mere cleverness and good ability is stressed at NE VI, 1144a23 -9. 
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not evident except to the person who possesses excellence, since badness distorts a 
person and causes him to be deceived about the starting points of action. So it is evident 
that it is impossible to be wise without possessing excellence». 
Given that in the process of euboulia arete makes the end correct and phronesis 
the steps forwarding the end, not possessing arete will prevent one from deliberating 
well. Phronesis is not completely separate from arete, and a wise man will be 
acknowledged as such not only thanks to the actions he performs, but also by virtue of 
his disposition of character. In order to identify an individual as 'wise' it is not 
sufficient to look at the correctness of his reasoning, but to the goodness of his actions. 
These must be the outcome of a deliberation in which ethical excellence is involved. 
2.4: Conclusions 
In this chapter I have tried to account for two kinds excellence: the first, excellence of 
character, is excellence of the non-rational part of the soul sharing in reason; the 
second, wisdom, is an intellectual disposition of the rational part of soul concerned with 
what can be otherwise, or, put it another way, with the steps forwarding decision. These 
two kinds of excellence are deeply entwined, and their relationship is evident in the 
process of euboulia. Ethike arete is a disposition of character achieved through 
habituation, which is a non-rational process; still, it seems to possess some sort of 
rationality, given that it makes people wish for good ends. 
I suggested that the rational prescription underlying the intermediacy of arete is 
the same orthos logos possessed by the phronimos, i.e. the man engaged in good 
deliberation; the rational prescription underlying phronesis causes wise men to feel 
affections and to do actions by escaping both excess and deficiency, and habituation to 
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moderate feelings and actions will develop a good and stable disposition of character. 
People who do not yet possess ethical arete might be guided by an external agent 
(either individual or collective or both) equipped with wisdom, whose rationality will 
appeal to their emotional sphere in order to train their non-rational impulses, e.g. by 
appealing to their sense of shame or of fear. Through habituation, the 'still non-
virtuous' will realise gradually both the goodness of a particular kind of actions and 
affections and the reason why these are desirable, and his acquired rationality will 
supply the one of the external agent. 
That the characteristic intermediacy of ethical excellence-as we have seen at NE 
II, 11 06b3 6-1107 a2 is determined as the wise person would determine it suggests that 
phronesis is involved in some way in the development of its rationality. Phronesis, just 
like ethical excellence, is not pure rationality, but it presupposes experience, which re-
elaborates in a rational way the non-rational grasp of particulars and formulates general 
views on what is good and how to achieve it; experience leads people to perform some 
types of action in specific circumstances, and in the way in which these should be done. 
The orthos logos characterizing ethical arete is the rational prescription 9.vhich 
allows its possessors to hit upon intermediacy in actions and affections. I think that, at 
the same time, whilst getting excellence of character, they will gradually also gain 
phronesis and, consequently, also the rational excellence involved in deliberation. 
Phronesis, then, will be a rational disposition stemming from experience, according to 
which decisions will be taken. Phronesis relies on ethical excellence insofar as a good 
deliberation presupposes a good end to be achieved, and such an end is determined by 
ethical arete. 
Given that, as Aristotle says at NE VI, 1144b30-2, it is not possible to possess 
ethical excellence without wisdom, nor to be wise without excellence of character, 
phronesis and arete will turn out to be shaped at the same time. 
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Part II 
Law and Political Justice: Between Individual Arete 
and Human Interaction 
On ne veut pas seulement que la Loi soil 
juste; on veut encore qu'elle soit 
philanthropique. 
On ne se contente pas qu'elle garantisse a 
chaque citoyen Ie libre et inoffensif exercice 
de ses facultes, appliquees a son 
developpement physique, intellectuel et 
moral; on exige d'elle qu'elle repande 
directement sur la nation Ie bien-etre, 
I'instruction et fa moralite. 
Fr6d6rique Bastiat 
Chapter III: 
Lawfulness and Justice in the Nicomachean Ethics 
3.1: Introduction 
In the first part of this thesis we have seen how ethical excellences and phronesis 
contribute to the achievement of human happiness, and how keen wise lawgivers are to 
operate with a view to the education of citizens to good conduct; still, the way in which 
such an education might reach its actualisation has not yet been treated. This will be my 
concern in the present and in the next chapter. The establishment of good laws and of a 
good system of justice seems to provide a way not only to the instantiation of some 
kind of order and stability in the polis, but also to the development of individual 
dispositions of character among its members: law and justice will tum out to be not 
only the expression of the wisdom possessed by those in power, but also the source of 
ethical growth for the members of a good polis. 
In this chapter I propose to investigate the issue of law as it is handled by 
Aristotle in his account of universal justice in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics. The 
passage of Book V I am going to analyse in this paper is NE V, 1129bll-19, where the 
Aristotelian equation of justice with lawfulness is introduced in the form of an endoxon, 
i.e. a belief commonly held by people. The just, Aristotle says at NE V, 1129b 11-13 
while reporting such a belief, amounts to what is lawful, the unjust to what is unlawful. 
It might be wondered whether or not Aristotle takes this equation as true: I believe he 
does, although, as it seems to me, he does not intend to establish an absolute identity 
between lawfulness and justice. The run of his argument displays a shift from beliefs 
commonly held by people, illustrated in the form of endoxa, to a position that is 
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authentically Aristotelian, although such a shift is not immediately perceptible~ it is 
interesting that the argument outlined by Aristotle is made up by sentences which might 
be read as expressing either people's beliefs or as Aristotle's genuine thought. 
What I am going to do in this chapter is to reconstruct the Aristotelian sense of 
such an ambiguous equation. In my view, Aristotle's claim that 'everything lawful is 
just' does not imply that it is obedience to law by itself to make actions and individuals 
just. The adjective 'just' will not be attached to any behaviour whatever, only in virtue 
of its being prescribed by law; nor (as I will show in the next chapter of my thesis) can 
the Aristotelian notion of justice be reduced to mere lawfulness, if by 'lawfulness' we 
mean obedience to any kind of laws, even to laws which drastically fail to attain the 
interest and the happiness of the whole of the polis. 
However, I believe that, in this context, by 'lawfulness' Aristotle does not mean 
obedience to bad laws. I propose that what is truly lawful is what is established by the 
true lawgiver'S art, i.e. the art which aims at the highest good; what is established 
according to such an art cannot fail to achieve the good of the community and its 
members. Still, it seems to me that Aristotle does not conceive justice as obedience to 
perfect laws only. I hope to show that whatever approaches in a way to the perfect 
legislative art will be regarded as just: that is, if an established law manages to secure 
the common happiness at least to some extent, obedience to it will be regarded as a 
source of justice. 
This means that, on the one hand, Aristotle might assume the perfect law and the 
true lawgiver's art as the highest sources of justice, and also as the paradigms in 
relation to which, respectively, the goodness of existing laws and the work of 
politicians can be assessed; on the other hand, as I am going to suggest, obedience to 
the perfect law is not the only kind of lawfulness admissible in the account of universal 
justice; conformity to non-ideal laws may be a source of justice insofar as such laws 
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resemble the perfect law, i.e. the law made according to the lawgiver's art. My view is 
that the lawfulness that lies at the basis of universal justice in the Aristotelian account is 
handled both in its ideal aspect and in its less perfect applications; the ideal character of 
the law is not stressed by Aristotle without any reference to less perfect laws in force in 
real communities, but it seems to represent the supreme goal at which such laws ought 
aim. In that case, even imperfect laws might be regarded as just, insofar as they 
approach the ideal paradigm of law and succeed in achieving the common happiness at 
least to some degree. 
In the second section, I propose to investigate how a good lawgiver is able to 
establish laws which aim at the common happiness or, in other words, how the 
lawgiver's art gets involved in the full actualisation of the aim of laws. Aristotle seems 
to speak of the law according to two different perspectives: on the one hand, as the 
things marked off by lawgivers, as he says at NE V, 1129b12-14; on the other hand, in 
terms of an ideal which prescribes actions according to the whole of ethical excellence, 
as he seems to do at NE V, 1129b 19-24. I propose to show how these two aspects 
contribute to the formulation of a law established by truly wise lawgivers according to 
their art. 
Then, I will focus on the concept of nomothetike, and attempt to tackle the 
lawgiver'S art as a form ofphronesis, as it is described in Book VI of the Nicomachean 
Ethics, so as to find out if that description of nomothetike makes any contribution 
towards a wider understanding of the lawgiver'S role in the political community. In 
Book VI Aristotle argues that, given some ends made correct by arete, one's phronesis 
sets out to find what leads to them; in my view, the analogy between he nomothetike 
and phronesis suggests that the lawgiver's art does not consist in finding legislative 
means to any end whatever, but in working to given ends, which must be provided by 
the law, i.e. the perfect law that enjoins the whole of ethical excellence. 
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3.2: The Just as Lawful 
The first occurrence of the idea of justice as lawfulness is at NE V, 1129a32-1129b 1; it 
is put forward in terms of a belief commonly held by people, together with the 
definition of justice as equal-mindedness: 
)' 
avtcrov», 
i.e., as Rowe translates, 
«People regard as 'unjust' both the person who breaks the law and the grasping, i.e. 
unequal-minded one; hence, clearly, both the law-abiding person and the equal-winded 
one are just. In that case, the just is what is lawful and what is equal, while the unjust is 
what is unlawful and what is unequal». 
As we can see here, both justice as lawfulness and justice as equal-mindedness 
are presented in the form of endoxa; however, they seem to mirror a position which 
Aristotle is keen on developing, since they are assumed as the starting point for his 
investigation and maintained throughout the whole book. At this early stage of the 
discussion, it is not clear yet what Aristotle means by 'law abiding'! and 'equal-
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minded,2; what he is doing here is only to put forward two possible definitions of 
justice without adding any further specification, so that his claim might fit with both 
common opinion and his own thought. As we still see, as he proceeds with his 
argument, his own idea of lawfulness emerges more clearly. 
The adjective 'law-abiding', according to what common people think, might 
suggest that a person's behaviour is just exclusively by virtue of obedience to law, no 
matter what law prescribes; but such a conception of justice might be at odds with the 
idea of justice as isotes expressed at NE V, 1 129b2-1 1, according to which the unjust 
person is a grasping individual who generally chooses the greater share of goods and 
less in the case of things he thinks to be bad. Were justice sheer obedience to law, no 
matter what law prescribes, even one's getting more than is due to him would be 
considered just, if there were laws which allowed such a behaviour or did not forbid it. 
We might expect a development of the argument aimed at showing that such a 
case is to be ruled out; however, after this description of the unequal-minded person, at 
NE V, 1129bll-12 Aristotle points out: 
«l E1tEt 0' b 1to.pavof..lOC; CiOt1coC; llV b OE VOf..l1f..lOC; 01lCo.1oc;, OilAOV 0't1 nav'tcx 
'tel vOf..l1f..la £0"'t1 1tCDC; 01lCo.1o.», 
I.e. 
«But because, as we said, the lawbreaker is unjust and the law-abiding person just, it is 
clear that everything in accordance with law is in a way just». 
2 "'tOOC;. 
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Apparently, Aristotle is declaring that everything according to law is just, even actions 
which, stricto sensu, are unjust. Still, it seems that the opposite intention is lurking in 
his claim. 
I believe that, in order to show that Aristotle's concept of lawfulness does not 
refer to mere obedience to law, we need to explain the sense of the expression '1tCOC;', 
applied to 'just' here at NE V, 1129b 11-2. A plausible explanation might be that the 
phrase 'in a way' refers to the first of the two senses into which justice has been 
divided, i.e. to justice as lawfulness, which Aristotle is careful to distinguish from 
justice conceived as isotes, which rather expresses a way of relating to goods. 
However, it seems that this suggestion needs to be dismissed, given that at NE V, 
1129b 12-14, just after saying that everything lawful is in a way just, Aristotle points 
out: 
1.e. 
«for the things marked off by the lawgiver'S art are in accordance with law, and we do 
call each of these just», 
where the 'yap' here seems to explain the reason why everything in accordance to law 
is 'in a way' just; in that case, the phrase 'in a way' would be connected to the 
lawgiver's art rather than to the distinction between justice as lawfulness and justice as 
equal-mindedness. 
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In my View, Aristotle elaborates his own conception of lawfulness by taking as a 
starting point for his investigation people's beliefs, and by changing the reported 
endoxa into a philosophical position. Aristotle's appeal to the lawgiver's art might, as I 
propose, be the key to a correct understanding of the idea of justice as lawfulness; 
however, notwithstanding his claim that the things laid down by the lawgiver's art are 
in accordance with law, it is not clear yet which kind of law Aristotle has in mind, nor 
does conformity to law explain the nature of such lawfulness. 
It seems that obedience to some kinds of laws might be of benefit to the whole of 
the community, whereas, by contrast, one may also obey laws that are not established 
with a view to the common welfare, or laws that do not succeed in attaining the 
common advantage, despite the efforts made by lawgivers to establish them with a view 
to the citizens' advantage. Is Aristotle referring to one kind of lawfulness in particular 
or to any kind whatever, when he says that everything in accordance with law is in a 
way just? In other words (my earlier question), does he think that even lawfulness as 
obedience to bad laws can be just? 
It might be supposed that justice is a matter of obedience to the laws settled in a 
political community, even imperfect laws3. NE V, 1129bll-19 suggests that, when 
Aristotle refers to lawfulness, it is basically obedience to existing laws that he has in his 
mind, even though such laws are defective. After all, to be nomimos means to put 
oneself in relation to the norms generally accepted by the community, such norms 
consisting not only in written enactments, but also in a set of values and kinds of 
behaviour shared by the citizens4 : the obedience of all the citizens to the laws will in 
most cases be a source of order and well-being in the polis. 
3 See R. Kraut, 2002, p. 101. 
4 See R. Kraut, 2002, p. 105. 
89 
On the other hand, it seems that the laws prescribed by any political community should 
guarantee at least some degree of stability and prevent people from engendering 
conflicts with their fellow-citizens. Even more, provided that the Aristotelian pxpert 
lawgiver will be committed to orientating the citizens to a virtuous behaviour and not to 
passive obedience to the laws, justice will not be a feature of the laws themselves but , 
rather a matter of one's attitude towards the laws. Given that people should be capable 
of assuming a critical attitude towards bad laws, it appears that it is not mere obedience 
to law what Aristotle has in mind when he speaks of lawfulness, because there might be 
laws which do not prescribe good behaviour and to obey them might generate 
instability or disorder in the polis. 
Nevertheless, nowhere does Aristotle point out that he is referring to perfect and 
good laws; if he did, only obedience to absolutely good laws would make an individual 
just, which does not fit well with the idea that everything lawful is in a way just. My 
view is that by 'obedience to law' Aristotle does not seem to mean exclusively 
obedience to non-defective laws, i.e. laws as they would be set up by experts in the art 
of politics, but, on the contrary, he assumes that such a lawfulness applies also to 
imperfect forms of government. In that case, Aristotle's concept of lawfulness would 
refer both to a perfect law, i.e. a law by compliance to which citizens may become 
virtuous, and to existing laws which do not manage to attain the level of perfection of 
the former. 
A first objection to my thesis might be that, when Aristotle claims at NE V, 
1129b 12 that everything which is lawful is in a way just, the 'ta nomima' he mentions 
are not referred to the perfect law, just insofar as they are 'in a way' just; had Aristotle 
been referring to perfect laws, he would rather have claimed that they are just' hap/os', 
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which Aristotle tends to employ mostly in relation to ideal realities5. Another objection 
might be that, were a just person someone who clings exclusively to perfect laws, he 
would not get easily involved in the political affairs of less perfect communities, and 
therefore he would not be able to perform his role as he would be capable of doing6. To 
these objections a response is provided by the remainder of Aristotle's argument, 
which, in my view, reveals that even an ideal, perfect law is included in the concept of 
lawfulness, and not only any existing law whatever. 
At NE V, 1129b 14-17 Aristotle says that 
aAAOV 1:t va 1:p61tOV 1:0tOU1:ov», 
l.e. 
«whenever they pronounce about anything, [the laws] aim either at what is of common 
advantage to all, or at what is of advantage to the best people, or those in power, or on 
some other basis of this sort», 
and, as he continues at NE V, 1129b 17-19, 
5 See R. Kraut, 2002, p. 112. 
6 See R. Kraut, 2002, pp. 112-13. 
91 
I.e. 
«So that in one way we call just the things that create and preserve happiness and its 
parts for the citizen community», 
which suggests that whatever does not promote and preserve the common happiness is 
excluded by the concept of justice 7 . 
The reading of NE V, 1129b14-17 is complicated by some difficulties raised by 
the text as it has come down to us. Rowe's translation, which I have adopted, omits the 
phrase 'KU't' apE'tT,V' referred to 'Ot KUptOt' at NE V, 1129b16, which is bracketed 
in the Oxford Classical Text~ the sense, with 'KU't' ap E'tT, V , would be: 'those who 
have power based on virtue or on some other such thing,8. If we omit the expression 
'KU't' apE'tT,v', we might think that the laws Aristotle is talking about are not 
necessarily established according to ethical excellence; in other words, we might think 
that arete is not necessarily required for the making of a law, given that there might be 
laws established by people who are in power without being virtuous. 
In that case, when Aristotle speaks of just laws, he would not be thinking only of 
good laws, but even of bad ones, that do not aim at common utility. In this respect, 
Aristotle might be referring to any possible criteria according to which rulers establish 
the laws, even in the case of bad constitutions, whose rulers draft laws for their own 
7 On the relationship between justice conceived as lawfulness and the happiness of the whole community 
see R. Bambrough, 1965~ C. Despotopoulos, 1969, p. 290~ E. Riondato, 1978~ G. Santas, 2001, p.280; P. 
Shorey, 1924~ P. Trude, 1955, p. 55~ G. Zanetti, 1993, pp. 20-1. These commentators also point out that, 
when justice is not connected to the common interest, a different form of legality can be found; a form 
which-as I will try to explain at pp. 105-10 of this chapter-approaches the former kind of justice by 
resemblance. 
8 See R. Kraut, 2002, p. 113, footnote 24. 
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advantage at the expenses of the common one. However, I believe that, whether we 
retain or bracket/omit the phrase 'K<l't' apE'tT,V', Aristotle has only good laws in mind, 
provided that they aim at producing at least some degree of happiness for the 
community as a whole and for its members individually taken9. 
If so, when Aristotle says that the laws should aim at the O"UJl~EPOV of the 
aplO"'tOl or of the KUP10l or K<l't' aAAov 1aVa 'tp61tov 't010U'tOV, by 'Ka't' 
aAAOV 'tlVa 'tp01tOV 't010U'tOV' he might be referring to any other similar criterion of 
power, like wealth or free birth. But if we maintain that the laws to which Aristotle is 
referring must produce the common happiness, wealth and free birth will be accepted as 
criteria for the establishment of laws only if they manage to guarantee the well-being of 
the whole polis rather than the happiness of a small part of it; any kind of advantage 
mentioned should be compatible, at least to some extent, with the common happiness, 
and this would support the view that laws must have some degree of goodness in order 
to be taken as a source of justice. If not, we would not be able to explain how each of 
these criteria can be of a similar kind to the types of advantage explicitly mentioned by 
Aristotle (i. e. common advantage, advantage of the best people and advantage of those 
in power). 
So far, Aristotle has not explicitly said what kind of law he is referring to, 
whether an ideal law or less perfect enactments in force in existing communities. 
Nothing rules out that the Aristotelian idea of lawfulness includes both the ideal law, as 
it would be devised by the lawgiver's art, and also imperfect laws existing in defective 
communities which nevertheless are run according to some degree of excellence, given , 
that what is lawful is what is according to laws which aim at the common happiness. I 
have already reported the obj ection of those who maintain that Aristotle is not referring 
9 For a similar view, see G. Zanetti, 1993, p. 20. 
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to the perfect law, given that, had it been the case, he would have used the adverb 
'Cx,1tAcO~' instead of '1tCO~'. My reply to this objection is that the phrase 'in a way' does 
not refer to imperfection in existing laws, but rather to the idea that the lawfulness of 
things and kinds of behaviour is established by the lawgiver's art, which is introduced 
by Aristotle just after his equation of justice with lawfulness. This does not necessarily 
entail that the laws to which Aristotle is referring are exclusively perfect laws; as I have 
just shown, there might be laws which are good to some extent, depending on the 
degree of excellence they achieve. 
As I believe, the defectiveness of imperfect laws does not indicate that these are 
not made according to the legislative art; rather, these laws might be defective in so far 
as they abide by perfect legislative art only to some degree, i.e. not completely. Even 
though Aristotle thinks of he nomothetike as a unique, perfect legislative art, 
nevertheless different degrees of competence might be admitted, degrees to which there 
would correspond laws with respectively different degrees of goodness. It is true that 
the Aristotelian argument mentions only one kind of nomothetike and that Aristotle 
does not make any explicit reference to less perfect forms of it; still, if everything 
lawful is in a way just, even defective laws, and what is just is established according to 
the lawgiver's art, defective laws cannot be just unless we suppose that they refer, at 
least to some degree, to the perfect art. The only way to save the view that even existing 
laws are just is that such laws are devised according to some form of competence, even 
though it is not the perfect one. 
That by 'lawfulness' Aristotle does not mean obedience to perfect laws only is 
evident in the PolitiCS, where he provides various descriptions of constitutions, either 
right or deviant, which are less perfect than the ideal form of government according to 
various degrees of inner excellence. When we think of imperfect laws, we should not 
regard them as established without any level of competence at all; rather, they might 
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approach the legislative art in some way. The 'yap' at NE V, 1129b12 (see p. 83 
above) establishes a tight connection between the statement that everything in 
accordance with law is in a way just and the idea that everything made according to the 
lawgiver's art is lawful; as it seems, it explains the reason why everything in 
accordance to law is 'in a way just', and even though Aristotle does not explicitly claim 
that it is the only reason, he does not provide alternative reasons besides the idea that 
the lawgiver's art is the source of lawfulness; as it were, he does not introduce this 
possibility as only one among different alternatives; that is to say, he does not mention 
other kinds of law that might be taken as lawful. Had he thought of some alternative 
reasons, he would probably have reported them to substantiate his argument. The 
reasonable inference from this, I think, is that the kind of lawfulness Aristotle has in 
mind is indissolubly related to he nomothetike. 
The solution I suggest, then, is that what is nomimos is both what is established 
according to the perfect legislative art and what approaches it by resemblance. 
Certainly the laws made according to the perfect art would be the source of a higher 
degree of justice than the laws made according to some form of competence that only 
approaches that of the perfect art. But given that positive laws, even though imperfect, 
can promote some degree of happiness for the whole of the political community, 
obedience to them will make the individual 'in a way' just, in that such laws are 
approximations to the ideal laws which are devised by such an art IO . I believe that the 
idea of approximation is capable of explaining how the concept of lawfulness includes 
both the ideal and less perfect laws, and would also explain the sense of the phrase 
'1tCOC; OtKata' at NE V, 1129b 12. I suggest that 1troc; allows a reference both to the 
lawfulness that comes about from the true legislative art and to the lawfulness that 
10 A similar reading is provided by T. H. Invin, 2002, p. 623, footnote l. 
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stems from less perfect (although not completely bad) laws, i.e laws that approach the 
ideal law according to nomothetike. 
Aristotle's train of thought might be the following. Given that the lawgiver's art 
(the perfect one) produces good laws, all the laws devised according to such art will be 
good at the highest level; on the other hand, when it comes to laws which do not 
manage to capture properly the ideal promoted by the lawgiver's art, these will be 
lawful insofar as they approach the ideal law, which is established by the true 
lawgiver's art. In that case, 'ncoc;' would allow that there might be some resemblance 
between defective laws and the ideal law of nomothetike. This might be a reason why 
Aristotle adopts the phrase 'in a way' in relation to 'just' instead of the saying 'in 
absolute terms'. Had he used the adverb 'anA-roc;', he would have drawn out attention 
exclusively to what is unqualifiedly just, namely to justice in the ideal sense; bnt, we 
have seen, there are other ways of understanding lawfulness besides conformity to the 
legislative science, e.g. the utterances of laws that are not established according to 
legislative art, where people abide by the law notwithstanding their badnessl1 ; the case 
of the worst laws, i. e. laws completely untouched by the competence of the lawgiver, 
seem not to be part of what Aristotle is referring to, even though people do abide by 
such laws. Rather, Aristotle seems to suggest that only one among such ways, i.e. 
lawfulness as obedience to laws with at least some degree of goodness is the source of 
justice. 
It is true that Aristotle does not make it clear explicitly that his concept of 
lawfulness includes even imperfect laws and neither, as a matter of fact, when he 
speaks of the lawgiver's art, does he specify that more than one degree of perfection is 
included in the concept of he nomothetike; nor, indeed, does he mention different 
11 See R. Kraut, 2002, p. 113. 
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degrees of excellence among universally just actions. But at NE V, 1129b24-5, after 
claiming that the law enjoins actions according to excellence of character, he adds: 
l.e. 
«correctly, if the law has been laid down correctly, but less well if it has been merely 
improvised» ~ 
which would prove his awareness that laws can have different degrees of perfection. 
This should not, in my opinion, be interpreted as an admission of the fallibility of 
the law, as instead Bostock supposes12 . While commenting on NE V, 1129b26, Bostock 
argues that, when Aristotle claims that a law can be set out badly when it is 
'improvised', what he intends to show is that law is not infallible; in order to support 
his view, Bostock makes reference to Aristotle's interest in equity as a form of 
correction of laws when these, because of their generality, cannot sometimes be applied 
successfully in a particular case 13 . Aristotle speaks of E1ttEtKEtCX (which is commonly 
translated with 'equity', but is translated by Rowe with 'reasonableness'), at NE V, 
1137 a3 1-113 8a3, and he tries to account for the way in which it relates to justice. The 
problem he identifies is that, apparently, the 'reasonable' is the same as 'the just', but, 
if seen under a different light, the reasonable is something that 'runs counter to what is 
12 See D. Bostock, 2000, pp. 55-6. 
13 See D. Bostock, 2000, pp. 56-7. 
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just' 14, given that it consists In some sort of correction of the law, all law being 
universal, and being unable to make correct universal pronouncements on some 
h' l'i t lngs -. 
Now, it is true that, on some occasions, laws may not be well applicable to 
particular cases and lawgivers may adopt individual measures which laws by 
themselves would be unable to prescribe with reference to such cases; however, when 
considered under a different light, equity, instead of being a signal of the imperfection 
of some laws, may tum out to be the expression of an attempt to approach the ideal of 
justice which only laws established according to he nomothetike can prescribe. In my 
view, when at NE V, 1 1 29b24-5 Aristotle claims that some laws enjoin virtuous actions 
less well than others which have been laid down 'correctly', what he seems to be 
showing here is only that there might be better and worse laws, not that no law in 
general is infallible; as I believe, the argument of equity/reasonableness introduced by 
Bostock may be misguiding if applied to the reading of the passage in question. Rather, 
what can be drawn of this passage is that some laws, more than others, will approach 
the ideal one, i.e. the one established by the true lawgiver's art, by virtue of their being 
established correctly. A degree of resemblance of an imperfect law to a perfect 
paradigm will make a law to some extent reliable. 
The rest of the argument, at NE V, 1129b17-19, shows that the laws must 
promote happiness for the whole of the political community, so that all the laws that are 
unable to contribute to the welfare of the whole community seem to be excluded from 
the concept of justice. If the kinds of advantage at which the laws aim must be 
compatible with the common happiness, and even promote it, it seems that the laws 
14 See NE V, 1137b2-4, where Aristotle assumes that it might seem odd that the reasonable should be 
something praiseworthy when it is something 'napa 'to OtKatOv'. 
15 See Aristotle, NE V, 1137b13-14. 
98 
must be devised according to some degree of excellence, although they cannot reach 
the ideal. 
A last note is worth making. Aristotle's philosophical argument shows how 
different his equation of justice with lawfulness is from the uncritical equation made by 
common opinion. Even though such an argument is construed so as to dismantle 
erroneous beliefs about justice, we should not forget that the Aristotelian argument 
originates from an endoxon, according to which justice is on the one hand obedience to 
law, on the other hand equal-mindedness. A characteristic of Aristotle's statements is 
that they might be read in a different light if viewed according to the perspective of the 
people's beliefs. For instance, the phrase 'in a way just' at NE V, 1129b12 may be read 
as entailing that everything consonant to any law whatever is just. Although the phrase 
is connected to the idea that what is lawful is what has been established by nomothetike, 
people may think of nomothetike as an arbitrary skill at ruling. Likewise, when 
Aristotle claims that laws aim at many kinds of advantage, not only the common 
advantage of all or the advantage of the best people, but also the advantage of the 
people in charge of political offices, he probably means that even obedience to the laws 
in force in the worst cities, aiming only at the advantage of incompetent rulers and 
therefore devised without excellence, is a source of justice. 
It is also true that, in people's opinion, the laws should aim at the common 
happiness, so that the '8ste hena men tropon dikaia legomen' at NE V, 1129b17 might 
also hint at what people generally say about the aim of the laws, and not only at 
Aristotle's philosophical thesis. The hena men tropon, which, according to Aristotle, 
seems to refer to the idea of justice as lawfulness, might also reasonably be applied to 
the idea of lawfulness as held by those who believe that it is obedience to any law 
whatever, even to bad laws. That nowhere in his argument does Aristotle hint at a 
possible incompatibility between justice as lawfulness, aimed at the promotion of the 
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common happiness, and justice as obedience to bad laws, fosters the sense of ambiguity 
in the passage in question, which might be also interpreted in terms of what common 
people believe. 
However, that Aristotle's view distances itself from the endoxa becomes clear 
when at NE V, 1129b19-24 he claims that the law enjoins actions performed according 
to excellence of character, so that the endoxa cease to be empty beliefs and are changed 
into a philosophical position, according to which the legal character of justice is not to 
be reckoned as a mere application of law, whatever law is. 
3.3: The Lawgiver's Art 
So far, I have dealt with the issue of lawfulness in the context of justice, and confined 
myself to showing that lawfulness is to be conceived as obedience to both the perfect 
law and moderately defective laws, without investigating the idea of a 'perfect law' and 
of the art according to which such a law is devised. In this section, I would like to 
concentrate on the ideal aspects of the law and of the lawgiver's art, and show the 
relationship between ho nomos and he nomothetike. 
We might wonder how the lawgiver'S art contributes to the making of such a law. 
NE V, 1129b 11-19 suggests that the laws aiming at the common happiness are the same 
things that are marked off by the lawgiver, which are nomima insofar as they are 
determined by the legislative art or only approach it; in that case, it seems reasonable to 
believe that the lawgiver's art must be involved in the realisation of the aim of laws, i.e. 
happiness of the whole of the political community. The reference to a perfect 
nomothetike art might indicate when a law is well or badly established; in that case, the 
idea of a perfect legislative science would be regarded as the measure of the goodness 
and badness of concrete laws and might even indicate a way to improve them. 
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As I have tried to show before, Aristotle's argument indicates that what the lawgiver's 
art establishes cannot be bad: his claim that everything lawful is just seems ultimately 
to rely on the assumption that the lawgiver's art is infallible, and whatever approaches 
it relies in any case on a stable model, capable of guaranteeing the highest degree of 
goodness in the making of laws. His statement at NE V, 1129b12-14 reveals the role 
played by the lawgiver's art in the establishment of justice; still, all the same, it seems 
to shed light on the idea of a law which is not a mere result of his activity, but 
something prior to it; a source of inspiration, as it were, for the lawgiver himself and, it 
might be suggested, what makes his art objectively grounded and infallible. 
The adjective nomimos, in fact, we might well take as referring not only to he 
nomothetike, but also to nomos, given that nomimos means primarily 'accord:ng to 
law'. On the one hand, Aristotle is explaining that people will perform just actions by 
sticking to the things marked off by the lawgiver's art, so that nomimos would refer to 
such an art; on the other hand, it should also be recalled that what the lawgiver aims at 
is the establishment of excellence that will contribute to the happiness of the political 
community, and the actualisation of such a goal according to the lawgiver's art requires 
the understanding of what the law should prescribe: the ideal character of law, in other 
words, should be kept in mind by wise lawgivers when they make laws. 
At NE V 1129b13 Aristotle refers to the laws in terms of ''tel cbp1cr~Eva U1tO , 
'tTtC; VO~OeE't1KTtC;'; Presumably, these are written enactments made by lawgivers 
according to art, in order to solve specific problems in the polis. By contrast, he uses 
the word '01 V0f.101' at NE V, 1129b 14, where he points out that the kinds of advantage 
the laws aim at are established with a view to happiness. But, above all, he talks of b 
V0f.10C; also in the already mentioned NE 1129b 19-24, in which he explains what the 
law should enjoin, namely ethical excellence: 
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«ltpocr'tO:t'tEt 0' b v6~o~ Kal 'ta 'tou aVOpEt01) epya ltOtEtV, OlOV J.l1l AEtltEtV 
. 
1.e. 
«But the law also enjoins us to do what the courageous person does (e.g. not leaving 
one's post, or running away, or throwing down one's weapons), and what the moderate 
person does (e.g. not committing adultery, or rape), and what the mild person does (e.g. 
not throwing punches, or resorting to verbal abuse)- and similarly in accordance with 
the other excellences and the corresponding forms of badness, ordering us to do some 
things and forbidding others». 
The law Aristotle is describing in this context is not any law whatever, since it 
prescribes the kind of virtuous behaviour which a good lawgiver should promote in the 
community with a view to common happiness, such a happiness consisting in an 
activity of citizens according to the whole of the ethical excellences. 
Conceived in this sense, the law described by Aristotle at NE V, 1129b 19-24 
expresses the ethical values by which good lawgivers are inspired in their framing a 
constitution' in this respect such an ideal law would be a measure of the lawgiver's art , , 
and, presumably, also of the goodness of the things established by lawgivers 
themselves. As it seems, b v6~oC; here expresses some ideal version of law, since what 
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it prescribes are not the immediate resolutions of particular laws in any given polis, but, 
more generally, common advantage and excellence of character. 
However, b VOIl0C; does not seem to be separate from 'to. mptcJ"IlEva U1tO 'tile; 
VOIlOeE'ttKilc;, which are real legislative measures. Aristotle might be slmply 
describing two different aspects of the law, and not two different laws: on the one hand, 
its specific content (i.e. particular laws as they are set up by the lawgiver); on the other 
hand, the ideal towards which a law strives, i.e. excellence of character/happiness. This 
second aspect of the law, which is presumably the aspect to which Aristotle refers at 
NE V, 1129b 19-24, illustrates in some way its ideal nature, since it shows how laws 
should be in order to promote justice in every circumstance. The expression ''to. 
mptcjllEva U1tO 'tilc; VOIlOeE'ttKlle;', instead, seems to indicate that Aristotle is 
talking of existing laws, and not of a vague idea of law detached from political reality. 
Now, it is difficult to believe that Aristotle is referring to a single law described 
according to two different perspectives. The idea of a perfect law seems to be very 
distant from concrete political laws; for instance, it might be objected that we will never 
find any law made by a lawgiver saying 'behave according to courage' or 'perform 
mild actions', but, rather, laws that regulate the allotment of private portions of land, 
that solicit the payment of money for some injustice, or that warn us against committing 
adultery etc. Apparently, the law, as it is described in the account of universal justice, is 
different from the specific decrees in force in some kinds of polis. 
Rather, the excellence prescribed by law might be seen as the long-term aim of 
particular laws; in that case, there would not be any universal law, more ambitious than 
others, which aims at promoting the excellence of the citizens alongside I.., less 
ambitious law that deals with more concrete matters (for example, the distributions of 
honours and money). Then, we might distinguish the aims of law into two aspects: 
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1) ethical excellence as a long-term aim; 
2) resolution of specific matters in the community as an 'immediate' aim. 
NE V, 1129b19-24 reveals the ethical aspect of law16, given that what law prescribes 
(in one of its aspects) is the whole of ethical excellence; if the lawgiver acts according 
to his art, the things marked off by him will provide the citizens with a model for ~cting 
according to ethike arete. In that case, the ideal law, given its capacity to produce 
happiness and ethical excellence, might be the law by reference to which things are 
held to be nomima, being a paradigm that suggests how every law should be; given that 
what is according to the law is determined by the lawgiver's art, whoever possesses 
such art must know what the law is and what it prescribes. So, in one way, the ideal law 
that orientates the lawgiver's art towards the making of particular laws would be the 
condition of its goodness; according to another point of view, the nomos is not separate 
from the particular laws made by the lawgiver according to art, just because it 
represents the end that the lawgiver should have in mind when he drafts a law, i.e. 
ethical arete. 
So far, I have tried to show that the law, i.e. the law underlying the lawgiver'S art, 
represents the ideal by tending to which particular laws will necessarily prescribe just 
actions. This might suggest that the task of a good lawgiver will consist in finding 
procedures leading to ethical excellence. What I am going to do now is to develop the 
idea of he nomothetike by introducing an interesting argument of Book VI of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, i.e. that in which the lawgiver'S art is described as a form of 
phronesis. I will make use of the relationship between phronesis and arete established 
16 Cf. Shorey's objection to Vinogradoff's legal approach to universal justice in P. Shorey, 1924, p. 279: 
«Aristotle's Universal Justice seems to me an ethical, rather than a legal, conception and what legal 
reference there may be is brought in only in subordination to, and in illustration of, the ethical ideal». 
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in the first part of this thesis to show that the lawgiver's art cannot be separate from 
ethike arete, which is the end at which ho nomos aims. 
As we have seen, the true lawgiver's art will work on ends like ethical excellence 
and common happiness, i.e. ends which are prescribed by the ideal law and which 
lawgivers ought to reproduce in the form of particular enactments. In this respect, we 
may find an analogy between legislative art and phronesis as it is described in Book VI 
of the Nicomachean Ethics. That the lawgiver's art can be taken as a form of wisdom is 
explicitly stated at NE VI, l14lb23-4, where Aristotle says that 
,) ,-
ou 'tau'tov au'tatc;», 
1.e. 
«political expertise and wisdom are the same disposition, but their being is not the 
same». 
As he goes on to explain, the former is practised with reference to the whole of the city, 
whereas the latter is confined to the happiness of the individual who possesses it
l7
. 
With this relationship as given, the description of phronesis may help us to 
discover aspects of legislative art which are not explicitly stated by Aristotle; even 
more because political expertise, as we are going to see, is described as a form of 
phronesis and therefore is not merely analogous to it l8 . When Aristotle describes the 
17 See Aristotle, NE VI, 1141h24-30. 
18 For an account of legislative art and political expertise as fonus of phronesis see R. Bodeus, 2004, pp. 
65-78. 
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first kind of disposition, namely the one that relates to the city, he identifies two 
different forms of political wisdom: legislative expertise, i. e. nomothetike, and political 
expertise, i.e. politike, which, as I propose to explain, are deeply related, although 
Aristotle describes them as separate skills: 
«Of the disposition as it relates to the city, the architectonic form of wisdom is 
legislative expertise (nomothetike), while the form of wisdom at the level of the 
particular is given the generic name 'political expertise' (politike), and this is concerned 
with action and deliberation, since a decree (psephisma) is something to be acted upon, 
as what comes last in the process. This is why only people at this level are said to take 
part in politics, because only they do things, like the various kinds of manual 
workers» 19. 
In this context, legislative expertise seems to be distinguished from the political on the 
basis of its being architektonike. In order to find out what nomothetike really is, we 
need to investigate what 'architektonike' means. 
If we look back at Book V, we will see that a lawgiver who acts according to 
nomothetike will not work as a manual worker does, if by 'someone analogous to 
manual worker' we mean a person like a magistrate or someone who confines himself 
to putting into effect the orders dictated by someone else, sometimes even without 
knowing the reason why these are prescribed20 . Rather, a lawgiver will be a person who 
marks off particular things with a higher end in mind: the promotion of happiness in the 
community. Were the art of the lawgiver based on mere ability to pursue any end 
regardless of its nature, neither would the things marked off accordingly prescribe 
19 Aristotle, NE VI, 1141b25-30. 
20 See R. Bodefts, 2004, p. 66, footnote 2. 
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ethical excellence, nor would they promote happiness for the whole of the community. 
In the same way, phronesis is not described as the mere ability to reach some end which 
has been established arbitrarily, as Aristotle points out at NE VI, 1144a23-8: 
«There is an ability that people call 'cleverness,2\ and this is of a sort such that, when 
it comes to the things that conduce to a proposed goal, it is able to carry these out and 
do so successfully. Now if the aim is a fine one, this ability is to be praised, but if the 
aim is a bad one, then it is unscrupulousness; which is why we say that both the wise 
and the unscrupulous are clever. Wisdom is not identical with this ability, but is 
conditional upon it». 
As we have seen in chapter II of my thesis, Aristotle acknowledges that, although 
ethical arete and wisdom seem to have different roles in the process of good 
deliberation, i.e. respectively of making the goal and what leads to it correct22, at NE 
VI, 1 1 44a29-b 1 he says that phronesis cannot exist without excellence. In the same 
way, we might suggest that the starting point for the lawgiver's activity according to the 
legislative art should be the knowledge of what end is best to aim for, and the best end 
in absolute terms is the one provided for by the law on which his art rests: happiness. 
The task of the lawgiver's art will be to find means to reach this end. Just as ethical 
phronesis is a different matter from arete, but cannot be possessed without arete, in the 
same way political expertise will not be practised without he nomothetike, giveT} that 
Aristotle is not referring here to mere cleverness. 
I proposed so far that he nomothetike is grounded in a law that prescribes ethical 
excellence as a source of happiness for the citizens of a community; given that 
21 o ElvO'tTl'ta. 
22 See Aristotle, NE VI, 1144a7-8. 
107 
universal law, as we have already hypothesized, is an ideal one, it seems plausible to 
suppose that the lawgiver's art too is taken in its ideal aspect, just insofar as it depends 
on such a law. Aristotle is not speaking here of any art liable to improvements or 
refinements, which would tum out to be only an approximation to the ideal and 
therefore capable of making mistakes. Had Aristotle been referring to such kinds of art, 
provided that the interpretation of NE V, 1129b 12-14 I have suggested is right, he 
would never have appealed to the lawgiver's art in order to show that things according 
to law are always just. 
Having said this, we might see how the difference drawn between he nomothetike 
and the form of political expertise more concerned with particulars, i.e. he politike, may 
allow us to understand how the lawgiver's art comes into being, and how it relates to 
concrete political experience. In order to clarify the specific roles of nomothetike and 
politike and establish their mutual relationships, let us take up NE VI, 1141 b:L5-30. 
Apparently, the so-called political expertise is more specifically concerned with 
deliberation and action than legislative expertise per se, given that he nomothetike is 
described as having to do with a process of general reasoning, whereas he politike is 
concerned with the final action that is the outcome specific choices; in this specific 
context, Aristotle seems to be making a distinction between a decree, which is the last 
term in the process of deliberation, and law at the basis of legislative expertise. Only 
people who are at the level of what comes last in the process of action and deliberation 
are said to take part in politics, Aristotle says, and in this respect they act as though 
they were manual workers. 
Presumably, when Aristotle refers to such people as the only individuals said to 
take part in politics, he does not mean that those who possess legislative expertise are 
never involved in the life of the polis, nor does he suggest that their task in the polis has 
nothing to do with action and deliberation. On the other hand, that people operating at 
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the level of particular actions and deliberations are compared to manual workers does 
not necessarily imply that none of them possesses an 'architectonic' form of wisdom. 
The distinction drawn between nomothetike and politike might be a conceptual 
one, and it does not necessarily imply that whoever possesses the architectonike 
legislative art is not endowed with political expertise or vice versa~ for instan-:e, as 
Aristotle claims at Pol. I, 1260a17-19, people in power in the ideal polis must possess 
complete excellence of character: 
1.e. 
«The ruler [ ... ] must possess moral goodness in its full and perfect form [i.e. the form 
based on rational deliberation], because his function, regarded absolutely in its full 
nature, demands a master-artificer, and reason is such a master-artificeD), 
which suggests that architectonic wisdom is the excellence of people engaged in the 
rule of the polis and not exclusively of individuals only indirectly involved in political 
life; people that, presumably, might have participated before in the affairs of the polis 
as citizens in charge of deliberative and judicial functions23 , and therefore in possession 
of he politike. 
23 At NE VI, 1141b32-3 political expertise (;, 1tOAt'ttKr,), as distinguished from legislation (;, 
voJl08Ema) is said to be split into deliberative (J30UAEU'ttKTl) and judicial (OtKaa'ttKT,); both forms 
of he politike operate at the level of particulars, unlike he nomothetike. 
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The individuals in possession of the architektonike art might not participate in the 
political life in the same way as those who draft specific decrees, in that they might not 
be involved in the actualisation of psephismata, an activity which is more characteristic 
of the kind of political expertise concerned with particulars; people who have the 
architektonike art, for example, might be experts in ethics and general political issues, 
and therefore capable of setting up good political frameworks in general, by virtue of 
their possessing the whole of ethical excellence. When it comes to people engaged in 
political activity at the level of particulars, instead, people who lay down decrees do not 
always act while having in mind the idea of how laws in general should be; in this 
respect, as I think, Aristotle compares them to manual workers, although it seems that 
in an ideal, absolutely good community, their competence might be supported by a 
general knowledge of how laws should be established and communities organised in 
general. 
Even if people in possession of legislative expertise were not the same persons 
who draft psephismata, nevertheless they might guide the work of those in charge of 
such a task, for instance through the setting up of the principles by which constitutions 
are formed. It is true that people engaged as 'manual workers' in political activity, 
either deliberative or judicial, produce decisions upon concrete matters, and it is only at 
the point of deliberation that wisdom becomes fully practical; still, we might suppose 
that even those who possess the legislative art are familiar with political decisions, in 
that such an art, as a kind of phronesis, is engendered through experience, and 
experience, as we have seen in Chapter II, has mainly to do with concrete particulars 
than universal principles. This argument seems to apply also to the lawgiver's art, given 
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that it is not a systematic knowledge and therefore cannot be acquired in the same way 
as a scientific discipline24 . 
The same conclusion can be derived from the discussion of nomothetike at NE X , 
1180b28-1181 b 15, where Aristotle wonders about the source of the lawgiver's art. At 
NE X, 1180b28-9, he proposes to inquire from what source one might become expert in 
legislation, given that, as he goes on at NE X, 1180b30-1, 
«after all, legislation seems, as we saw, to be a part of political expertise». 
If the legislative art is acquired through a process of activity at the level of particulars, 
the lawgiver, in order to get hold of such an art, must be already familiar with particular 
aspects of the political life. If so, when it comes to legislative art, general views about 
what is good for the ruling of a polis cannot be separated from experience at the level of 
particulars, and whoever deals with the highest ends of the law should also possess 
some degree of expertise in practical decisions. If the lawgiver's art comes about from 
experience, whoever possesses such an art, as a consequence, will be capable of using 
his practical expertise also in particular situations. 
As Aristotle claims at Pol. III, 1279a2-8, nothing prevents the trainer from being 
on occasions himself also one of the persons who do some training, in the same way as 
the pilot is always a member of the crew. It may happen, for example, that those who 
used to be at the highest position in the ruling of the polis end up by getting involved in 
particular situations where practical wisdom concerned with particulars is more 
required than a general form of knowledge of what is generally good in a political 
community, e.g. in forms of government based on the principle of equality between the 
24 Cf. the already mentioned NE II, 1142all-20 in 2.3 of this thesis. 
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citizens where people hold office by turn25 . When those who have occupied political 
positions as rulers become common citizens, their phronesis inevitably shifts from the 
level of universal issues to more practical matters that require some kind of ground-
level wisdom, either juridical or deliberative. That in Aristotle's view the characteristic 
activity of the citizen consists in taking part in deliberative and judicial offices26 seems 
to mean that citizens are committed to tasks which involve more ground-level wisdom 
than the architectonic one, and when the rulers become common citizens, presumably 
they have to cope with such tasks. 
So, the analogy drawn by Aristotle between people who take part in politics and 
manual workers does not entail that 'manual' activity is always disengaged frOtrJ. ideal 
ends, but, on the contrary, that it should be driven by the awareness that laws should 
prescribe ethical excellences. In this respect, po!itike is not always a mere form of 
experience at making decrees, but a kind of competence which displays itself at the 
level of particulars without being a separate matter from the search for the highest ends 
of the law, pursued by nomothetike. 
3.4: Conclusions 
In this chapter I proposed to investigate how Aristotle deals with the issues of law and 
lawfulness in book V of the Nicomachean Ethics. The passage of Book V I have 
attempted to analyse in the first section is NE 1129bll-19; my proposal was to 
reconstruct the meaning of the equation of justice with lawfulness, which, although 
introduced by Aristotle in the form of an endoxon, i.e a belief commonly held by 
people, seems to mirror an authentically Aristotelian position. 
25 See Aristotle, Pol. III, 1279a5-8. 
26 See Aristotle, Pol. III, 1275a22-4. 
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I hope to have demonstrated that, in his thought, lawfulness is not to be intended as 
uncritical obedience to law, whatever law prescribes. A subtle link may be found 
between the law and the lawgiver's art, which seems to be the source of true lawfulness 
and justice; I suggested that this link explains in which way whatever is lawful can be 
regarded as just: only the true legislative art produces just laws, i. e. laws capable of 
contributing to common happiness. Obedience to a perfect law is not the only kind of 
lawfulness admissible; conformity to non-ideal laws may be a source of justice in so far 
as such laws resemble the perfect law, i.e. the law made according to the lawgiver's art. 
In the second section of this chapter, I have tried to investigate the nature of the 
lawgiver's art and to illustrate its connections with the issue of law, by showing that 
Aristotle refers to nomothetike in terms of an art which enables whoever possesses it to 
establish laws capable of contributing to the common happiness. On the one hand, such 
an art might be regarded as the real source of lawfulness; on the other hand, it might be 
a source of inspiration from the ethical values which the ideal law prescribes. As 
Aristotle shows at NE V, 1129bI9-24, what the law should enjoin is activity according 
to each of the ethical excellences possessed by a fully virtuous person, so that to know 
what such a law prescribes will be the ground of the art of ruling; in other words, at the 
basis of the ideal legislative art lies the knowledge of the ideal law: to know what the 
perfect law prescribes should drive the lawgiver towards the making of laws capable of 
promoting the common advantage. 
I have argued that such an ideal law is not a separate law from ta horismena hupo 
tes nomothetikes, i.e. the existing laws established by lawgivers. I suggested that ho 
nomos represents the long-term aim of the law, which seems to be connected more to 
its final end than to the immediate resolutions of the particular laws made by lawgivers. 
Still, Aristotle is not speaking of two different kinds of laws; simply, he might be 
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referring to a single law, devised with a view to the resolution of specific problems in 
the polis and at the same time capable of promoting ethike arete. 
Given that good lawgivers make laws by having in mind the ideal to which every 
law should aim, they might be thought of as working on fixed, virtuous ends; in this 
respect, the legislative art can be seen as a form of phronesis, since it provides whatever 
forwards a good end, i.e. an end made correct by excellence of character. The close 
relationship between nomothetike and phronesis outlined in Book VI of the 
Nicomachean Ethics is illuminating also because it provides us with useful details 
about legislative art which are not treated in Book V; the legislative art, for example, is 
not only a matter of framing good policies, but also presupposes the capacity to deal 
with concrete political situations, which provides the experience required to formulate 
general views about the good of the state. 
To conclude, even though in Book VI Aristotle draws a distinction betV\een a 
form of political expertise concerned with universal issues and another more grounded 
in the particular political situation, such aspects should be combined in good rulers: 
both forms of wisdom rely on the ends established by ethike arete, or otherwise they 
would be mere cleverness and not a capacity to promote the well being of the whole of 
the community. 
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Chapter IV: 
The 'Other-regarding' Aspect of Universal Justice 
4.1: Introduction 
In the last chapter I have introduced the issue of law as it is treated in Book V of the 
Nicomachean Ethics; as we have seen, lawfulness was identified with one of the senses 
in which the notion of justice might be understood. The two senses of justice mentioned 
by Aristotle were reported in the form of endoxa, which might lead us to thirr~ that 
what people usually believe about justice does not correspond to Aristotle's own 
conception of justice. However, as I have already suggested before, it seems that 
Aristotle is keen on deveioping such beliefs with a view to elaborating his theory of 
justice. The idea of justice as lawfulness, as we have already seen, induces him to speak 
of a law which enjoins the whole of ethical excellences, and to identify this 'meaning' 
of justice with complete excellence1; in this respect, such a justice might be called 
'universal'. By contrast, justice in terms of isotes is regarded as a single part of 
excellence rather than being entire excellence itself: this is the source of the well-
known Aristotelian distinction between universal and particular justice2. 
In this chapter I will try to shed some light on the notion of universal justice as it 
is handled in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics, and to establish its relationships with 
particular justice. At NE V, 1129b30-3 Aristotle claims that universal justice prescribes 
complete excellence of character to the highest degree, since the person who possesses 
1 See Aristotle, NE V, 1129b25-6: «amll JlEV ouv " Ou(awO"uvll a.PE'tT, JlEV EO"'tl 'tEA-Eta». 
2 On the distinction between universal and particular justice see for example R. Bambrough, 1965, pp. 
159-63; A. MacIntyre, 1988, pp. 103-4; F. Rosen, 1975, pp. 228-9; B. Yack, 1993, pp. 149-57; G. 
Zanetti, p. 1993, pp. 18-31. 
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it exercises his excellence in relation to other people, and not just by himself; such a 
view finds support in the common belief that justice is an allotrion agathon3. My 
starting question will be the following: what makes a virtuous act an act of justice? Or, 
in other words, what causes an ethical excellence to become an allotrion agathon, i.e. a 
good performed in relation to other people? 
I suggest that the Aristotelian account of particular justice as isotes may 
contribute to clarifying the way in which actions done from ethical excellences become 
just actions in the universal sense. I claim that, as a possible (although apparently 
paradoxical) consequence of the Aristotelian description of universal and particular 
justice, isotes-in a way-might coincide with what makes an excellence of character 
something relating to the well-being of the political community; that is to say that 
particular justice would be the condition of the possibility of universal justice. 
I hope to show that each arete belonging to universal justice is itself a form of 
isotes, insofar as it displays some concern for the well-being of the whole community 
and contributes to preserving the proportion according to which goods and functions 
are distributed in the polis; these properties, as I maintain, belong not to ethical 
excellence per se, but to equal-mindedness. 
A reasonable objection to my thesis will immediately raise: in the first five 
sections of Book V, Aristotle seems more committed to stress differences than 
connections between universal and particular justice. As the relationship between the 
two forms of justice is established, it seems that not everything lawful is ~qual, 
whereas, conversely, everything equal is lawful4. If so, how would it be plausible to 
claim that the aretai belonging to universal justice are kinds of isotes? 
3 See Aristotle, NE V, 1130a2-5. 
4 See G. Zanetti, 1993, p. 23; cf. R. Kraut, 2002, p. 103. See also R. Bambrough, 1965, p. 159: «A man 
. .. ·11 ·1 b J·ust in the second sense [particular 
who is just in the first sense [uruversal JustIce] WI necessan Y e 
justice], but a man may be just in the second sense without being just in the first sense». 
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My reply to that objection will find support in the variety of perspectives according to 
which the issue of particular justice is approached by Aristotle; as we are going to see 
in section III of chapter V, besides being treated as a disposition of character, isotes is 
also described in terms of political activities concerned with distributions of goods and 
rectifications, and relies on the idea of reciprocity (section V)5. My view is that just 
actions in the universal sense take place in the context described under the notion of 
'particular justice', and are performed with respect for one's fellow-citizens just as isoi 
actions. 
In order to support my thesis, in the first section of this chapter I will try to 
demonstrate that, when Aristotle speaks of justice as the whole of ethical excellence, he 
is referring to justice of a political kind, and not simply to justice in private 
relationships; in the second section, instead, I will show that in the excellence of isotes 
is contained a form of being in relation to others of the same political nature ~s the 
relational aspect at the basis of universal justice. I am going to call this aspect of justice 
'other-regardingness' . 
4.2: Ethical Excellences in Universal Justice: Their Political Nature 
The notion of justice occupies a prominent role in Aristotle's ethical theory; in the 
Nicomachean Ethics he devotes an entire book to investigating what sort of actions it 
, 
relates to and what sort of intermediate state it is6. His approach to the issue is not one-
sided; on the contrary, he explores different perspectives according to which justice can 
be investigated. The first indication about the nature of justice provided by Aristotle is 
that everyone uses 'justice' to mean 
5 See Bodeus, 2004, p. 107; cf. B.A.O Williams, 1980. 
6 See Aristotle, NE V, 1129a3-5 
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«the sort of disposition 
7 
that makes people such as to do just things, i.e. which makes 
them act justly and wish for what is just» 8. 
That justice is held to be an hexis reminds us of its closeness to any other 
excellence of character: unlike any kind of episteme or dunamis, which seem to relate 
to both members of a pair of contraries9 and might be employed with a view to opposite 
ends, justice will not enable us to do a thing and its contrary; in other words, whoever 
possesses such an hexis will not perform unjust acts. 
Now, let us go back to the two senses of justice reported at NE V, 1129a33-4: on 
the one hand, as people think, justice is lawfulness; on the other hand, justice is to be 
identified with equal-mindedness. As we have seen in the last chapter, the equation of 
justice with lawfulness established by Aristotle suggests that justice is not obedience to 
any law whatever, independently of its goodness, but, rather, obedience to a law which 
enjoins the whole of ethical excellence. This kind of justice, i.e. the justice that 
prescribes complete excellence of character, is commonly called universal justice. 
My concern here will be with one aspect in particular: ethical excellences that 
belong to universal justice are exercised in relation to other people. As I have said in 
the introduction to this chapter, I am going to call such a relational aspect of ethical 
excellences 'other- regardingness'. As we read in NE V, 1129b25-7, 
u'A'AcX 1tpOC; E'tEPOV», 
7 ~tC;. 
8 Aristotle, NE V, 1129a6-9. 
9 See Aristotle, NE V, 1129a13-14. 
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l.e. 
«This justice, [then], is complete excellence, only not without qualification but in 
relation to another persom>, 
and, as Aristotle explains at NE V, 1129b30-3, 
6:AA' ou J.lovov 1<:0.8' al)1;6v», 
1.e. 
«it is complete excellence to the highest degree because it is the activation of complete 
excellence; complete, too, because the person who possesses it has the capacity to put 
his excellence to use in relation to another person as well, and not just by himself». 
As we can see, Aristotle is insisting on a particular aspect of justice, i.e. a kind of 
relation to other people which is proper to those possessing such a disposition; as he 
will explain at NE V, 1130a3-6, that is why people regard justice as an allotrion 
agathon: 
I 'f\)/ 'f\ ,.. 
npa't'tEt, 11 apxov'tt l11<:otvcovcp», 
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1. e. 
«It is also for the same reason, i.e. that it relates to another person, that justice alone of 
the excellences is thought to be someone else's good-because the just person does what 
is of advantage to someone else, whether someone in power or associate». 
By describing justice as 'someone else's good', Aristotle implies that the effects 
of such a good will not be exclusively felt by the possessors of justice, but also to those 
towards which one is justlO . When Aristotle engages in a description of the various 
excellences of character, he seems to stress their being practicable because of 
themselves with a view to individual happiness rather than their being the outcome of 
one's virtuous conduct in relation to other people; in this respect, justice as the whole of 
ethical excellence immediately appears as a different kind of disposition from the rest 
of ethical virtues. As Aristotle explains at NE V, 1129b33-1130a1, 
«many people are able to display their excellence in relation to what belongs to them, 
but incapable of doing so when it comes to dealing with another person»; 
in other words, a virtuous action does not necessarily need to be performed with regard 
to other people, but when we speak of justice in the universal sense we cannot think of 
10 On the notion of allotrion agathon, see G. Zanetti, 1993, p. 21: «La giustizia universale si differenzia 
dalle altre virtU grazie al suo costitutivo rapportarsi all' a/tro: essa rappresenta dunque il fondamento 
intersoggettivo della virtU, la fondamentale interazione presupposta da Aristotele nella sua concezione 
della giustizia come virtU socia/e, ponte teorico fra cio che in epoca moderna sarebbero stati definiti 
come ambiti dell'etica e della politica». Cf. R. Bodeiis, 2004, pp. 109-12. A different perspective on the 
issue is offered by F. Rosen, 1975; Rosen compares the Aristotelian treatments of justice as a I/o trion 
agathon with the argument provided in Plato's Republic 343C; unlike Thrasymachus, who claims that 
justice is a 'good of others' insofar as it works to the advantage of the stronger, Aristotle uses that 
expression to indicate that justice serves the advantage of virtuous men (pp. 229-30). 
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an ethical excellence simply as exercised exclusively in view of an individual's ethical 
perfection. I will now try to explore the idea of the 'other-regardingness' of universal 
justice and investigate its nature by reference to the other ethical excellences which this 
notion of justice seems to encompass. 
As it seems, the notion of universal justice will not be fully understood unless we 
proceed to investigating the elements which such a notion involves. We might start by 
concentrating on the ethical excellences that universal justice includes. What is 
immediately worth noticing is that, in the context of universal justice, ethical 
excellences are treated in a different way from the way in which Aristotle describes 
them in Books II, III and IV of the Nicomachean Ethics; as I have suggested above, in 
the latter case they are not illustrated in terms of being in relation to other individuals. 
The difference between justice and simple excellences of character is stressed at 
NE V, 1130a12-13: 
1. e. 
«while it is the same disposition, what it is to be the first [excellence] is not the same as 
what it is to be the second [justice]; rather, in so far as the state relates to another 
person, it is justice, while in so far as it is this sort of disposition without such a 
qualification, it is excellence». 
This suggests that the idea of an ethical excellence exercised with reference to other 
people is not necessarily entailed by the definition of ethical arete given at NE II, 
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11 06b3 6-1107 aI, where it is described as a sort of intermediacy between passions and 
affections. 
A person may act according to his ethical arete without this affecting someone 
else's life; for instance, the actions of a temperate individual might be concerned 
uniquely with his own affairs and not necessarily involve any kind of relation with 
others, e.g. when one's refraining from overeating benefits no one besides oneselfl1. 
The same holds true of courage: for instance, in isolated hand-to-hand combat, one's 
capacity to dominate fear may be exercised exclusively for the sake of individual 
safety, given that no one else beside oneself is at risk12. 
These examples suggest that concern for the good of other people is not to be 
found within ethical excellence per se. But, if so, how do excellences of character come 
to be displayed with regard to other people? Let us take up the already mentioned 
passage at NE V, 1129b19-25, in which Aristotle deals with the issue of universal law; 
as I believe, it reveals that there are cases in which someone's actions affect other 
people positively or negatively: 
«But the law also enjoins us to do what the courageous person does (e.g. not leaving 
one's post, or running away, or throwing down one's weapons), and what the moderate 
person does (e.g. not committing adultery, or rape), and what the mild person does (e.g. 
not throwing punches, or resorting to verbal abuse )-and similarly in accordance with 
the other excellences and the corresponding forms of badness, ordering us to do some 
things and forbidding others; correctly, if the law has been laid down correctly, but less 
well if it has been merely improvised». 
11 See R. Kraut, 2002, p. 119. 
12 See R. Kraut, 2002, p. 119. 
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As we can see here, Aristotle's main concern is not to illustrate arete in terms of 
individual ethical perfection. For instance, when he claims that the law enjoins us to do 
what the courageous person does, he is not referring to courage in terms Jf an 
intermediate state relating to fearing and being bold, as he is at NE III, IIISa6, nor is 
he describing the sort. of things according to which we are called courageous or 
cowardly, in the way he does at NE III, 111Sa 1 O-b 7; rather, he is providing some 
examples of courage that reveal an interest in a political framework, over and above the 
individual. 
Not leaving one's post, or running away, or throwing down one's weapons are 
kinds of behaviour that seem to belong to activity within a sort of association where 
each member is required to play a particular role, in this case a military one; military 
activity is a very important component of political life, so that someone's failing to 
respect his role in the military 'association' would mean evading his duties in the 
community. Similarly, when Aristotle discusses moderation in the passage, he treats 
this excellence in terms of what the moderate person does to others, and not of what 
kind of intermediacy moderation is. At NE V, 1107b6 he depicts it as an excellence 
concerned with pleasures and pains, and at NE V, 1117b22-1119b18 he sets out to 
determine to what sorts of pleasures moderation and self-indulgence relate; but no 
mention is made of the possible consequences of his actions for other people or for the 
whole of the political community. In Book V, by contrast, self-indulgence is not 
presented as some lack of ethical perfection in one individual, but rather as a cause of 
adultery or rape, which are crimes dealt with by justice of the rectificatory kind. These 
are only two examples of ethical excellence practised with regard to others, but we may 
extend these observations to all the other aretai, and say that they all have important 
effects in interpersonal relationships. These assumptions fit with what follows, since at 
NE V 1129b2S-7 Aristotle concludes that this kind of justice is complete excellence, 
, 
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'not only without qualification but in relation to another person', and virtuous actions 
are called 'just' when they are employed in the service of others. 
Given all this, what kind of regard for others emerges in the account of universal 
justice? In my view, it is not merely a matter of private interpersonal relationships. It is 
interesting that, before saying that the law prescribes the whole of ethical excellence at , 
NE V, 1129b17-19, which I mentioned in the last chapter, Aristotle tells us that 
«in one way we call just the things that create and preserve happiness and its parts for 
the citizen community», 
which suggests that the law underlying universal justice enjoins us to perform actions 
that contribute to the well being of the polis. Regard for others here seems to be of a 
political kind, not merely inter-personal in a private sense. That in universal justice 
excellence is aimed at promoting the interest of the whole community and not merely 
of a few individuals is confirmed at NE V, 1130b25-6, where Aristotle says that 
«the things that tend to produce excellence as a whole are those legal provisions that 
have been enacted in relation to education with a view to the common interest». 
It is true that an action might be performed with a view to another individual and 
not affect the general order of the political community, for instance when one has 
displayed irascibility against another person. This, we might well think, will not 
compromise the common well-being. It is difficult to believe that a single act of 
injustice is capable of disturbing the balance underlying a well-governed community, 
nor is the common interest usually the kind of concern that one has in mind when one 
acts justly towards someone. 
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However, we may easily reply that, if any and every citizen were allowed to behave 
unjustly, disorder would prevail within the polis and the law would lose its power to 
promote the happiness of each part of the community. In this way, an act of injustice 
may not only be harmful to someone, but even disruptive for the political community. 
For instance, an act of adultery might harm one person in particular, i.e. the person 
wronged, but it will also violate an important nonn of behaviour in force in the polis; 
likewise, an act of cowardice may harm a specific individual, but also damage the order 
of a military association, as Aristotle seems to suggest in the example provided. 
Given all of this, two different aspects of other-regardingness might be identified: 
1) regard for others in private relations; 
2) regard for others contributing towards the common interest. 
In my view, the other-regardingness Aristotle refers to is a form of regard for others 
that takes place within the frame of inter-personal relationships and is, at the same time, 
of a political kind. The common interest, in Aristotle's view, does not seem to be 
something impersonal, but, rather, it seems to concern individuals as members of a 
political community; in that case, the other-regarding aspect of universal justice in its 
private sphere will be easily combined with the public interest. To act with a view to 
someone else's interest does not mean necessarily to have the advantage of the 
community in mind; however, it seems that the whole of the community will derive 
some benefit when a virtuous action is done; the good of the polis, then, does not 
transcend the good of each individual free citizen, but depends on the good of each of 
them taken individually. 
I think we are allowed to conclude that the characteristic other-regardingness of 
universal justice is not confined to interpersonal relationships of a private kind, but, 
125 
rather, it is concern for other people that determines the taxis of the whole political 
community. Such a taxis, in my view, means more than a sheer good functioning of the 
polis; I believe that, within this frame, Aristotle is referring to the ethical order that will 
subsist in a political community when each individual behaves towards his fellows-
citizens according to his or her own excellence of character. 
It seems that a polis might be outstanding for its internal order without this 
entailing that its members possess ethical excellence; they might simply obey the laws 
in force because they fear the consequences of bad actions, e.g. a bad punishment, and 
not because they inwardly possess the excellence that good political laws prescribe. 
However, my impression here is that Aristotle is not concerned with such a possibility, 
but sets out to stress the ideal character of the law that enjoins complete ethical 
excellence. If what political laws should promote is inner ethike arete towards others, 
the other -regardingness connected to ethike arete in universal justice will contribute to 
establishing correct relationships between citizens based on authentic excellence of 
character and not on mere conformity to political laws. 
4.3: Ethical Excellences as Forms of [sotes 
So far I have tried to illustrate what kind of other-regardingness is that of universal , 
justice; I have explained that it concerns the well-being and the ethical order of the 
polis, but nothing has been said about the origin of such a concern for others. We may 
immediately exclude the possibility that it is to be found in the ethical excellences, 
since these can be practised without relation to or effect on other people; as a 
consequence, we should suppose that it is external to them. But, on the other hand, 
other-regardingness is essential to the notion of universal justice and it seems to be 
inseparable from ethical excellence in the account of universal justice, given that justice 
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is, or can be seen as, an allotrion agathon; so, in this context we cannot speak of ethike 
arete per se, but specifically of 'ethike arete in relation to others'. In other words, what 
is separate from ethical excellence without qualification is not separable from it in its 
guise as universal justice. 
With this as given, I propose that the concept of isotes may help us to understand 
the idea of universal justice as the disposition according to which each ethical 
excellence is displayed with a view to others; my belief is not only that just actions in 
the 'universal' respect are always performed according to isotes, but also that isotes 
itself is the cause of their beingjust actions and not merely virtuous actions. 
As Aristotle suggests at NE V, 1129bl-4, where he describes the llnjust 
individual in terms of activity of grasping some good (as we are going to see, of 
grasping more than one's share of goods), isotes is specifically connected to the pursuit 
of the goods to which good and bad fortune relate; such goods, supposedly, might be 
honours, money or security. From NE V, 1130a14 on, isotes will be identified with 
particular justice; in this respect, isotes is treated as separate from the ethical 
excellences enjoined by universal justice. On the other hand, isotes is regarded as a part 
of the whole of the arete prescribed by universal justice13, which makes me believe that 
Aristotle holds it to be an 'official' arete, although differing in a way from the others. 
The distinction between isotes and the other ethical excellences is stressed at NE 
V, 1130aI6-22, where Aristotle says that 
«the person who is actualising any of the other forms of badness behaves unjustly but 
14 hr h' does not grasp after more than his share at all ,e.g. someone who has t own away IS 
13 See Aristotle, NE V, 1130a14-16: «J.l€poe; yap 0:0't11 11 aOtK:la 'tile; OA:I1e; aOU<:1,ae;, OJ.lOlroe; O£ 
Kat" Oucatocruvll 'tile; OtKatocruv1l9>· 
14 1tAEOVEK'tet 0' ouotv. 
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shield because of cowardice, or resorted to verbal abuse because he is a 'difficult' sort 
of person, or not helped someone out with money because of avariciousness; wllereas 
when someone does grasp after more than his share, often the action does not 
correspond to any states of this sort, still less to all of them together, and yet it does 
correspond to some form of viciousness (since we censure it) i.e. injustice». 
However, given that isotes is taken as a part of the universal justice, it seems that, just 
like the other ethical excellences included in universal justice, it will be exercised in 
relation to other people, i.e. the members of a given polis. 
That both particular and universal justice are other-regarding is claimed at NE V, 
1130bl-5: 
<<the force of both [particular and universal justice] lies in their other-regarding aspect15, 
the difference being that the one has to do with honour, or money, or security (or 
whatever single term might be available to cover all these things), and because of the 
pleasure that comes from profit, while the other has to do with all the things that 
concern the person of excellence» 16. 
We might wonder if such an other-regardingness is the same for the two kinds of 
justice; in my view, it seems to be so. It is true that, as might be objected, particular 
justice is handled by Aristotle as a separate matter from universal justice17, which may 
suggest to us that it has nothing to do with the kind of justice which prescribes activity 
15 a}l4>ill yap EV 't41 1tpOC; E'tEpOV EXOU(n 'tflV ouvaJ.ltv. 
16 See R. Bambrough, 1965, p. 161: «although justice in the first sense is distinct from justice in the 
second sense, it is nevertheless fundamentelly connected with it [ ... ] justice in the first sense is connected 
with justice in the second sense by the fact that they both concern our relations with other human beings, 
and it is this connection that we mark by using the same word for both concepts». 
17 See Aristotle, NE V, 1 130b5-7. 
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according to the other ethical excellences; such an objection might be supported by the 
idea that the motives according to which one acts are different in the case of ethical 
excellences and of isotes, as the already mentioned passage at NE V, 1130a16-22 
makes it clear. 
Given all this, how can we assume that the 'other-regarding' aspect of justice is 
the same for both universal and particular justice? I believe that we may be helped by 
the conclusion which has been reached in the last paragraph of this chapter: the 'other-
regarding' aspect of universal justice refers not only to private relationships between 
few individuals, but also to the organization of the whole of the political community. 
That the' other-regarding' aspect of particular justice is of the same nature, i. e. political, 
emerges from the idea that particular justice is introduced in terms not only of a 
dispositional trait18, but also of conformity to a set of political and economical 
principles of justice established in each polis. As a proof of this we may see Aristotle's 
distinction of particular justice into distributive and rectificatory at NE V, 1130b30-
1131al, which displays some concern for the members of a political community: 
«Of the justice that is a part, and of what is just in this sense, one sort is the one found 
in distributions of honour, or money, or the other things to be divided up among those 
who are members of the political association (for in the case of these things it is 
possible for one person to have either an unequal or an equal share in relation to 
another19); while another is rectificatory, operating in interactions between one person 
and anotheo>. 
18 As for some examples of particular justice in terms of a disposition of character, see the already 
mentioned passage at NE V, 1130a16-22, where he describes injustice as a form of generic pleonektein in 
opposition to other forms of badness and, by contrast, isotes as a disposition according to which a person 
pursues the share of goods due to him. See also NE V, 1134al-6. 
19 EV wUWtc; yap EO"'tt Kat 6.VtO"OV EXEtV Kat "to"OV E'tEPOV E'tEpoU. 
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Conceived in this way, distributive and rectificatory justice are not dispositions of 
character, but settled rules of political organisation which ensure for each citizen a 
share of goods like honours, money and security, according to some kind of reciprocal 
proportion. As we can see in this passage at line 1130b33, Aristotle does not talk about 
isoi individuals, but rather of isa and anisa shares20; an ison share of goods for each 
citizen is meant to preserve reciprocal ties between the members of the political 
community, and in this respect it seems to be part of a structure of justice more than 
question of a personal desire or inclination. Therefore, isotes-in the context of 
distributive and rectificatory justice-refers to the organization of the community and not 
merely to private relationships between individuals; as it seems, its other-regarding 
aspect will be of the same nature as that of universal justice, i. e. political. 
However, to say that the other-regarding aspect of universal justice is of the same 
nature as the other-regardingness of particular justice does not amount yet to saying that 
being in relation to other people is the same in both kind of justice, nor would it prove 
that isotes is the cause of the other-regarding aspect of the other excellenGes of 
character. In order to show that Aristotle is speaking of a single kind of relationing 
aspect, I will try to demonstrate that ethical excellence, when pursued with a view to 
the well-being of other people besides one's own, might be regarded as forms of isotes, 
which would explain why they share in the same involvement of other people. Then, I 
will propose a possible reason why, as I believe, the other-regarding aspect of isotes 
might be the cause of the justice of actions performed according to the other 
excellences of character; this reason, as I will show at the end of this chapter, lies in the 
role of other-regardingness in the development of isotes. 
In order to show that such excellences are forms of isotes, let us see what isotes is 
and to what objects it relates. As I have already said, it has to do with activity of 
20 That is Rowe's translation of «Kat avtaov EXEtV Kat "taov £'tEPOV E't£POU» at NE V, 1130b33. 
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grasping~ a person lacking isotes, for example, will tend to commit bad actions either 
for the sake of profit, e.g. for his desire to grasp an excessive amount of money or 
honours at the expenses of other people. At NE V, 1130a24-32 Aristotle points out that, 
unlike other unjust actions, which are pursued because of specific vices like self-
indulgence or cowardice, the action of making a profit is not referred to any form of 
badness other than injustice. In that case, it seems that the corresponding kind of justice 
will not be determined by any of the motives proper to each single excellence of 
character, e.g. moderation or courage. 
Particular justice, as Aristotle says at the already mentioned NE V, 1130b30-
1131 aI, is found in distributions of honour or money, or to the things which members 
of any political community should share~ this aspect of particular justice will be taken 
up at NE V, 1134al-6, where Aristotle provides a definition of justice which seems to 
relate more to particular than universal: 
a vaAOrta v, b~otc.o~ OE Kat aAAq? 1tp6~ aAAOv», 
. 
1.e. 
(~ustice is the disposition in accordance with which the just person is said to be the sort 
to do what is just, as a result of decision, and to distribute things to himself in relation 
to another and between two others not in such a way as to give himself too much of 
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what is desirable and his neighbour too little, and the reverse with what is harmful, but 
so as to give what is proportionately equal to both, and similarly where the distribution 
is between two others». 
To be isos amounts to one's going for the right share of goods, and to distributing 
things so as to preserve the share of goods which other people should be allowed to get. 
Such an activity, inevitably, will turn out to affect other people than oneself. 
My view is that, since the excellences of character belonging to universal justice 
are practised in relation to others, their effect is similar to that caused by a fair 
distribution of goods; a just action performed according to some ethical excellence, as it 
were, would contribute to preserving a degree of proportion in the relationship s 
between citizens. A vicious action, for example, might represent not only a lack of 
ethical excellence in the agent, but also some kind of damage for the people who are 
affected by such action; that is to say that people who suffer an injustice might be 
treated as people to whom their share of goods in the polis (safety, honours or money) 
has been subtracted. 
I suggest that, if the excellences of character are viewed as parts of universal 
justice and we consider them in relation to others' well-being, they might be regarded 
as forms of isotes. It is true that ethical excellences without qualification are kinds of 
intermediacies between an excess and a deficiency, connected in some cases to the 
affections of human soul (e.g. anger, fear, appetites), in other cases to the pursuit of 
external goods like honour and money; but when they are considered as components of 
universal justice, they end up by assuming a different role. When it comes to other-
regarding ethikai aretai, what is at stake is not individual ethical perfection, but a kind 
of relation to others that displays itself in the preservation of a right proportion of goods 
between people; in other words, virtuous behaviour in relation to others in universal 
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justice is linked to the wish, which is typical of an isos person, not to subtract from the 
share of goods assigned to other people. 
If we go back to NE V, 1129b 19-24, for instance, we will see that not leaving 
one's post, or running away, or throwing down one's weapons are not described as 
actions aimed at preserving an individual intermediacy between an excess and a 
deficiency of fear but, rather, as actions which might seriously undermine the safety of 
a military association. Again, what the self-indulgent person does in relation to others is 
a form of wishing for more pleasure than appropriate at the expense of others, as in the 
case of adultery, where the person who suffers adultery gets harmed, or simply in the 
case of an individual who takes away another person's share of some goods that lnight 
produce pleasure, when his or her own share is not considered sufficient to fulfil his or 
her desires. 
In these cases, Aristotle's interest is not focused on failure at achieving one's 
individual intermediacy in the pursuit of pleasure, but on the infliction of some damage 
to members of the political community. The same holds of mildness and the 
corresponding forms of vices; an excessive amount of anger might disturb the ethical 
order in the community, whereas mild behaviour might be aimed at re-establishing a 
correct proportion if someone has inflicted damage on someone else by taking away his 
share of goods. In this respect, as far as the political community is concerned, we do not 
speak of courage, moderation or mildness, but we rather speak of justice, in that 
virtuous actions are performed with a view to the common interest; that is to say that, 
within such a frame, an action performed with a view to others is generally named just, 
and not only "virtuous", e.g. courageous or moderate. 
Obviously, just actions in the universal sense are not arithmetically quantifiable; 
however, that ethical excellences might be taken as forms of isotes when they are 
practised in relation to other people is clear if we think that a bad action, e.g. an action 
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due to cowardice or of self indulgence, may provoke losses for the political community, 
whereas behaviour according to one of the ethical excellences may produce advantages. 
The idea of gain and loss is proper to particular justice. At NE V, 1132a2ff. Aristotle, 
while discussing the issue of rectificatory justice, explains that, even if injustice has 
been committed by a person who usually behaves in a decent way, the law pays 
attention only to the difference provoked by the damage inflicted, with no regard for the 
quality of either the one who has inflicted or the one who has suffered it. In this respect, 
the involved persons are treated them as equals. What matters to our case is that, in 
such a situation, according to Aristotle we might talk, even if, perhaps, not 
appropriately, 
«about the 'gain,21 accruing e.g. to the assailant, and the 'loss,22 suffered by the victim; 
but when the effect is measured the one is called a 'loss' and the other a 'gain'. So the 
equal is intermediate between too much and too little in contrary ways, the gain too 
much good and too little bad, the loss the other way round; intermediate between 
which, we say, is the equal, which is what we are saying is just, so that what is just in 
terms of rectification will be intermediate between loss and gain» 23. 
Loss and gain seem to be regarded as consequences of an interaction between 
individuals in which someone achieves more and someone else less than he should. It is 
true that, in the account of particular justice, they are described as the consequences of 
an unequal distribution of goods or of a bad rectification, which does not fit perfectly 
the case of universal justice, which involves actions not necessarily concerned with 
21 'to K£p80c;. 
22 11 l; llJl to.. 
23 Aristotle, NE V, 1132alO-19. 
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such a kind of goods~ however, even though universal justice does not consists in 
actions performed in relation to honour and money, an unjust action according to 
universal justice ends up with some damage to those who suffer it, and damage can be 
taken in some respect as a form of loss. This implies that, if a peculiar kind of 
intermediacy is to be identified in universal justice, that would not be the intermediacy 
of the other ethical excellence, but the one that constitutes isotes, i.e. intermediacy 
between too much and too little or, in other words, between loss and gain. 
Even though acts of justice in the universal sense are done on the basis of a 
specific motive of character, the characteristic intermediacy of each ethical excellence 
ends by being obscured: when it comes to excellences of character in relation to other 
people in the political community, greater importance is accorded to their capacity to 
preserve a correct proportion according to which goods and evils are shared among 
people, as though they were particular kinds of isotes; in this respect, as I think, their 
being 'other-regarding' is of the same kind as that ofisotes. 
This seems to be the first step towards a demonstration of the way in which isotes 
contributes to making an act performed according to any of the other ethical excellence 
a just act, i. e. an allotrion agathon. Any ethical excellence, in order to be exercised 
with a view to the well-being of other people than the agent, must be grounded in some 
kind of concern for the share of goods due to other people and, more in general, for the 
proportion according to which such goods are distributed. In this sense, I presume, we 
might speak of particular justice as the condition of possibility of the universal: isotes 
will be the ground of a virtuous, just action. What enables us to maintain such a reading 
is that the other-regarding aspect of ethical excellences like moderation and courage is 
not inherent to such excellences, in that they might be performed just for the sake of the 
ethical perfection of the agent, and not necessarily in relation to the well-being of other 
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people. By contrast, when it comes to isotes, it seems that the relationing aspect is 
inseparable from such a disposition and represents its inner core. 
In fact, at NE V, 1131a14-20 equality is described as a particular kind of 
intermediacy, which cannot be established within a single's individual soul, since it 
comes about from the interaction between people. As Aristotle says: 
«since what is equal is intermediate, the just will be a sort of intermediate. But the 
equal involves at least two terms. So what is just is necessarily both intermediate and 
equal, and relative, i.e. relating to certain individuals; and in so far as it is intermediate, 
it will be between certain things (i. e. too large and too small), in so far as it is equal, it 
will involve two things, and in so far as it is just it will relate to certain individuals. 
Necessarily, then, the just involves at least four terms: the persons with an interest are 
two, and the things in which they deal are twO». 
What is just, as he claims, is 'both intermediate and equal', which means that 
intermediacy and equality are not separable in particular justice, even though they are 
two different aspects of such a kind of justice. The intermediacy of particular justice 
relates to a 'too large' and a 'too small' 24, and involves at least two things in which 
people deal, so that it will never be realised without the involvement of inter-personal 
relationships. In this way, it seems that, differently from the other aretai, the other-
regarding aspect of isotes is inner to isotes itself; which means that, in order to be isos, 
one must necessarily be isos to someone. 
How shall we make use of this point with a view to showing that the other-
regarding aspect of isotes is what turns ethical excellences into forms of justice? I 
believe that, just because the other-regarding aspect of isotes is not external to isotes 
24 See Aristotle, NE V, 1131a9-14. 
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itself, but is deeply involved in the development of such a disposition and in the 
actualisation of its typical intermediacy, this aspect itself will represent the inner core 
isotes, especially if we take that that isotes and pleonexia are not marked by any 
specific motive of character25 . On the other hand, such an aspect is external to ethical 
excellences per se. In that case, given that the other ethical excellences, when 
performed with a view to the others' well-being, presuppose the same regard for others 
as that of isotes and may be viewed themselves-although only in a way-as forms of 
isotes, it might be supposed that such a regard coincides with that at the basis of isotes. 
Since Aristotle does not provide any other kind of other-regarding excellence 
besides isotes and universal justice, we are plausibly entitled to think that the true 
source of other-regardingness lies in the ethical disposition of whose existence this 
relational aspect is the first condition, i.e. isotes. In this respect, as I believe, particular 
justice might be regarded as the condition of the universal. 
4.4: Conclusions 
In this chapter I have proposed that particular justice makes an important contribution 
towards the understanding of the way in which excellences of character are practised in 
relation to other people in the political community. As we have seen, concern for others 
is a separate matter from ethical excellence without qualification; ethical excellence 
might lead to virtuous action without the agent's necessarily having in mind the good of 
another person. However, the kind of concern that I have called 'other-regardingness' 
seems to be a constitutive element of universal justice, which enjoins the whole of 
ethical arete. 
25 See D.K. O'Connor, 1988; Ph. Foot, 1978, p. 9; B.A.O Williams, 1980; cf. A. MacIntyre, 1988, who at 
p. III speaks of pleonexia in tenns of "mere acquisitiveness". 
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The question I proposed in this chapter was the following: where does the 'other-
regardingness' proper to universal justice stem from, if it does not spring from the 
excellences of character encompassed by such a justice? I suggested that the source of 
it lies in a specific aspect of isotes that makes up the core of Aristotle's account of 
particular justice. In order to argue for my thesis, I tried at first to demonstrate that the 
'other-regardingness' of ethical excellences in universal justice has a political character, 
and is not exclusive to interpersonal relationships of a private kind; similarly with 
particular justice, which is presented not only as an ethical disposition, but also as a set 
of principles of organization underlying the well-functioning of the polis. In this 
respect, the other-regarding aspect of particular justice seems to be the same as that of 
universal justice. 
Then, I attempted to develop further the links between isotes and the ethikai 
aretai underlying universal justice, and tried to show that the 'other-regardingness' of 
universal justice is exactly the same as that belonging to the particular, by assuming 
that each excellence of character exhibited with a view to others' well-being might be 
regarded as a form of isotes. In other words, the ethical excellences of universal justice 
might be viewed as a way of getting the share of benefits due to one in the political 
community, which is also a characteristic of isotes, so that, if my view is plausible, 
one's violation of the injunctions of universal law would mean a violation of the 
proportion that guarantees a reasonable share of goods for each citizen in the polis. 
My general view is that the kind of concern for the interests of others 
characteristic of isotes would cause one to practise excellences of character with regard 
for other people in the political community. Given that ethical excellences per se do not 
necessarily entail a relational aspect, such an aspect being an indispensable component 
of isotes, and provided that they can be taken as kinds of isotes in a political context, 
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the 'other-regardingness' of particular justice might be the element which trans:'orms 
them into justice. 
What I have tried to demonstrate should show that universal and particular justice 
are not unrelated matters, although they are handled as separate spheres; on the 
contrary, they seem to be deeply entwined, in that they reveal different perspectives of 
the same justice, i.e. political justice. In chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis I will complete 
my account of justice by stressing Aristotle's account of political justice and its 
distinction into natural and conventional justice. 
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Part III 
Political Friendship: A Path to Authentic Justice 
Quodsi amicitia per se colenda est, 
societas quoque hominum et 
aequalitas et iustitia per se 
expletenda. 
Cicero 
Chapter V: 
Between Advantage and Ethical Excellence. 
The Relevance of Friendship in Political Theory 
5.1: Introduction 
In this chapter I will explore the concept of political friendship as it is elaborated by 
Aristotle, by trying to stress its relationship with justice and individual excellence of 
character. The ordinary use of the word 'friendship' is generally confined to the 
characterization of some kind of intimate relationship between a few people, inspired 
by values like love, trust and reciprocal concern with a friend's happiness. But when it 
comes to friendship in a political community, this cannot involve merely a few 
individuals; on the contrary, it will concern and affect every member of the community. 
Aristotle is probably the first thinker to provide a systematic theory of friendship: in the 
Nicomachean Ethics he identifies three different kinds of friendship: friendship 
grounded in pleasure, friendship grounded in utility and, finally-the kind which seems 
to be the most valuable in his view-friendship grounded in ethical excellence l . I 
propose to answer the following question: under what kind of friendship does the 
notion of 'political friendship' fall? 
My view is that, in Aristotle's thought, political friendship is a kind of advantage-
friendship sui generis, where the search for utility does not prevent people from 
displaying 'other-regarding' qualities like cooperation, trust and loyalty, that are typical 
1 See NE VIII, 115 5b 17 -21, where Aristotle suggests that friendship has to do with what is lovable ('to 
<ptA:rl'WV), and that the lovable may be good, pleasant or useful (cf. EE VII, 1236a30-3), and NE VII, 
1156a6-7, where he continues by saying that there will be three kinds of friendship corresponding to the 
objects of love. 
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of friendship according to virtuous individuals2 . I hope to show that activity according 
to justice replaces the form of mutual and intimate love that should subsist in a 
friendship based on ethical virtue, i.e. a kind of love which is not conceivable between 
citizens who do not know each other personally. 
In the first section of this chapter I will try to explain in what sense political 
friendship may be taken as a proper kind of friendship in the Aristotelian sense, and 
how it relates to the concept of justice in the polis; then, in the second section I am 
going to illustrate in what respects it resembles both friendship of utility and friendship 
grounded in ethical excellence. 
5.2: lloAznK'lj t/Jula. A Real Form of Friendship 
Aristotle devotes much space to the description of friendship in the Nicomachean 
Ethics, and tries to place the discussion of its various aspects within the framework of 
human eudaimonia and arete3; a detailed description of different types of friendship 
fills Books VIII-IX, a fifth of the whole work4. At the very beginning of Book VIII, 
friendship is described as a kind of excellence, or something related to it, that is 
necessary for human life: 
«it will be appropriate to discuss friendship, since friendship is a kind of excellence, or 
goes along with excellenceS, and furthermore is very necessary for living» 6 . 
2 The same view is held by B. Yacko See B. Yack, 1985, pp. 103-9. 
3 On the relationship between philia and eudaimonia see J.M. Cooper, 1977a, p. 619; A. Kenny, 1992, 
pp. 45-55; M. Nussbaum, 1986, pp. 335-50. 
4 See J.M. Cooper, 1977, p. 619. 
5 eO"'tt yap ape'tt, 'ttC; fl ~e't' ape'tnc;. 
6 Aristotle, NE VIII, 1155a3-5. 
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When he deals with the issue of friendship, Aristotle seems to do it in relation to 
happiness, and to the choices made with a view to happiness: 
«For no one would choose to live without friends, even if he had all the other good 
things; for even the wealthy or those who rule over or dominate others are thought to 
need friends more than anything-since what use would such prosperity be if they were 
deprived of the possibility of beneficence, which occurs most, and is most to be praised, 
in relation to friends?» 7. 
But friendship, as Aristotle intends it, is not only to be taken as a private and 
personal bond between two individuals, but as the ground of political community, as is 
shown by the beginning of Book VIII of the Nicomachean Ethics: 
«Friendship also seems to keep cities together, and lawgivers seem to pay more 
attention to it than to justice8. For like-mindedness seems to be similar, in a way, to 
friendship, and it is this that they aim most at achieving, while they aim most to 
eliminate faction, faction being enmity; and there is no need for rules of justice between 
people who are friends, whereas if they are just they still need friendship-and of what is 
just, the most just is thought to be what belongs to friendship»9. 
What we can draw from this passage is that political friendship presents some degree of 
utility, since it is introduced also as a means through which the cohesion of cities can be 
7 Aristotle, NE VITI, 1155a5-9. 
8 £OtKe Oe Kat 'tae; 1tOAete; cruvExetV t, ~tAta, Kat Ot Vo~oeE'tat ~ciAAOV 1tept a:i)'tTlV 
cr1tOUoa~etV 11 't1lV OtKatocr\>VllV. 
9 Aristotle, NE VIn, 1155a22-8. 
142 
brought about. This aspect of utility, if connected to the preliminary definition of 
friendship as a kind of excellence or something related to it, may suggest that both 
usefulness and some kind of excellence are involved in the nature ~~ politil':~ 1 
friendship. 
The expression politike ph ilia is rarely mentioned in Aristotle's ethical and 
political works, and the scarce textual occurrences do not allow us to outline directly a 
proper description of its prominent features. At the very beginning of Book IX of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, the expression politike philia appears in relation to proportionate 
equality in friendships based on dissimilarity: 
«In all friendships based on dissimilarity, what is proportionate equalizes and preserves 
the friendship, as has been said, just as in political friendship too the return the 
shoemaker gets for his shoes is measured by their worth, and similarly with the weaver 
and the rest» 10 . 
Another occurrence is NE IX, 1167b2-3, where homonoia, 1.e. like-mindedness, IS 
defined as politike philia: 
«1tOAt1:tK" 8" <ptAta <patVE1:at " oJlovota, Ka8u1tEp Kat AEYE1:ae 1tEpt 'ta 
O"UJl<PEpov'ta yap £O"1:t Kat1:a £u; 1:0V J3tOV l1Kov1:a», 
I.e. 
«it has to do with what is advantageous, and what affects people's lives». 
10 Aristotle, NE VIII, 1163b32-5. 
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A similar assertion can be read at EE VII, 1242a7-10, where it is claimed that politike 
ph ilia is based mostly on utility: 
«Civic friendship has been established mainly in accordance with utility11; for men 
seem to have come together because each is not sufficient for himself, though they 
would have come together anyhow for the sake of living in company». 
As we may see, all these three passages focus on political friendship as the 
ground of activities concerned with human needs. However, as I have just said in the 
introduction to this chapter, besides the kind of friendship grounded on utility, two 
other different forms of friendship are identified by Aristotle: friendship based on 
ethical excellence and friendship based on pleasure. Since friendship concerns the 
'lovable,12, and the lovable can be the good, the pleasant or the useful, a corresponding 
kind of friendship will subsist for each kind of lovable things. As Aristotle states at NE 
VIII, 1156a6-7, 
1.e. 
11 t, oe 1tOAl1:1K11 cruvEcr1:TlKE JlEV Ko.1:o. 1:0 XPT,cr1JlOV Ko.t JlaA1cr1:o.. 
12 See footnote 1 of this chapter. 
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«these things differ in kind; so, then, does the loving, and so do the friendships. There 
are, then, three kinds of friendship, equal in number to the objects of love; for there 
corresponds to each of these objects a reciprocal loving of which both parties are aware, 
and those who love each other wish good things for each other in the way in which they 
love». 
To which of these three kinds of friendship does political friendship belong? I 
suggest that a stable and good politike philia is a kind of friendship grounded in utility, 
which, nevertheless, will promote in the community values like love of the other, living 
together, trust and reciprocal reliability on the citizens' part. In other words, if my idea 
is reasonable, political friendship-in Aristotle's theory-would consist of a sort of 
shared-advantage friendship in which people behave according to some degree of 
ethical excellence. 
A first objection that might be raised is that it is quite difficult for us to imagine a 
civic association composed only of virtuous people and based on mutual well-wishing 
as though people knew each other and wished them well for their sake. As a matter of 
fact, a political community includes a wide range of people of different character~, and 
political ties are doomed to link virtuous citizens with people of inferior worth. It might 
be wondered if a friendship grounded in some degree of excellence is conceivable even 
in such a variegated frame. Aristotle believes that friendship between virtuous people is 
a rare phenomenon insofar as goodness is a prerogative of just a few individuals 13, 
which suggests that such a friendship in the political community is impossible to 
actualise. 
On the other hand, in some cases the many and their lack of goodness-as 
Aristotle conceives it-might not prevent virtuous men from acting according to 
13 See S. Stem-Gillet, 1995, p. 148. 
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complete excellence in the affairs of the polis, as long as the less virtuous people abide 
by the established norms of justice. Respect for the laws in force might exist even if not 
all the citizens were intrinsically good, for instance if they were afraid of punishment or 
if they considered that through activity according to justice they would get their 
personal share of goods. Even in those cases, to some extent, would justice be a means 
to the preservation of political stability and to the avoidance of conflicts within the 
community. 
A legal system set up by just people (especially people who are 'inherently' just) 
in order to yield political harmony may create some form of reciprocal respect between 
citizens, which might be intended to replace the intimate love proper to friendship that 
cannot be realised in the polis. As far as political friendship is concerned, reciprocal 
loving is not to be understood as an intimate feeling between people, but rather as some 
form of legal, virtuous respect: in good political communities, obedience to the laws on 
the citizens' part will be supported by their intrinsic disposition of character which 
makes them act justly; in less virtuous cities, instead, people might abide by the 
established laws simply to escape punishment or, more generally, for the sake of 
personal advantage, without being authentically virtuous people themselves. 
However, even in this case some friendship will subsist among fellow-citizens, 
insofar as some degree of justice is preserved and people are not damaged by their 
fellows' behaviour. Justice, then, would provide the necessary political bonds of 
reciprocity and proportional equality among all the members of a community ~ both 
virtuous and less virtuous, so replacing in this way the love and the trust typical of 
virtuous friends. Since justice, like friendship, seems to hinge on some sort of 
reciprocity, each individual will act in relation to his fellows' needs and expect a 
proportionate return from them. People who are not equipped with a suitable level of 
ethical excellence may act according to it simply by subscribing to the norms of justice 
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imposed by external prescription, once they have realized that adapting themselves to it 
will bring about greater advantage to them. This does not necessarily mean that people 
without noble inclinations will become virtuous and perform noble acts for the sake of 
the fine just by acting according to law (especially if the law is not devised with a view 
to the common advantage), but only that, at least, they may contribute to the well-being 
of the polis without being an obstacle to those who wish to pursue a virtuous kind of 
life. 
Our problem here is to sketch out a plausible account of civic friendship as based 
on some degree of excellence, and to see what kind of excellence is required and to 
what extent even individuals who are not properly virtuous from a private point of view 
may contribute to the well-being of the polis. 
In order to define the domain of political friendship, we have to establish first in 
what respect it satisfies the general conditions of friendship laid down by Aristotle in 
the Nicomachean Ethics. Unlike in the Rhetoric, where friendship is defined as any 
relationship characterized by mutual well-wishing and well-doing out of concern for 
one another14, in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle does not provide any explicit 
definition of friendship, but he confines himself to putting forward some basic 
conditions without which no form of relationship will be regarded as friendship. One of 
these features is reciprocity of love. When Aristotle explains why there cannot be 
friendship with inanimate objects, he underlines the absence of reciprocal loving and of 
eunola: 
14 See Aristotle, Rhet. II, 1380b36-1381al: «We may describe friendly feeling ('to ~lA€tV) towards 
anyone as wishing for him what you believe to be good things, not for your own sake but for his, and 
being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about». 
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1.e. 
«the word 'friendship' does not apply to the loving of inanimate objects; for there is not 
reciprocal loving, nor wishing for the other's good» 15. 
Good will, Aristotle holds, will not be friendship if it is not reciprocated: 
«people say friendship demands that one wish a friend good things for his sake. Those 
who wish good things for someone else like this are said to have good will towards 
him 16, if the same is not forthcoming from the other party as well; friendship, people 
say, is good will between reciprocating parties 17» 18. 
But, in order to become friendship, reciprocal love should be accompanied by 
awareness on the reciprocating parties' side, otherwise people would never either 
realise a life in common or even do anything togetherl9 . At NE VIII, 1155b34-1156a5 
Aristotle wonders: 
«Or should one add, good will that one is aware of? For many people have good will 
towards those whom they have not met, but suppose to be decent, or useful; and one of 
15 Aristotle, NE VITI, 1155b27-9. 
16 TOUc; oe J)oUAO).lEVOUC; 01Yt;OO 'tCx.yaea EUVOUC; AEYOU(HV. 
17 EUVOtaV yap EV Cx.v'tt1tE1tove6crt <l>tAtaV EtVat. 
18 Aristotle, NE VITI, 1155b31-4. 
19 See lM. Cooper, 1977, p. 620. 
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these might in fact be in the same position in relation to them. Good will, then, is what 
these people evidently feel towards each other; but how could one call them friends, if 
they are not aware of their mutual feelings? If there is to be friendship, the parties must 
have good will towards each other, i.e. wish good things for each other, and be aware of 
the other's doing so ... ». 
Having established these two conditions of friendship, i.e. reciprocity and awareness of 
the reciprocal loving, let us go to political friendship, and try to find out in what 
respects it meets these general requirements; only after that will we consider the 
condition of well-wishing, which is the core of friendship, and try to see in what respect 
political friendship satisfies such a condition. As far as political friendship is 
concerned, reciprocity is an essential condition in so far as every citizen is involved in 
the life of the community, which must be based on interchanges and reciprocal 
interactions, both in the economical and in the political sphere. Mutual well-wishing 
needs to exist in every community, although people do not know each other, since each 
of them plays a particular role, and the impersonal reciprocity of functions relies at any 
rate on reciprocal good-will (on the part of those who exercise those functions) with a 
view to supplying mutual deficiencies. Reciprocity, thus, is at the basis of the fulfilment 
of a chain of needs allowing each citizen some degree of a good life. 
Well-wishing must not be hidden, but it has to be shown openly. A first problem 
might emerge: how may mutual benevolence exist among people who do not even 
know each other? What allows their display of mutual and aware well-wishing? In my 
view, a plausible answer might be a constant activity according to justice. As we have 
already seen in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics, justice is a form of excellence 
which presupposes a relationship with other individuals. In order to promote the well-
being of the community, justice must be reciprocal and involve all the citizens in a 
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relationship, more or less impersonal, which cannot remain unreturned. Besides this, 
justice, by reminding the contracting parties of their reciprocal role in the friendship, 
also promotes awareness of the relationships established, without which individuals 
could eschew their own contributions and fail to acknowledge the advantages yielded 
by life in the community. 
As for the issue of awareness, lack of it would prevent people from realising a 
common ground of action and of life; awareness of reciprocal loving seems to be at the 
basis of particular justice, which can be either distributive or rectificatory. Perhaps 
more than in distributive justice, the necessity for aware interactions emerges in the 
rectificatory, in that, as Aristotle explains at NE V, II30b30-II3Ia9, when he draws a 
distinction within the sphere of particular justice into distributive and rectificatory, the 
latter operates in interactions between one person and another. In particular, given that 
the relationships involved in justice of the rectificatory kind are divided into voluntary, 
which include activities such as selling, buying and so forth, and counter-voluntary 
ones, such as theft, adultery etc., voluntary relationships will be those more fitting our 
context. 
As it seems, voluntary interactions, among which commercial transactions are 
included, might be extended to political 'exchanges' in general, which is confirmed by 
the idea expressed at NE V, I132b3 1-1133 a2 that reciprocal action is the basis of the 
city's unity: 
«In commercial associations, however, the parties are bound together by a form of the 
just that is like this, i. e. what is reciprocal in proportional terms, not in terms of 
numerical equality20. For it is reciprocal action governed by proportion that keeps the 
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city together21. Either people seek to return evil for evil, and if they don't, it seems like 
slavery; or they seek to return good for good, and if they don't, there is no giving in 
exchange, and it is exchange that keeps them together». 
At any rate, both distributive and corrective justice must rely on a ground of 
reciprocity22, and the latter form of justice seems to be the basic condition of the well-
functioning of the polis, just insofar as it puts people in relation to one another, 
although not necessarily in personal and intimate terms. So much for reciprocity and 
awareness of mutual loving; in the next section I will discuss the issue of well-wishing. 
I am going to treat it as a separate matter in that, as I believe, such an issue is 
preliminary to the description of the respects in which political friendship resembles 
both the friendship rooted in utility and the friendship of ethical excellence. 
5.3: The Double Nature of Political Friendship 
Just as in the Rhetoric, so in the Nicomachean Ethics friendship is said to exist only if 
there is a kind of wishing for the other's good. At NE VIII, 11S6a3-4, Aristotle says 
that if there is to be friendship, the parties must have good will towards each othl-r, i.e. 
wish good things for each other. But this seems to be at odds with what has been 
established in relation to the three different kinds of friendship. Well-wishing seems to 
occur in all the three kinds of friendship identified by Aristotle23 ; however, to different 
21 Tq> av'tl1tOtetV yap avcX.Aoyov cru~~EVet n 1tOAtC;. 
22 See D. G. Ritchie, 1894, p. 185. Ritchie maintains that the conception of reciprocity is at the basis of 
those forms of particular justice~ he coins the term 'Catallactic justice' with reference to the ground of 
reciprocity which makes the practice of particular justice possible. On his account of 'Catallactic justice' 
see p.192 of his article. 
23 See lM. Cooper, 1977, pp. 624-5. 
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kinds of friendships will correspond different kinds of well-wishing. For instance, in 
friendships grounded in utility people will love each other not for their sake, but with a 
view to their personal advantage, whereas in the case of friendships of the primary kind 
friends will have concern for their friends' good. 
It is surely plausible to assume that that the pursuit of personal profit is not 
completely at odds with some form of well-wishing towards one who is able to provide 
a friend with some advantage; in light of the benefits to be received, this tendency 
would not appear so unnatural. In that case, it seems plausible to suggest that, even 
where personal interest is prevailing, in every kind of friendship the well-being of the 
other will be wished for to some degree24 . Likewise, as for political frienJship, 
although organized with a view to the interest of its members, it might be supposed that 
it does not preclude the exhibition of actions directed to the well-being of the others25 . 
If so, human actions and decisions might be made also with a view to others' 
benefit even when the agents are engaged in a kind of advantage friendship. In this 
section I shall argue that, in some respect, the well-wishing of civic friendship 
resembles the well-wishing of friendship according to utility, whereas, in other 
respects, some similarities can be found with friendship grounded on goodness. 
Given that, as we have already seen, Aristotle mentions the notion of political 
friendship in relation to some kind of utility, let us see in what respect such a kind of 
friendship is a friendship of utility. Friendship grounded in utility is described as a 
relationship which is not caused by the inner characteristics of the friend, but only by 
the advantage that can be drawn from the friend. As Aristotle states at NE VIII, 
24 See J.M. Cooper, 1977, pp. 625-6. A different position is held by Whiting~ see J.E. Whiting, 1991, p. 
20. With reference to NE IX, 1167a10-18 Whiting claims that, in Aristotle's thought, character-
friendship alone is founded on eunoia. 
25 See S. Stern-Gillet, 1995, p. 38. 
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1156alO-16, friends by utility, as well as friends by pleasure, do not love each other 
because of themselves: 
«So those who love each other because of the useful do not love them for themselves, 
but in so far as some good accrues to each of them from the other26 . Similarly, too, with 
those who love each other because of pleasure: people do not feel affection for the witty 
for their being of a certain character, but for the pleasure they themselves get from 
them. And indeed those who love because of the useful feel fondness because of what 
is good for themselves, and those loving because of pleasure because of what is 
pleasant to themselves; they do not love by reference to the way the person loved is, but 
to his being useful or pleasant». 
At NE VIII, 1156a16-19 Aristotle underlines the incidental character of such a 
kind of friendship: 
1.e. 
26 01 IlEV OUV Otd 'to XP1l<HIlOV (j>tAOUV'tee; aAAT,AOUe; ou Ka6' amove; (j>tAOUCHV, aAA' n 
ytve'tat 'tt au'tOte; nap' aAA1lAWV ayae6v. 
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«And in fact these friendships are friendships incidentally; for the one loved is not 
loved by reference to the person he is but to the fact that in the one case he provides 
some good and in the other some pleasure». 
If so, in what respect does political friendship resemble friendship according to 
advantage? At NE VITI, 1160a9-11 Aristotle claims that 
«cn)~1tOpEUOV1:at yap E1tl 1:tVt cru~<PEpOV1:t, Kal 1topt~6~Evol 1:t 'twv EtC; 'tOV 
(310V» , 
1. e. 
«people make their way together on the basis that they will get some advantage from it, 
and so as to provide themselves with some necessity of life»; 
in political communities people do not join together because of the inner characteristics 
of their fellow citizens. Individuals do not know each other, and they are related in a 
community only insofar as the association is a convenient way to get an advantage. 
Still, although advantage seems to be the real and first mover of civic friendships, 
we should not forget that the aim of expert lawgivers is to promote the highest good, 
and that the state as Aristotle makes it clear at Pol. I, 1252b28-30, does not seek after , 
the mere life of its members, but rather it aims at a good life27 . As he says in Book VIII 
of the Nicomachean Ethics, that the individual is not loved for the sake of himself is the 
reason why friendships based on utility get easily dissolved: 
27 Cf. Aristotle, Pol. III, 1280a31-2; 1280b32-5. 
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l.e. 
«Such friendships, then, are easily dissolved, if the parties become different; for if they 
are no longer pleasant or useful, they cease loving each other»28. 
But political friendships do not get dissolved so easily. Aristotle shows his realistic 
concern with the reasons why political constitutions often change and rebellions take 
place, as he does for example in Book V of the PolitiCS; however, the friendship at the 
basis of a political organization gets dissolved only when the reciprocal relationships 
among the citizens hinge on a low degree of justice, or when the laws in force fail to 
attain the common advantage. 
It seems, then, that Aristotle's concern for the causes of political change is not a 
matter of mere historical curiosity, and reveals the need to reflect on the measures to be 
adopted in order to keep constitutions safe29 . Differently from ethical excellence, which 
is a stable disposition of character according to which consistent choices can be made, 
the useful is not provided with any guarantee of stability, and actions performed for the 
sake of advantage can be made on the basis of an unsteady inclination: 
28 Aristotle, NE VIn, 1156a19-21. 
29 Cf. Aristotle, Pol. V, 1301a20-5. 
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«And the useful is not something that lasts, but varies with the momeneo; so, when 
what made them be friends has been removed, the friendship is dissolved as well, in so 
far as it existed in relation to what brought it about» 31. 
In friendships of utility, as is established in Book VIII, any change does not depend on 
character, but on exterior and contingent events which at a certain point may make 
friends useless to one another, and therefore no longer friends. Usefulness is rot an 
inner feature of a person; rather, it is only something that depends on the needs of 
another individual or group of people. The utility of someone is only something that 
someone else finds in that person, not as belonging to it, but only in relation to the 
needs of the subject that finds that person useful; if the need is fulfilled, the utility of 
the friend gets dissolved together with friendship. 
In this respect, political friendship seems to be at distance from a crude kind of 
utility friendship; although citizens do not love each other because of their intrinsic 
excellence, nevertheless they can act on the basis of a stable disposition, i.e. justice, 
which is even more solid if grounded on friendly feelings among them. If justice is 
more than obedience to a mere set of rules shared in as an external imposition and is a 
proper disposition of character, reciprocal trust and cooperation between just citizens 
will rest on a safer ground. But given that justice is established by virtuous lawgivers, 
even when justice is not an inner disposition of character possessed by all the citizens, 
stability will be secured within the polis, provided that they confine themselves to 
sticking to the laws. Thus, if a polis falls short of justice, either legal or based on inner 
excellence or both, friendship as well will be dissolved, insofar as the citizens are 
mostly advantage-seekers and do not love each other for their own sake. 
30 'to O£ XP"cHIlOV ou Otall€V£t, a../ ... :A,' o.A.A.o't£ 0.")..,")..,0 y'tv£'tat. 
31 Aristotle, NE VITI, 1156a21-4. 
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But when it comes to political life, the useful is not necessarily something that does not 
last and varies with the moment. Friendship according to utility has been described so 
far in Book VIII as a kind of relationship in which the contracting parties seek their 
own personal advantage; but a civic friendship presupposes the pursuit of individual 
utility as compatible with the advantage of all the citizens and of the community they 
live in. As Aristotle states at NE VIII, 1156a24-31, when introducing the example of 
friendship among old people, utility-friendship is not characterized by living together: 
«This sort of friendship seems especially to occur among the old (since it is not the 
pleasant that people of that age pursue, but the beneficial), and in the case of those in 
their prime, or young, among those who pursue advantage. This sort don't really even 
live together with each other32, for sometimes they are not even pleasant people, and so 
neither do they feel an additional need for that kind of company, unless the people 
concerned are of some use, since they are pleasant just to the extent that they have 
hopes of some good accruing to them. (People put guest-friendships33 too with 
friendships of this sort)>>34. 
On the one hand, civic friendship resembles this kind of relationship in so far as people 
do not live together in the community except in a broad sense, and in most cases they 
do not even know each other, as I have already said; on the other hand, Aristotle 
sometimes observes that the bonds linking citizens each other are not the same as those 
linking different cities: so, for example, mere alliances, as e.g. at Pol. III, 1280b7-10 
(already quoted in Chapter I, p. 21): 
320b 1tavu 0' ot 1:otO\)1:ot obOe O'U~Wcrt J..1E1:' Cx.AA:r,AWV. 
33 1:r,v ~EVtKflv. 
34 Cf. Aristotle, NE VIII, 1158a7-10. 
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«OEt 1tEp\ apE'tl1e; E1tltlEAEe; EtVCll 'tTl y' we; aA119cOe; bVOtlCl~OtlEVn 1tOAE1, tl1l 
AOYOU XaplV· ytVE'tCll yap " K01VWVtCl O'UtltlClXtCl, 'tcOV aAAWV 'tonq:> 
OlClq,EPOUO'Cl tl0VOV 'tcOV a1t09EV O'UtltlUXWV», 
1.e. 
«Any polis which is truly so called, and is not merely one in name, must devote itself to 
the end of encouraging goodness. Otherwise, a political association sinks into a mere 
alliance, which only differs in space [i.e. in the contiguity of its members] from other 
forms of alliance where the members live at a distance from one another». 
What Aristotle is saying here is that a real state must pay attention to ethical excellence, 
and this suggests that political friendship is a kind of advantage-friendship sui generis. 
As the passage explains, any state should have concern for ethical excellence. A similar 
idea is expressed in the following lines of the Politics, i.e. at Pol. III, 1280bl0-12 
where Aristotle points out that, without such a concern, law would be simply a 
covenant, instead of being a rule of life capable of making the members of a polis good 
and just; which fits well with the idea that there might be various degrees of justice, 
and, correspondingly, degrees of concern for ethical excellence. 
In this respect political friendship resembles the kind of friendship which 
involves a display of ethical excellence more than it does friendship of mere advantage. 
With reference to the former kind of friendship, at NE VIII, 1156b7-9 Aristotle states: 
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«However, it is the friendship between good people, those resembling each other in 
excellence, that is complete35 ; for each alike of these wishes good things for the other in 
so far as he is good, and he is good in himself». 
This form of reciprocal love is not incidental, i.e. it is due to inner characteristics of the 
reciprocating p artie S36 . In fact, at NE VIII, 1156b9-11 it is claimed that 
«those who wish good things for their friends, for their friends' sake, are friends most 
of all; for they do so because of the friends themselves, and not incidentally». 
Intrinsic goodness prompts love between similar people, in so far as their excellence 
leads them to establish friendly ties with individuals provided with the same 
characteristics as their own; nevertheless, this does not exclude that even less virtuous 
persons may feel love towards eminently virtuous ones, for instance when friendship 
based on superiority is at stake37 . 
It is true that, unlike in friendship by goodness, in political relationships 
reciprocal well-wishing is not unconnected with personal advantage. That a person is 
virtuous does not entail a complete devotion to his friends without thinking of his own 
good; political justice itself is pursued for the sake of the advantage to be gained, as he 
repeatedly insists in the PoliticS38 . As I have already suggested, in political friendship 
intimate relationships are not practicable, nor do fellow-citizens love each oth~r for 
their inner features, not least because many of them do not have good dispositional 
35 TEA-Eta 0' eO''ttv t, 'twv aya6wv <1>tAta Kat Ka't' apE't1lV b~ot(J)V. 
36Cf. A.W. Price, 1989, pp. 109-10. 
37 Cf. S. Stem-Gillet, 1995, p. 4l. 
38 See Aristotle, Pol.III, 1282b16-8~ 1283b40-2; 1279a17-2l. 
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traits. But they can be good to some extent, that is, in so far as they are respectful of the 
established laws, even if their behaviour is not dictated by an intrinsic excellence. 
However, if some degree, even a minimal one, of excellence is maintained within 
the polis, political friendship can be something lasting, just like friendship between 
good individuals39 . The kind of love people can feel for each other in a political 
community hardly fits the idea of intimate love; certainly it is a kind of impersonal 
love, which we could identify as a form of respect; but reciprocal respect, guaranteed 
through the excellence of justice, assures mutual reliability and the possibility of living 
without fear of continuous recriminations. 
Reciprocal trust is surely a typical feature of friendship grounded on goodness. 
At NE VITI, 1 1 57a20-4 Aristotle says: 
«The friendship of the good is also the only kind that is immune to slanders; for it is not 
easy to give credence to anyone about a person one has scrutinized oneself over a long 
period; also trust exists between them, and the thought 'he would never have treated me 
unjustly', and all the other features that one expects of a friendship that is truly 
friendship». 
Moreover, at EE VII, 1237b10-3 it is said that 
«friendship seems something stable40, and this alone is stable [ ... J There is no stable 
friendship without confidence 41». 
39 See Aristotle, NE VIII, 1156blO-2. 
40 f3ef3atOv. 
41 OUK EO''tt 0' aVe\) 1ttO''te(J)~ <j>tA'ta f3ef3atO~. 
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In order to have a civic friendship grounded in excellence, trust is required. Still, trust 
in a polis cannot exist regardless of the existence of unjust individuals, in that their 
search for personal advantage can create conflicts. Justice should be displayed in order 
to resolve disputes, and laws themselves established in order to prevent irregularities 
and consequent conflicts; nevertheless, trust should be proportional to the worth of 
people. Friendship grounded in excellence of character resembles a disposition, as 
Aristotle says at NE VIII, 1157b29-32, 
«;, yap CPt A 110't~ oux n't'tov 1tpOC; 'to' u'Vuxa EO''ttV, UV'tt<!>tAoucrt DE IlE'tcX. 
1tpOCltPEO'ECO~, ;, DE 1tpOCltPEO't~ u<j>' E~ECOC;' KClt 'tuYCl8O, J3ouAOV'tClt 'tOt~ 
<j>tAOUJ.lEVOtC; EKEtVCOV EVEKCl, OU KCl'ta 1ta8oc; O,AAU KCl8' E~tV», 
l.e. 
«one can feel love no less towards inanimate than towards animate objects, but 
reciprocal loving involves decision, and decisions flow from dispositions, and when 
people wish good things for those they love for these others' sake, this is not a matter of 
affective state but of disposition» 42, 
which suggests that, in such a kind of friendship, actions are not chosen and decisions 
made on the basis of transitory inclinations, as occurs in the case of friendship 
grounded in mere utility; if friendship is between virtuous people, it turns out to be a 
42 Aristotle, NE VIII, 1157b29-30. 
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relationship involving individuals who choose and act according to a steady disposition 
of character, which makes them love reciprocally in themselves43 . 
As Aristotle claims at NE VIII, ll57bl9-24, friends resembling each other in 
excellence want to live together: 
«For nothing is so characteristic of friends as living together (for whereas the needy 
want help, even the blessedly happy want to spend their days with others; for the~e are 
the last ones to live in solitude); but it is not possible for people to spend their time with 
each other if they are not pleasant, and if they do not enjoy the same things, which 
seems to be characteristic of comradely friendship». 
As is entailed later at NE VIII, IIS8al0-2, such a kind of intimate friendship cannot 
take place when friendship involves an entire citizen body: 
«it is not possible to be a friend to many in the case of the complete kind of friendship, 
just as it is not possible to feel erotic desire for many people at once». 
In political friendships, people's loving each other for their sake seems to be highly 
unlikely, in that individual advantage is predominantly what is sought after. But when 
the life of a polis is conducted according to some kind of excellence like justice, 
personal utility can be combined with common advantage. By acting according to the 
norms of justice, fellow-citizens will establish between themselves a reciprocal bond of 
trust and loyalty, just as in the 'virtue-friendship'; moreover, they might be thought of 
as living together, although their community of life turns out to be impersonal, insofar 
as they belong to the same community and share in the same network of laws. As I 
have already suggested, and as I am going to explain further in the next chapter of my 
43 See A.W. Price, 1989, p. 108. 
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thesis, someone might obey legal prescriptions without actually realizing the benefit he 
will get from obedience, maybe more out of fear of punishment than of inner 
conviction. 
Justice as mere lawfulness is different from justice as intrinsic disposition of 
character. Nevertheless, I think that, in both cases, justice may be regarded as a 
plausible substitute for excellence, even when it is mere lawfulness, although it is not 
practised for the other's sake. Behaviour according to laws of justice can promote the 
well being of each citizen without this being the outcome of a conscious purpose. If 
love cannot be felt towards unknown people, nevertheless respect can be taken as a 
form of well-wishing, maybe less personal and more formal, but capable of replacing 
the reciprocal love typical of virtuous persons. 
5.4: Conclusions 
In this chapter I have tried to sketch a general description of political friendship, and 
define its boundaries through the analysis of resemblances to and differences from both 
friendship based on ethical excellence and friendship grounded on utility; what emerges 
from this investigation of political friendship is a picture whose distinguishing fedtures 
are reciprocity of virtuous acts and useful benefits. Politike ph ilia appears as a system 
of bonds established so as to produce both individual advantage and the advantage of 
the whole of the community. No kind of political organization will work without the 
employment of some degree of ethical excellence, given that individual advantage 
pursued without any respect for other people's needs turns out to shake the foundations 
of the political community: lawfulness, trust and equality of opportunity according to 
worth. 
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Political friendship in non-ideal communities involves people of different sorts, among 
whom there will be many who are not provided with the inner dispositional traits 
typical of virtuous individuals; still, the adoption of norms of justice seems to 
supplement the lack of virtuous inner features and to promote mutual advantage 
according to excellence. We have seen that political friendship is neither a mere 
advantage-friendship, nor a pure friendship grounded on goodness; in any case, it is 
plausible to assume that it is a friendship consisting in some reciprocity of roles and 
functions and involving ethical excellence with a view to the well-being of the 
community. 
Political friendship will never be a friendship exclusively based on authentic 
goodness, not even in its most ideal condition, since the intimate well-wishing proper to 
such a friendship cannot take place among many people who do not know each other; 
moreover, justice may not be practised for the sake of itself in the polis, but for the sake 
of advantage. However, in any political community advantage will never mean 
exclusive and personal utility: rather, mutual cooperation which supplies reciprocal 
needs will require some degree of respect for the interest of one's fellow-citizens. 
That Aristotle insists on the characteristics of stability, trust and mutual love 
typical of friendship of goodness might be taken as a source of inspiration, an 
orientating ideal worth applying to political life. In the next chapter I am going to 
develop an aspect of political friendship at which I have only hinted here: the 
correspondence between friendship and justice. I will try to show that the concept of 
friendship is employed by Aristotle in relation to political justice, i.e. with a view to 
showing that a different kind of justice from mere obedience to the established laws is 
possible. 
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Chapter VI: 
Relationships between Political Friendship and Justice 
6.1: Introduction 
In the last chapter I have tried to show that Aristotle does not identify the concept of 
political friendship with forms of agreement based on mere utility, but casts his net 
wider, by including the exercise of ethical excellence in the running of any community 
for the sake of its stability. He seems to dedicate special attention to the ethical 
relevance of friendships in political communities, and to the possibility of attaining 
forms of justice which are not to be understood as mere obedience to written rules. Still, 
it might be wondered why Aristotle applies the concept of friendship to the political 
sphere. My main concern in this chapter will be with trying to answer this question. 
On the one hand, political friendship seems to be regarded by Aristotle as a true 
kind of friendship and not to be simply employed as a colourful metaphor, devised to 
depict more efficaciously those relationships that exist among citizens belongine to a 
political partnership. Rather, it seems to be authentic friendship, just insofar as shared 
recognition ·of the norms of justice in force in the polis and virtuous behaviour in 
accordance with the established laws will make for those reciprocal relationships 
among citizens that are set up with a view to the common interest, producing at the 
same time a form of reciprocal trust and well-wishing which is typical of private 
friendships grounded in ethical arete. On the other hand, we cannot help but notice the 
apparently anomalous character of a friendship in which fellow citizens, although living 
together, cannot cultivate intimate mutual relationships based on authentic concern for 
each other, i.e. relationships ofa kind that the idea of friendship itselfwould suggest. 
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I claim that Aristotle's idea of friendship as it is employed in his political theory does 
not involve any particular interest in actualising in each polis the intimate friendship 
which can take place only between individuals who spend their lives together and feel 
reciprocal affection; rather, I claim that his main interest is in looking for a form of 
justice which, if possessed by each citizen, will be capable of ensuring a lasting 
stability and inner harmony in the polis. I propose that Aristotle's theory of political 
friendship emphasizes the need for authentic justice in the community, that is, justice 
grounded in the ethical excellence of fellow-citizens. 
I also suggest that Aristotle's concept of politike philia might be regarden as a 
concept of a value whose nature mirrors the degree of justice subsisting in any political 
community 1. Political friendship in a virtuous polis, i. e. a community whose fellow-
citizens are intrinsically just, will reveal a bond of empathy and trust between 
individuals; by contrast, social bonds resulting from sheer utility-agreements will make 
a city unstable and liable to conflicts, and the kind of political friendship in force in 
such a community will be of inferior quality. In that case, to endorse authentic 
friendship in political communities would amount to fostering a justice of a higher 
quality than mere' prudential' obedience to the established laws. 
What I will do in this chapter is to show how the relationships between justice 
and friendship outlined by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics may contribute towards 
the understanding of the role of friendship in Aristotle's political theory. In the first 
section of this chapter I am going to analyse NE VIII, 1 1 55a22-6, in which Aristotle 
proposes that lawgivers should pay more attention to friendship than to justice, and I 
hope to show that the superiority of friendship to justice will be conceivable only if we 
take it as an ethical friendship, superior to a form of justice which is not necessarily 
1 A different opinion is expressed by Yack in B. Yack, 1993, p. 110: «Political friendship is a fact of 
ordinary political life rather than a moral ideal, a source of conflict as well as a means of promoting 
greater cooperation». 
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grounded in ethical excellence. In the second section I propose to stress some pa&sages 
of Books vnI and IX in which Aristotle seems to draw a correspondence between 
forms of justice and kinds of friendship, with a view to showing that a truly ethical 
justice will produce a corresponding kind of friendship, i.e. the friendship subsisting in 
the ideal community. 
6.2: Friendship or Justice? A Reading ofNE VIII, 1155a22-6 
In the Nicomachean Ethics justice and friendship are treated as two separate issues; 
still, at the end of Book VIn they are treated as standing in some sort of relation to one 
another. The first time that friendship appears in connection with justice is at NE VIII, 
1155a22-4. Here Aristotle claims: 
«Friendship also seems to keep cities together, and lawgivers seem to pay more 
attention to it than to justice». 
This is because, as he explains at NE VIII, 1155a24-6, 
«t, 'Yap oJ.Lovota OJ.LOtOV -Ct -CTI CPtAt~ EOtKEV Elvat, -cau-cll~ O£ JlUAtcr-c' 
EcptEv-Cat Kat -C1lV O'-cucrtV Ex9pav oucrav JlUAtcr-ca E~EAauvoucrtv», 
1.e. 
«like-mindedness seems to be similar, in a way, to friendship, and it is this that they 
aim most at achieving, while they aim most to eliminate faction, faction being enmity». 
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At NE VIII, 1155a26-8 he continues: 
«Kat <ptACOV f..lEV 1/ OV'tO) V OUOEV OEt OtKatocruVllC;, OtKCXtOt 0' QV'tEC; 
1.e. 
«and there is no need for rules of justice between people who are friends, whereas if 
they are just they still need friendship». 
What does Aristotle mean when he says that lawgivers seem to attach more importance 
to friendship than to justice? 
Since Aristotle identifies three different kinds of friendship, we need to find out 
which kind he has in mind on this occasion. In this context, the friendship he is 
referring to might be, in general terms, a bond of mutual affection and sympathy which 
is typical of friends who love each other; a bond, as we might suppose, which is kept in 
view by people in power in order to produce homonoia among the citizens and, as a 
consequence of this, a stable well-being in the polis. Probably, what Aristotle is 
suggesting here is that friendship might be a more powerful source of well-being for the 
polis than justice by itself, as though justice may be defective in some way by 
comparison with friendship. 
Justice does not necessarily entail affection or true well-wishing for the other, 
e.g. when justice is simply obedience to an established set of laws and is practised by 
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citizens without any bond of empathy going beyond mutual interest2. Such a reading is 
confirmed by 1155a26-8, where Aristotle explains that friends do not need rules of 
justice to behave correctly towards each other, insofar as, as he seems to imply, 
behaviour according to justice is already involved in the idea of friendship; by contrast, 
whoever is just to another is not necessarily a friend of his. 
It seems clear that by 'superiority of friendship to justice' Aristotle does not 
mean the superiority of friendship based on mere utility agreements, i.e. a friendship 
which might even be identified with a kind of justice that does not stem from an inner 
disposition of character. This passage, as I believe, sheds light also on the idea that 
there might be different kinds of justice, e.g. justice conceived as a dispositional trait, 
as Aristotle has shown at Book V, or a more 'formal' justice, which does not entail any 
authentic concern for the other, but nevertheless displays itself in some kind of correct 
behaviour according to law. 
As we have seen in the last chapter, a characteristic that friendship share~ with 
justice is its capacity for keeping cities together; such a capacity is peculiar of 
reciprocal action governed by proportion3, but it does not necessarily presuppose the 
aspect of love characteristic of friendship. Given that the aim of lawgivers is to produce 
harmony in the political community and avoid conflicts which may be disruptive of it, 
Aristotle's statement that they pay more attention to friendship than to justice suggests 
that justice itself, if not supported by some degree of friendship, is not capable of 
guaranteeing that kind of stability which is given by homonoia; as Aristotle points out 
at NE VITI, 1155a24-6, like-mindedness is thought to be similar to friendship rather 
than to justice. 
2 The lack of such a bond in political life is what Aristotle helps us to see according to B. Yack, 1993, p. 
199. 
3 See Aristotle, NE V, 113 2b31-4. 
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The idea of justice that emerges here is of a kind of mutual relationship among citizens 
liable to recriminations and, because of this, extremely fragile and dangerous for the 
stability of the polis. As I suppose, such a justice may be of a legal sort, i.e. impersonal 
and without that reciprocal intimate well-wishing typical of friends; moreover, such a 
kind of justice, defective in relation to friendship would be mere rectitude not , , 
necessarily related to any form of ethical excellence. A truly virtuous justice, by 
contrast, might cause people to act virtuously with authentic concern for their fellow-
citizens, even though they do not know each other. 
Justice, when it is conceived as mere rectitude produced by obedience to settled 
laws, seems to be similar to a kind of conventional friendship established according to 
sheer utility, a friendship which, according to modern standards, could not properly be 
called friendship, being rather an agreement established by citizens in order to protect 
their personal interests without concern for the well-being of other people. Legal justice 
itself, which, in some respect, might be reckoned as virtuous if the laws which people 
obey enjoin virtuous actions, is still defective by comparison with friendship if no bond 
of affection is established among the citizens; a citizen may, for instance, act virtuously 
only out of fear of punishment and not because he is persuaded of the fineness of the 
just act. 
In my view, Aristotle identifies two kinds of justice: justice lacking friendship, 
corresponding to mere 'legal justice', and 'friendly' justice, which presupposes a shared 
excellence of character. In the same way, as Aristotle explicitly states, different forms 
of political friendship may be identified. The first, i. e. 'virtuous friendship', is a kind of 
political friendship accompanied to excellence of character; a second form of political 
friendship, by contrast, is friendship according to mere utility (which might be called 
'conventional friendship', i.e. friendship according to agreement). What Aristotle seems 
to suggest is the idea that such differentiations are related in some way. 
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As Aristotle tells us, many kinds of friendship may be identified, and, presumably, 
different forms of justice, as the variety of political constitutions shows us. The first 
general statement about the relationships between justice and friendship is provided at 
NE VIII, 1159b25-6: 
«EOtKE OE, Ka9a1tEp EV apxn Etprl'tat, 1tEpt 'taU-to' Kat EV 'tOt~ aU'tot~ 
Eivat 11 'tE <j>tAta Kat 'to OtKatOv», 
1.e. 
«It does seem, as we said at the beginning, that friendship and justice have to do with 
the same things, and involve the same persons». 
What Aristotle is explaining here in general terms is that the actualisation of both 
friendship and justice takes place in the sphere of human relationships, which suggests 
that the same persons who are tied together by bonds of justice will be in some way 
friends and, conversely, people who are friends to each other will have to respect those 
principles of justice conformity to which is the basic condition for friendship. 
That friendship involves justice is confirmed at EE VII, 1234b26-7, where the 
author says that 
«'to OtKatOV Kat 'to aOtKOV 1tEpt 'toue; <ptAOUe; Eivat JlaAtO''ta 1tav'tEe; 
<j>aJlEv», 
1.e. 
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«all say that justice and injustice are specially exhibited towards friends», 
and also at EE VII, 1234b24-6, where it is claimed that 
«OU [ ... ] EvoEXEcr8at <ptAoue; eau1:0te; Eivat 1:01>e; aOtKouJlEVOUe; un' 
aAA nA co v» , 
I.e. 
«those who are unjustly treated by one another cannot be friends to one another», 
which suggests that justice between people is a necessary condition of friendship, 
without which friendship would never be established. At EE VII, 1234b31-2 Aristotle 
additionally claims that 
1. e. 
<~ustice and friendship are either the same or not far different», 
which it might lead us to think that what concerns justice is a matter of interest also for 
friendship and vice versa. In other words, in any political community the demands of 
friendship would be the same as those of justice and extend as widely as the latter4 . 
4 See A. W. Price, 1989, p. Ill. 
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But, as it seems, the correspondence between justice and friendship is not to be 
regarded just in general terms; at NE VIII, 1159b26-31 Aristotle tells the reader that for 
every kind of justice there seems to be a specific kind of friendship, i.e. that to different 
kinds of justice there will correspond different kinds of friendship: 
«in every kind of sharing community there seems to be a specific kind of justice, and 
also friendship; at any rate people address as 'friends' those sailing with them or on 
campaign with them, and similarly too with their partners in other kinds of sharing 
community. And to the extent that they share in it, they are friends; for that is the limit 
of the justice between them too». 
As we see here, the limits of justice and friendship are reciprocally defined in any 
political community, and their being established in one way rather than another seems 
to determine their shape; in that case, variations between justice and friendship will 
occur only as long as they are characteristic of different kinds of community. That there 
are specific kinds of justice and friendships is also made clear at EE VII, 1242a20, 
where it is said that 
I.e. 
«To inquire [ ... ] how to behave to a friend is to look for a particular kind of justice». 
Given that, as Aristotle suggests at NE VIII 1159b31-2, it is correct to say that 
'what belongs to friends is shared in common', in that friendship depends upon some 
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sharing 5 . When it comes to a political community, which kind of sharing might be at 
issue? An answer to this question is provided at NE VIII, 1161 b6-S: 
«for there seems to be a kind of justice that obtains for any human being in relation to 
anyone capable of sharing in law and taking part in agreements, and so there can be 
friendship too, to the extent that the other is a human being». 
To share in law and to take part in agreements are activities without which no political 
association would exist and, for that reason, they are mostly concerned with the 
advantage of the whole of the community6; still, as we have seen, friendship existing in 
political communities combines the aspect of utility with ethical excellence: the more 
virtuous citizens are in a polis, the more valuable political friendship will be. 
Various levels of obedience to law might be given, and the kind of sharing which 
gives birth to political friendship will be affected by the corresponding kind of justice. 
It is true that, even within a bad community, whose established laws do not aim at 
making the citizens good, familiarity with the same legislative system might create to 
some extent a kind of relationship between its members, in that just actions according 
to the established laws will be performed with respect to one's fellow-citizens. 
However, we should not forget that-as I have shown in the last chapter with 
reference to Pol. III, 12S0b7-10 and 12S0blO-13-any form of political association 
which does not pay any attention to ethical excellence will turn out to be a mere 
alliance, and its laws will be a mere covenant; in that case political friendship will not 
be determined simply by people's sharing in law; the law in which they share should 
5 ev KOtVroVtg yap t"1 <l>tA'tcx.. 
6 See Aristotle, NE VIII, 1160a13~ cf. Pol., III, 1282b16-18. 
174 
prescribe at least a nlinimum degree of virtuous activity in order to create bonds of 
friendship. In the next section I will try to develop further the idea that a 
correspondence exists between justice and friendship, i.e. the correspondence between a 
mere legalistic justice and friendship mostly based on utility. 
6.3: Correspondences Between Levels of Justice and Friendship 
So far, political friendship has been treated in relation to two different kinds of 
friendship: friendship based on utility and friendship based on ethical excellence. In this 
chapter I will show that, in the case of political communities, friendship according to 
ethical excellence does not intervene in friendships of utility as an external component; 
what I hope to show is that political friendship is the offspring of justice, and that the 
correspondence between different kinds of justice and friendship is causal. 
We have just seen that political friendship is based on observance of laws; but, as 
Aristotle explains at NE VIII, 1162b21-3, there might be written or unwritten laws: 
«Now it seems that, just as what is just is twofold, part of it being unwritten and part 
what accords with written law7, so too friendship in terms of the useful falls into a type 
based on character and a type based on legal requirements8». 
This passage confirms the correspondence between justice and friendship. We might 
suppose that there are political friendships based on mere obedience to written laws 
without involving reciprocal trust and sympathy between the citizens. These seem to be 
mere conventional friendships that are easily dissolved when problems arise with;.n the 
7 'to ~ev aypcx,<I>ov 'to oe Kcx,'teX. v6~ov. 
8 tl ~ev ,,8tK11 tl Oe vO~tK". 
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conlmunity; if the bond that keeps citizens together is exclusively the pursuit of what is 
beneficial for each of them, such a friendship will turn out to be only a legal agreement. 
By contrast, a more valuable degree of friendship based on utility will be the one 
which accords with the just that is unwritten, which probably refers to the disposition 
according to which one is led to perform virtuous actions even if these are not explicitly 
prescribed by written laws. In friendships rooted in utility justice is pursued for the sake 
of advantage rather than because of itself; still, unlike those legal arrangements 
respected with a view to personal utility, actions that come about from a just disposition 
might be pursued also with concern for one's fellow-citizens, rather than exclusively 
for one's own interest. In the latter case, the friendship, although being mostly based on 
utility, will be conducted according to some degree of ethical excellence, i.e. something 
which will make it more durable. 
At NE VIII, 1162b25-36 Aristotle provides the reader with a description of legal 
and ethical kinds of friendship according to utility. On the one hand, the legal type 
operates by agreement on fixed terms, e.g. in the case of relationships of commercial 
kind; on the other hand, the kind of friendship based on character will be basec.1 on a 
higher degree of trust between the contracting parties: 
«The legal type is the one that operates on stated terms9, the wholly commercial sort 
from hand to hand, the more cultivated sort over time, but still by agreement, something 
in exchange for something. With this type what is due is clear and not for dispute, but if 
it is based on friendship it will allow for postponement; hence the fact that in some 
places lawsuits to recover such debts are not allowed, the thought being that those who 
have made an exchange on the basis of trust should be content with that. The type based 
on character does not operate on stated terms, but presents are given, or whatever else it 
9 EO"'tt 0' 11 VOJ.1tKll J.1€V 11 btl P1l'tOtC;. 
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may be, as to a friend; yet the giver expects to come away with an equal amount, or 
more
10
, on the basis that it was not a gift he made but a loan, and if when the friendship 
is being dissolved he is not in the same position as he was when it was formed, 
accusations will follow». 
Although Aristotle refers mainly to agreements of a commercial sort, it is evident how 
the lack of trust between the contracting parties makes it an 'inferior' form of 
friendship. The more love and affection exists between friends, the more a friendship 
will be 'ethical' friendship. 
Given the correspondence between justice and friendship in each political 
community, it seems plausible to suppose that even for political justice, in which utility 
plays a substantial role, different levels might be identified: a merely legal one, which 
does not necessarily entail bonds of reciprocal affection and trust among the contracting 
parts, and a 'superior' kind of friendship, whose superiority stems from its greater 
stability and trust between friends. It seems, then, that ethical arete is what creates a 
stable and lasting bond of affection upon which true friendship relies, and arete itself, 
conceived in its various degrees, will determine, correspondingly, different kinds of 
political friendship, ranging from a mere conventional kind to a kind in which jus" laws 
are observed by citizens in conformity to their authentic disposition of character. The 
more trust there is among the citizens of any polis, the more the chances of their 
friendship being solid. 
That a kind of correspondence subsists between different kinds of justice and 
friendship is confirmed by the direct proportionality established at NE VIII, 1160a3-7 
between friendship and some kinds of injustice committed against one's friends. The 
unjust, as Aristotle declares, 
10 1(ol1t~£creat oe <X~tOt 'to tcrov ll1tA£ov, cb~ OU o£oO)1(W~ <XAAa xp"O'a~. 
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«increases with the degree of friendship involved 11: so e.g. it is a more terrible thing to 
cheat a comrade out of money than a fellow citizen, or to fail to help out a brother than 
a stranger, and to strike one's father than anyone else at all. And the requirements of 
justice also increase naturally along with the degree of friendship, both things involving 
the same persons and having an equal reach». 
Presumably, by saying that injustice is even greater if it is done by someone 
against his friends, Aristotle means that the expectations of justice grow according to 
the degree of friendship established, so that a violation of the implicit norms of justice 
in a friendship based on goodness would be regarded as more unjust than unjust 
behaviour towards people with whom there is a lesser form of sharing. For instance, to 
do wrong to a member of one's family would be taken as more shameful that an unjust 
act committed against an unknown person. 
That the degree of justice is proportional to the degree of friendship involved is 
also made clear in NE VIII, 1160a28-30: 
«1tacral 8" <pat VOV1:a 1 'j' Elval' 
1.e. 
«All the different kinds of community, then, are evidently parts of the political one; 
and along with community of each sort will go friendship of the same sort». 
11 atX;llCHV AaJlJ3aV£t 1:4) JlCiAAOV 1tpOC; ¥tAOUC; £tvat. 
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Aristotle goes on to depict different kinds of right community, to which there 
correspond deviant forms. The kinds of right political constitution described are 
kingship, aristocracy and timocracy, among which kingship is best, timocracy least 
good12~ their corresponding deviations are respectively tyranny, oligarchy and 
democracy. 
As we are going to see in the next chapters, what makes the distinction between 
right and deviant forms of government is whether rulers govern by having in view the 
utility of the whole of the polis or simply their own advantage 13. The more rulers act to 
promote the well-being of the whole of the polis, the more will they promote authentic 
justice and friendship in the community. In that case, when Aristotle claims that 
lawgivers seem to pay more attention to friendship than to justice, he seems to be 
referring to virtuous lawgivers who aim at the actualisation of the advantage of all the 
citizens and at the endorsement of mutual trust. 
Political friendship will be stronger or weaker according to both the kind of 
justice established by rulers and the conformity of citizens to such a kind of justice. 
However, we might wonder by what means such friendship is established by lawgivers 
and the ruled. Aristotle does not state it openly, but it seems clear that the justice 
established by the rulers and people's abidance by it will bring about some kind of 
political friendship. Unlike private and intimate friendships between few innl"lnll~l" in 
which mutual justice seems to stem from the bond of affection established between 
friends, in friendships of political kind, as I have also suggested in the last chapter, 
justice will be the main condition of friendship. 
As Aristotle claims at NE VIII, 1161 a 10-11 : 
12 Aristotle, NE YIn, 1160a35-6. 
13 See Aristotle, Pol. III, 1279a17-21. 
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01 Ka lOV», 
1.e. 
«Corresponding to each kind of constitution there is evidently a friendship, to the extent 
that there is also justice», 
which says that without justice, a corresponding friendship would never come about. 
The kinds of friendship handled by Aristotle after this passage are forms of superiority-
friendship like that of a king for his subjects, which is thought to be of the same kind as 
a fatherly friendshipl4, or friendships subsisting in an aristocracy, which is similar to 
friendship of husband for wifel5, or, again, friendships of brothers, similar to 
friendships between comradesl6 . The correspondence between justice and friendship is 
confirmed also in the case of deviations from right forms of government: the less 
justice there is in a polis, the less friendship there will be: 
«As for deviations, just as there is little in the way of justice in them, so there is little 
friendship, and least in the worst deviationl7; for in a tyranny there is no, or little, 
friendship. For where there is nothing in common between ruler and ruled, there is no 
14 See Aristotle, NE VIII, 1161all-20~ cf. EE VII, 1241b30. 
15 See Aristotle, NE VIII, 1161a20-5~ cf. EE VII, 1241b30-1. 
16 See Aristotle, NE VIII, 1161a25-30~ cf. EE VII, 1241b31-2. 
17 £V Oe 'true; 1tap£KJ3a.O"£cnv, c001t£p Kat 'to OtKatOV £1tt ~ltKp6v £O"'ttV, ou'tCO Kat " ~tAtcx., 
Kat flKtO"'ta tv 'til K£tPtO"'t1l-
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friendship either (after all, neither is there justice)-e.g. of craftsman towards tool or of , 
soul towards body, or of master towards slave» 18. 
Differently from friendship between two people or family friendships, which 
might come about from their living together19, the friendship characteristic of a political 
community might be the result of the sharing of one kind of justice rather than another. 
In that case, the particular form of justice inner to a specific political friendship will be 
the cause of civic friendship itself. If, as is said at EE VII, 1234b23-4, 
1.e. 
«it is thought to be the special business of the political art to produce friendship», 
presumably such a task will be fulfilled only through the setting up of an adequate kind 
of justice, by means of written laws and the promotion of ethical values conformity to 
which will make the happiness of the polis attainable to some degree. 
It is true that there might be other factors capable of producing friendship in the 
polis, such as belonging to the same community and sharing the same cultural values. 
But, when it comes to political life, bonds of sympathy and affection seem to spring 
especially from reciprocally correct behaviour, which can be displayed at different 
levels: either in terms of sheer respect of conventions, or as behaviour according to law 
18 Aristotle, NE VIII, 1161a30-5. 
19 See for instance Aristotle, NE VIII, 1161 b 17 -34, where the source of friendship between parents and 
children is claimed to be the belongings of children to parents. As for friendship among brothers, which 
springs from their having grown up together, see NE VIII, 1161b34-1162al. 
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and an inner ethical excellence at the same time. Higher degrees of friendship will 
occur wherever people are good men; however, in order to be a good citizen-I suppose-
it might be sufficient not to behave unjustly, even without engaging in highly virtuous 
actions, as EE VII, 1234b27-30 confirms: 
«the same man seems both good and a friend20, and friendship seems a sort of moral 
habit21~ and if one wishes to make men not wrong one another, one should make them 
friends, for genuine friends do not act unjustly». 
This shows that the least degree of friendship might be the one corresponding to 
obedience to rules of justice established in the polis with a view to preventing citizens 
from harming each other; the highest, on the contrary, will presuppose a wider display 
of authentic virtuous acts towards fellow-citizens, which are not restricted to a mere 
prudential form of not-harming-others. 
The Aristotelian idea of a friendship consequential on justice in the community 
seems to take up the idea espressed by Socrates in reply to Thrasymachus in Plato's 
Rep. 351d5-6, according to which injustice is a source of disunity: 
«injustice breeds divisions and animosities and broils between man and man, while 
justice creates unanimity and friendship»22, 
or the claim in Protagoras' Great Speech in the Protagoras, where dike, together with 
aidi5s, is taken as a bond producing friendship: 
20 Kat ayaSOc; Kat <\>,tAOC;. 
21 il8tKTl £~tC;. 
22 Tr. Davies and Vaughan, 1900. 
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«Zeus, fearing that our race would be wholly wiped out, sent Hermes bringing 
conscience and justice to mankind, to be the principles of organization of cities and the 
bonds of friendship» 23. 
In that case, the correspondence between justice and friendship would be causal, in so 
far as it would be only by engaging in ties of justice that the members of a political 
community could create bonds of friendship corresponding to the kind of justice in 
force. 
We have seen so far that in friendship according to utility, as well as in justice, 
more than a degree of ethical excellence can be found. Still, this does not explain why 
Aristotle says that lawgivers pay more attention to friendship than to justice. 
Undoubtedly, the idea of friendship captures more than the idea of legal justice, 
represented as mere obedience to a set of established rules. The idea of friendship 
expresses in a more effective way the view that fellow-citizens are human beings who 
share laws and ethical values within the political community in which they live; in 
other words, it emphasizes the ethical dimension of life in a political community. 
However, that a corresponding kind of justice may be found for each kind of 
political friendship suggests that even friendship of utility, like justice, may be 'ethical' 
instead of consisting merely in a conventional agreement not to transgress boundaries. 
The definition of justice itself as a disposition of character at the beginning of Book V 
of the Nicomachean Ethics confirms that the ideal of justice Aristotle has in mind is not 
merely conformity to a set of established rules, but presupposes human initiative and a 
display of virtuous actions, not only in the private sphere, but also in public affairs. 
Virtuous behaviour in the political sphere is not the exclusive prerogative of rulers who 
govern for the common interest, but also of the ruled, who should respect written laws 
23 Plato, Prot. 322cl-5~ tr. Taylor, 1991. 
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and act according to ethical excellence, i. e. according to those values which every law 
should prescribe. 
That more than one kind of justice may be found, according to the degree of 
ethical arete possessed, and put into practice by both rulers and ruled is not explicitly 
stated by Aristotle. I think that one of the reasons why he speaks of political friendship 
rather than merely of justice is because friendship can be taken as a yardstick of the 
level of justice subsisting in a political community. When Aristotle tells the reader that 
lawgivers are more interested in promoting friendship than justice in the polis, he does 
not mean that they are less interested in justice than in friendship, but only that the kind 
of justice they should promote should be as ethical as possible, i.e. approach the ideal 
of a friendship grounded in excellence of character. 
The idea of such a kind of friendship, which, we have seen, cannot be realised 
fully in a political community where the 'friends' are far more than a few, still indicates 
to lawgivers the importance of a justice and a political friendship where citizens behave 
according to inner excellence of character and not only according to a mere 'prudential' 
justice as in the case of, e.g., uncritical obedience to law aimed only at escaping 
punishments. Notwithstanding the impossibility of achieving a fully-fledged ethical 
friendship in political communities, where not all the citizens are equally good 
individuals, some characteristics of friendship based on arete might be realised to some 
extent in the political community. For instance, the stability typical of friendship 
between virtuous people may be an ideal attainable by political constitutions, given that 
in Book V of the Politics Aristotle shows his interest in the possible ways in which 
constitutions are preserved and not ruined by inner enmity between fellow-citizens. 
Friendships based on mere utility without exercise of ethical excellence, as well 
as forms of justice that are merely conventional rather than being inner dispositions of 
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character, are liable to slanders, as Aristotle says at NE VIII, 1162b5-6; by contrast, 
people who are friends because of excellence 
«are eager to do each other good (for doing good is characteristic of excellence and of 
friendship), and between people competing with each other in this regard there are no 
accusations, and no battles; for no one objects to someone's loving and doing him 
good, but ifhe is a person of taste, he defends himself by doing good to the other»24. 
As a consequence of their being virtuous and keen to do good to friends, people of good 
character will be reckoned by their friends as reliable individuals, and this will prevent 
them either from accusing each other or from quarrelling. 
I have said that civic friendship involves some degree of ethical excellence, 
whose minimal level amounts to that of justice conceived as sheer rectitude (i.e. 
conformity to laws). As is suggested at EE VII, 1243a32-3, civic friendship looks to the 
homologia and to the pragma, whereas ethical friendships are more concerned with 
proairesis. In the latter kind of friendship, as the author states, we may find a greater 
justice, which is a 'friendly justice,25. In comparison to friendship, the idea of justice 
does not appear as attractive as the idea of friendship might be. 
The concept of 'friendly justice', instead, captures a meaning which is central in 
Aristotle's theory of justice: the ethical dimension of justice itself. Although the word 
'friendship' is employed by Aristotle in a wide variety of senses, the idea of frierldship 
as people take it, i.e. friendship as a mutual bond of affection, virtuous attitude and 
trust, involves something more than mere justice conceived as a mere system of rules to 
observe. It rather entails that there can be some relationships of justice which turn out 
24 Aristotle, NE VIII, 1162b6-11. 
25 OtKCUOO'UVTl ~tAtK", 
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to be ethical agreements and not simply conventional. If so, we might suppose that 
intimate friendship between individuals is not what Aristotle is really concerned with in 
the political community~ his interest is rather related to the necessity to find a form of 
justice capable of avoiding disruptive forms of enmity among fellow-citizens. 
What is interesting about friendship in a political context is its capacity to 
promote stability which justice in the form of conventional agreements would be unable 
to attain~ trust is a requirement of ethical justice which cannot spring from mere 
conventions, but only by virtuous behaviour and mutual affection. We might wonder 
how trust can be produced within a political community where not all the citizens are 
intimately virtuous and just. A possible way might be to educate citizens to the ethical 
excellences embraced by universal justice, i.e. excellences that the law enjoins~ all these 
values seem to foster the sense of collectivity and of correctness towards fellow-
citizens which supplies the affection felt by intimate friends. In this way, friecdship 
turns out to be a paradigm in relation to which different degrees of justice can be 
detected, and, at the same time, a paradigm for lawgivers who are not willing to confine 
themselves to promoting mere conventional justice. 
6.4: Conclusions 
What I have tried to argue for in this chapter is that the concept of friendship as it is 
employed by Aristotle in his political theory does not involve an interest in actualising 
in each polis the intimate friendship which can take place only between individuals who 
spend their lives together and feel reciprocal affection. Rather, it seems to me that his 
main interest is in looking for a form of justice which is capable of ensuring a lasting 
stability and inner harmony in the polis. Although in Aristotle's thought the concept of 
friendship is not restricted to mere friendship based on goodness and involves also 
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forms of agreement based on mere utility, still he seems to devote special attention to 
the ethical relevance of friendships in political communities, and to the possibility of 
attaining forms of justice which are not to be understood as sheer obedience to written 
rules. Ethical values can make justice a 'friendly justice', a form of justice superior to 
mere avoidance of injustice. 
This is, in my view, the sense of NE VITI, 1155a23-6, where he claims that 
lawgivers pay more attention to friendship than to justice. I believe that Aristotle is not 
giving priority to friendship rather than to justice, also because, as we have seen, he is 
anxious to stress a correspondence between different degrees of friendship and justice. 
Rather, he means that lawgivers pay more attention to the actualisation of a form of 
justice which spreads ethical values and fosters friendship among citizens than to a set 
of conventional agreements respected only for fear of punishment and liable to 
recriminations which might seriously compromise their stability. 
Friendship seems also to be the visible signal of the degree of justice in force in a 
political community; if so, we might draw the conclusion that, just as Aristotle engages 
in a discussion about different kinds and levels of justice, in the same way different 
kinds and degrees of friendship can be found. Although all of them can be included in 
the idea of justice, some kinds will be higher than others, such as those forms of justice 
in which common utility is achieved by means of correct relationships not only between 
rulers and ruled, but also between fellow-citizens themselves. The goals pursued by 
some correct constitutions (i.e., as we are going to see in the next chapters, monarchy 
and aristocracy; polity, although being included among the correct constitutions, is not 
run according to ethical excellence) involve a constant exercise of ethike arete, the 
same excellence that is characteristic of friendships of excellence. 
Justice, we have already said, increases with the degree of friendship involved, 
and to different kinds of justice a corresponding friendship will subsist. I suggested that 
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what makes justice correspond to friendship is the degree of excellence of character 
employed in partnerships, and, even more, that justice is the cause of the corresponding 
kind of friendship. Since civic friendship cannot stem from intimate living together, but 
only from sharing the same system of laws and ethical values promoted by rulers, it 
seems reasonable to suppose that friendship will be the outcome of the setting up of a 
particular system of justice, and therefore specific kinds of justice will bring about 
friendships of the same kind. Thus, what Aristotle is doing here is striving to build a 
model of justice inspired by ethical excellence and not by conventionality; this is why 
friendship is so relevant in his ethical and political thought. 
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Part IV 
Nature and Convention. 
Political Constitutions as Instantiations of Natural 
Justice 
Ka'ta JlEv <'to> KOtVoV naO"t 'to 
OtKatOV 'to au'to, O"UJl<PEpov yap 
'tt llv EV 'tTl npoe; oJ .. )\-itA-OUe; 
KOtVCOVta' Ka'tu oE 'to l'tOtov 
L 
"Iv cbpae; Ka 1 OO"cov oTt no't£ 
) ,.... ),.... I 
at'ttcov ou naO"t O"uv£n£'ta t 
'to au'to OtKatOV Etvat. 
Taken generally, justice is the same 
for all, to wit, something found 
expedient in mutual intercourse; but 
in its application to particular cases 
of locality or conditions of whatever 
kind, it varies under different 
circumstances. 
Epicurus (in Diogenes Laertius) 
Chapter VII: 
A Justice in the Making. Nature and Convention in Political 
Justice 
7.1: Introduction 
Upon the relationship between natural and conventional justice and law a lot of ink has 
been shed. Such a controversial issue inspired the works of poets, play-writers and 
philosophers, who often stressed a stark opposition between the concepts of nomos and 
physis1, in terms either of conventional laws contrary to human instincts and 
ambitions2, or of a conflict between written and unwritten laws3, the first being the' 
product of human agreement, the second independent of human decisions. That so 
many representatives of ancient Greek culture pronounced upon the relationship 
between nature and convention confirms the relevance of such an issue in the Greek 
cultural tradition. 
Aristotle comes to terms with the long and rich tradition of thought moulded with 
the concepts of nomos and physis, and in the Nicomachean Ethics he reshapes it. We 
may find it staggering that his treatment of such an important issue covers barely one 
1 On the controversy between nomos and physis, see W.K.C. Guthrie, 1971, pp. 55ff. 
2 See for example the Platonic Glaucon, and his story of Gyges' ring in Plato, Rep. 359c-360b, which 
shows that what is commonly called 'justice' is only a convention established by people whose weakness 
would allow them to suffer injustice, whereas, by contrast, human beings are led by nature to fulfil their 
desires, even at the expense of other people. This ring enabled its possessor, a simple shepherd, to make 
himself invisible and seize power by killing the king Candaules. On Glaucon, see F. Decleva Caizzi, 
1999, p. 314. Another notable representative of the antithesis between nomos and physis is the sophist 
Antiphon; cf. G.B. Kerferd, 1981, p. 116. 
3 See e.g. Antigone's story in Sophocles, Ant., 450-2, which displays the incompatibility of written and 
unwritten laws. Cf. M. Hamburger, 1951, p. 59. For a full list of examples of nomos andphysis described 
in terms of written and unwritten laws, see F. Wormuth, 1978, pp. 19-20. Among the examples put 
forward by Wormuth we find Sophocles' Oedipus the King and Antigone, the speechAgainstAndocides, 
Xenophon's Memorabilia and the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum. 
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page of the Nicomachean Ethics, precisely NE V, 1134b18-1135a5. Aristotle dedicates 
just a few lines to the issue of natural justice in the Nicomachean Ethics, which might 
apparently suggest that it occupies a marginal role in his ethical philosophy; 
nevertheless, that natural justice is described as a part of political justice seems to be 
indicative of its importance to his ethical and political thought. 
In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle brings natural justice into the political 
realm, which represents a deep innovation and determines a radical re-signification of 
the concept of natural justice. In the first section of this chapter I will try to examine the 
relationships between natural and conventional justice. When Aristotle illustrates the 
distinction between natural and conventional justice, he seems to offer a detailed 
description of conventional justice, whereas the description of natural justice is left 
indeterminate. I propose to reconstruct Aristotle's view of natural justice by resorting to 
its distinction from the conventional, and I will attempt to demonstrate that some aspect 
of conventionality is, paradoxically perhaps, involved in the concept of natural justice 
itself. 
My view is that Aristotle conceives natural justice as an attainable ideal, not 
detached from conventional norms, but destined to be instantiated more or less 
perfectly in existing political communities in so far as these try more or less correctly to 
actualise it. That natural justice is human justice makes it a justice liable to changes and 
to new formulations. In this respect, as I believe, we may speak of political justice as a 
justice "in the making"; a justice which, as I will try to show both in this chapter and in 
the next one, intervenes in existing political communities by assuming a conventional 
form. In the two chapters that follow I hope to provide some suggestions as to how 
nature and convention contribute to the actualisation of the common good pursued by 
political justice. 
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7. 2: How Natural is Natural Justice? Ideal and Conventional in 'to 
cpual1COV 011Cal0v 
We have seen so far that conformity to principles and norms of conduct plays a decisive 
role in the life of human beings. When it comes to life in the political community, their 
actions and attitudes are inspired by norms of behaviour and general ethical values, 
obedience to which enables them to preserve both their status as citizens in a po~itical 
partnership and the correctness of their mutual relationships in the community. The 
norms involved seem to be of different kinds: some consist of a set of rules established 
differently in accordance with the specific conditions of each polis; others rely on 
human nature as such and possess general validity everywhere. Notwithstanding their 
diversity in kind, it seems that, within the political frame, such principles contribute 
towards a shared goal, i.e. the common well-being of the political community. 
In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle tries to correct the commonly held view 
according to which nomos and physis are two opposite spheres. His awareness of the 
divorce between nomos and physis becomes apparent at Soph. El. 173a7-12, where, 
while speaking of the generation of paradoxes, he claims that: 
«The widest range of commonplace argument for leading men into paradoxical 
statement is that which depends on the standards of nature and of convention: it is thus 
that both Callicles is portrayed as arguing in the Gorgias, and that all the men of old 
supposed the result to come about; for nature (they said) and convention are opposites, 
and justice is a fine thing by a conventional standard, but not by that of nature». 
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In the the Nicomachean Ethics the distinction between nomos and physis is set up in 
terms of natural and conventional justice. In Book V, after the descriptions of universal 
and particular justice, Aristotle engages in a brief discussion of the issue of political 
justice, which turns out to be the frame within which his well-known distinction 
between natural and conventional justice is drawn. But such a distinction, in Aristotle's 
thought, cannot be one of opposition, since both natural and conventional justice are 
claimed to be part of political justice, and seem to contribute towards a common aim, 
which is the realisation of the common good for the polis. 
At NE V, 1134b 18-25 political justice is divided into the natural and the legal: 
«What is politically just divides into the natural4 and the legalS: the natural being what 
has the same force everywhere6, and does not depend on a decision whether to accept it 
or not7 , the legal what in the beginning makes no difference whether enacted or not, but 
when enacted does make a difference, e.g. that the ransom for a prisoner of war be set 
at a particular amount, or that the sacrifice should be of a goat, not two sheep, or again 
the laws laid down to meet particular cases, e.g. that sacrifice be made to Brasidas, and 
enactments in the form of decrees». 
Natural justice so depicted appears as a kind of unwritten justice which, althourh not 
formally enacted in a kind of law, indicates the right behaviour to adopt, and creates a 
shared consensus without formal agreement among people just insofar as they are 
members of the human race. On the other hand, conventional justice is concerned with 
4 'to 4>U(HK6v. 
5 'to vo~tK6v. 
64>'OO'tK()v JlEV 'to 1tav'taxou 't1lV am1lV £XOV ouva~tv. 
7 Kat ob 't4> OoKEtV fl ~ n. 
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issues that can be settled in different ways according to human wishes without its 
mattering whether they are settled in one way or another. 
Such a stark distinction leaves many problems unsolved. The first is that only 
non-ethical examples are given of the concept of convention, i.e. examples of 
agreements which may be established in any way whatever without compromising a 
way of life. The second is that, although Aristotle stresses the importance of natural 
justice in the political sphere by including it as a part of political justice, he does not 
provide us with any further indication as to how natural justice plays its role in concrete 
political life, i.e. in existing political communities. In this chapter I shall attempt to 
provide a solution to these questions. The idea of natural justice I will try to elaborate in 
this chapter is not of an ideal detached from political reality, but of a justice which is 
put into conventional form and can be identified only in the shape of enactments 
established by human beings. It is my intention to show that natural justice in its 
actualised form presupposes an aspect of conventionality, and I hope to establish to 
what extent such a conventional aspect intervenes in the establishment of natural justice 
in the polis. 
The distinction between natural and conventional justice drawn in the Ethics 
recalls the one drawn in Rhet. I, 1368b7-9 between nomos koinos and nomos idios8 : 
«Law is either special9 or general 10 . By special law I mean that written law which 
regulates the life of a particular community; by general law, all those unwritten 
h 11 principles which are supposed to be acknowledged everyw ere ». 
8 On the distinction drawn in the Rhetoric between nomos idios and nomos koinos, see M. Hamburger, 
1951, pp. 64-5. 
9 K01V6c;. 
1 0 "t~hoc;. 
11 KOlvOV Oe oaa aypaq,a napa na.alV b~oA.oyeiaeal 8oK£t. 
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Although in the Ethics passage the distinction is established in terms of justice rather 
than of laws, it seems to present many analogies with this passage of the Rhetoric. First, 
natural justice and law are described as having a universal character. The Rhetoric 
describes natural law as 'acknowledged everywhere' i.e. independent of specific 
constitutions and because of this different from conventional laws. This suggests that 
principles of natural law are something over and above agreements established in 
specific communities. In the same way, universal justice, which in the Nicomachean 
Ethics is claimed to have the same dunamis everywhere, is something universally 
accepted independently of specific political conventions. 
Just as natural law is distinguished from written laws according to which states 
are administered, natural justice is distinguished from particular conventions, inasmuch 
as it is a common trait of every community, to a greater or lesser degree, independently 
of its specific inner condition; the fundamentals of justice are accessible to man as man, 
and not to man as a member of a particular polis. Furthermore, as Aristotle tells us in 
the already mentioned NE V, 1134b 19-20, it does not depend on a decision to accept it 
or not. In other words, it is not a matter of human judgment and preferences; it seems 
that its dictates have already been established in some way, and bring about an order of 
justice which does not rely on human acceptance, and which subsists notwithstanding 
the variety of kinds of justice in force in different political communities. 
By contrast, a legal enactment depends only on human agreement and does not 
exist independently, given that only after being approved and enacted can it be regarded 
as just. In this kind of justice, the element of human acceptance seems to be ess~ntial. 
Such a justice makes a difference only when enacted, which means that what gives it 
legitimacy is not something over and above human acceptance, but only its being 
settled in the form of a legal convention after an agreement has been made. At the 
already quoted NE V, 1134b18-25, where he draws the distinction between natural and 
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conventional justice, Aristotle mentions as examples of conventional justice the 
quantity of the ransom for a prisoner of war, or the way in which a sacrifice should be 
made, or enactments laid down in the form of decrees to meet contingent needs of the 
polis. 
What is worth noting here is that such conventions do not seem to ccncern 
important principles of justice, since they may apparently be established in a way or 
another without affecting the overall running of the polis. Similar examples of 
conventions of this kind reported by Aristotle in this argument are concerned with the 
adoption of units of measure. For instance, at NE V, 1134b35-1135a3 he says: 
«Those just arrangements based on agreement and what is advantageous are like units 
of measure12 : measures of wine and corn are not everywhere of equal size, but larger 
where people buy, smaller where they sell». 
This last example shows that such enactments are not completely arbitrary, in so far as 
they meet particular needs and must be established in the most advantageous way; still, 
in any case, they are not principles that would put the order of the polis at risk if 
established otherwise. 
Conventional justice may be realised by human agreement in different manners, 
and its validity will be confined to the particular political community in which it has 
been established. Conventional law is a human product inasmuch as it depends on 
human decisions; before being established, no one would act according to such 
prescriptions, just because they are not inherent in human nature and there is no 
intrinsic merit in acting accordingly13; conventional nomos does not inhere in human 
12 TO. [ ... ] KCX.'to. (J"u"lnK llV Kat 'to O'Ull<Pepov 'twv OtK<:X.tCOV 0llota. £O''tt 'tote; llE'tpote;. 
13 See B. Yack, 1993, p. 143. 
195 
nature as a universal principle, valid for every political context, but it depends on the 
organization of specific communities. It is worth noticing that the kind of convention 
Aristotle is referring to is far narrower than the whole range of conventions which 
includes ethically relevant conventions. 
The norms he mentions have to do exclusively with morally indifferent actions; 
these are not ethically assessable, and might be established otherwise without 
compromising the inner order of the polis. But if a law prescribed a distributjl)n of 
wealth producing inequality among the citizens and generated rebellion, or if a . 
punishment were not adequate to the crime committed, the stability of the polis would 
surely be undermined. 
So far, Aristotle has stressed a stark distinction between natural and conventional 
justice, without making any hint of a conventional justice concerned with ethical cases. 
But convention is involved in these sorts of cases too. Presumably, this second kind of 
convention belongs to natural justice14. But, in order to admit that, we shall have to 
suppose that natural justice somehow includes an element of the conventional. A first 
step towards solving this difficulty is to establish what Aristotle means by 'natural 
justice'. At first, it might be said that nature and convention do not seem to be 
competing standards of justice, in so far as they are both regarded as parts of political 
justice. Nevertheless, nature is kept distinct from convention. It seems that they play 
different roles in the actualisation of justice in any political community: the role of 
conventional law might be to establish agreement among citizens of a political 
community about non-ethical measures, i.e. legal enactments which are not a matter of 
ethical judgment, whereas natural justice, on the other hand, involves man as a political 
animal in general and not as a member of a particular polis. 
14 See B. Yack, 1993, p. 143. 
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The role that would be played in the political community by conventional justice, 
described in this limited way, is clear. More difficult to understand is the role of natural 
justice, which we know only to be part of political justice. But Aristotle does not add 
any further information about the contribution made by natural justice to the life of the 
polis. That it is part of political justice, which aims at the actualisation of the good of 
the polis, suggests that it has an active role in the promotion of such good. The 
supposed diversity of contributions made by the two kinds of justice, alongside the 
description of conventional justice as a justice which deals with ethically indifferent 
issues, might mean that the contribution made by natural justice towards the 
organisation of the polis is more significant than that made by particular decrees which 
would never be held to be just without being enacted. 
Aristotle seems to suggest that the conventional decrees he describes come to be 
part of justice only after, or by, being enacted, but he does not say anything about 
constitutive principles of justice. Natural principles themselves may constitute the basic 
structure of justice in any polis whatever, and compose the skeleton of justice as 
universally valid everywhere, as is claimed at NE V, 1134b19. Still, Aristotle does not 
provide any example of such a universal justice, as he does for conventional justice, 
and leaves it indeterminate. He describes it only in general terms, by stressing its 
universal dunamis, but without making any suggestion about what such principles 
might be. A clue might be given by its belonging to political justice. These are not 
principles restricted to a private, intimate sphere, but, on the contrary, they play an 
active role in political life, given that they are supposed to orientate the behaviour of 
the citizens towards the good of the polis. 
A first requirement is that they must be the same for every kind of community, 
given that natural justice has been claimed to have the same force everywhere. Since, as 
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is suggested in the first book of the Politics, justice is an element of the state15 and its 
task is to contribute to the good life of its members, a natural principle of general 
justice might prescribe any behaviour conducive to goodness and common utility. An 
example of a principle of natural justice might be the prescription of kinds of behaviour 
which contribute to the promotion of the individual and collective interest as an 
ingredient of the good life for a political community, as is suggested at Pol. III, 
1278b20-2, where men are depicted as political animals, who, on the one hand, wish to 
live together even when they do not need reciprocal help, but, on the other hand, form 
political partnerships with a view to their share of advantage. 
Such an interest is the goal of right constitutions16, i.e. those governed acccrding 
to respect for the citizens and not only a restricted part of the polis. And since justice, 
conceived as common good consists in some sort of equality, as is asserted at Pol. III, 
1282b 14-8, natural justice will attempt to preserve it by establishing a right proportion 
in human transactions. The fact itself that Aristotle presents as one-sided the belief held 
by the majority of people according to which justice is an allotrion agathon17 shows 
that it is a good whose actualisation involves reciprocal relations, and the common 
good it aims at must be realised through commutative justice and behaviour according 
to ethike are tel 8. 
Further indications as to what a principle of natural justice might be may be 
found in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics, in the passages that precede the argument 
15 See Aristotle, Poi., I, l253a37-9: «Justice belongs to the polis (t, Oe OtK(X.tOO'UVll1tOAt'ttKOV); for 
justice, which is the detennination of what is just, is an ordering of the political association». 
16 See Aristotle, Pol. III, l279a18-22, where right constitutions are defined in the light of their aiming at 
the common good. See also III, l279a26-30. 
17 See Aristotle, NE V, l130a3 and NE V, l134b5. 
18 Cf. L. Strauss, 1953, p. 160: «The common good consists normally in what is required by distributive 
and commutative justice or by other moral principles of this kind or in what is compatible with these 
requirements». Strauss adds: «But the common good also comprises, of course, the mere existence, the 
mere survival, the mere independence, of the political community in question». 
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of natural and conventional law. A common good is realised in different ways 
according to how sources like honours and money are distributed and injustice 
corrected. Aristotle's account of particular justice and its distinction into distributive 
and rectificatory justice are revealing. A principle of natural justice might enjoin fair 
distributions of honours or wealth, whose 'fairness' consists in respect of some sort of 
proportion between the citizens of a polis; conceived in general terms, rules of 
distributive justice are left indeterminate. Aristotle explains that distributions in general 
should be made according to some kind ofaxia19, given that 
«everybody agrees that what is just in distributions must accord with some kind of 
. 20 
ment» . 
But at NE V, 1131a26-9 he points out that 
«everybody is not talking about the same kind of merit: for democrats merit lies in 
being born a free person, for oligarchs in wealth or, for some of them, in noble descent, 
for aristocrats in excellence». 
This suggests that there might be different criteria according to which distributions are 
made; still, the general idea is that, if distributions and corrections are not made 
according to axia, the political order is at risk. In the same way, rectificatory norms 
might be included among those rules established so as to secure stability in the polis 
and prevent disorders; although different rectificatory enactments are in force 
respectively in different communities (for instance, punishments for various crimes can 
19 Aristotle speaks of distribution 'Ka't' Cx1;tav' at NE l131a24-5. 
20 Aristotle, NE V, 1131a25-6. 
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be established in different forms), a principle that is universally valid is the one 
according to which injustices are to be punished according to the kind of injustice 
perpetrated. 
Another example of a principle of natural justice might be concerned with 
preservation of proportion in economical exchanges; by 'economy', here, I do not refer 
to (what Aristotle would regard as) extreme forms of trade aimed at accumulating 
money21, but only to a network of human transactions which provide for both survival 
and the well being of any polis. Economical exchanges so conceived constitute one of 
the bonds that maintains the political association, so that people living in the same polis 
will have laws to prevent them wronging each other in the exchange of products. The 
concept itself of antipeponthos, which is reciprocity based on proportional equality, 
alongside Aristotle's insistence on preservation of correctness in reciprocal interactions 
suggests that not hurting each other might be a principle valid in any polis. So, natural 
justice might be conceived also in terms of avoidance of harmful actions, as a means to 
preserve not only individual but also common utility. 
It is evident here that natural justice consists of indeterminate rules of social 
expediency, valid in any polis22 . If the examples I have put forward so far can be 
accepted as principles of natural justice, we might conclude that the concept of natural 
justice leaves utterly undetermined the meaning of concepts like "hurting", "common 
good", or "fair distribution"; it is only through specification that these terms become 
truly meaningful. With regard to the indeterminacy of natural justice, Yack says: 
«What then is "natural" about Aristotelian natural right if not the existence of 
intrinsically just states of affairs defined by the nature of things? Natural right is natural 
21 See S. Meickle, 1995, pp. 68-75. 
22 See R. Bodeiis, 2004, p. 137. 
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in the same way that the political community is natural. Nature neither provides us with 
determinate standards of political justice nor disposes us to act justly. But it does 
dispose us to form political communities and to hold each other accountable to the kind 
of standards of obligation that Aristotle associates with judgments of natural right»23. 
The characteristic indeterminacy of natural justice is confirmed by the wide array of 
constitutions of which Aristotle is aware; its principles, it might be suggested, can be 
laid down in a variety of ways. But, if so, we should assume that, just like conventional 
rules, even natural principles can be otherwise. In the next section I will try to show 
that conventionality is a pre-existing condition for natural principles to be put into 
effect in any possible political community. 
7. 3: Conventionality in Natural Justice. 
In the introduction to this chapter, I roughly sketched the idea that, besides those 
conventional laws mentioned by Aristotle while illustrating the distinction between 
natural and conventional justice, there is also some kind of convention concerning more 
important, ethically-relevant principles which may compromise the social order of the 
polis if established in a different way. The description of conventional justice provided 
by Aristotle seems to be too restrictive, and does not account for every kind of 
convention. There are rules which, for instance, might be settled differently according 
to the specific conditions and needs of each polis; rules which might be fitting for a 
particular polis but not for another. 
23 B. Yack, 1993, p. 147. 
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Such a kind of convention is not the one that Aristotle was talking about when he 
referred to conventional justice, in that he confined himself to displaying cases of 
conventions which might be irrelevant if established in one way or another. This means 
that, although ethically relevant principles may be realized in more than one way, still 
the array of possible ways will not be as wide as the range of possibilities allowed by 
enactments which are not ethically relevant. Such principles are more significant than 
any particular decree such as the setting of units of measure. Since these principles are 
a matter of interest in any polis, we might suppose that they will be included in 
universal justice. But although universal principles of justice have universal validity, 
they will be put into effect in different ways according to the specific situation of each 
polis. In this respect, conventionality intervenes in the concept of natural justice. Before 
being put into conventional form, natural principles of justice are not actualised in the 
political community, and their meaning is left indeterminate; but once they are put into 
effect, they will turn out to assume different forms according to the kind of convention 
within which they are actualised. 
In other words, such principles will be realised by every community In 
different ways according to different conceptions of common interest. On the one hand, 
they have the same dunamis everywhere, just insofar as they are indeterminate; but, on 
the other hand, that what is just in one polis is not the same as it is in another entails 
that these principles are applied in a different way according to variety of constitutions 
and ways of life. Given this, how can the actualisation of such principles take place? In 
order to be in force in every community and not depend on human decision, these 
principles must be indeterminate so as to be applicable to communities which may not 
have anything in common. 
On the other hand, if these principles exercise an effective role in the government 
of each polis, and' each polis has its own specific situation, it seems that their being put 
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into effect in different communities will produce diversity in the way in which these 
principles are realised, and this operation will depend on human decision. Thus, in the 
case of any natural principle two aspects may be envisaged. The first is an element of 
indeterminacy, which makes the principle universally applicable; the second is the 
specific outcome of its being established in a determinate community. So, we may 
conclude, in order to be effective, a principle of natural justice also needs an element of 
convention. 
That natural principles of justice can be 'otherwise' is confirmed by their 
changeability. I will face the issue of the changeability of natural and conventional 
justice in the next chapter. My concern here is with the connection established between 
the idea of changeability and the idea that natural law is one of those things that 'can be 
otherwise'. At NE V, 1134b30-3 Aristotle claims: 
«1tOtOV OE q,UCJEt 'tcOv EVOEX0f.1EVroV Kat aAAroc; EXEtV, Kat 1tOtOV OU UAAa 
VOf.1tKOV Kat CJUVST,KTI, Et1tEP af.1$ro KtVll'ta 0f.10troC;, °llAOV», 
1. e. 
«It is clear enough what sort of arrangement, among those that can also be otherwise 
than they are, is by nature, and what sort is, rather, legal and the result of agreement, 
given that both sorts alike are changeable». 
When he says that both sorts are changeable, he stresses a feature belonging to both 
kinds of justice. Changeability entails the possibility for a thing to be otherwise than it 
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is. Differently from the realm of the gods, where there is no change24, even natural law 
can change, and it can be otherwise than it is. 
In what respect may natural justice be otherwise than it is? We have seen that 
what makes conventional enactments otherwise is just their being conventional, i.e. 
possibility of their being settled in more than one way according to human decisions. 
That even natural justice is included among the things which can be also otherwise is, 
as I claim, because it necessarily contains an element of conventionality. In order to be 
'otherwise', even natural justice, as well as the conventional in the Aristotelian 
meaning, will assume different shapes and, in this respect, will presuppose an element 
of conventionality. Nevertheless, Aristotle still speaks of general principles of justice 
that are to be distinguished from particular decrees enacted in any particular political 
community; nature and convention, he insists, are not to be confused. This seems to be 
the suggestion made at NE V, 1134b30-3, where Aristotle says that 
«it is clear what things are just by nature and what by convention and agreement». 
The most plausible reason for this claim is that justice by nature and justice by 
convention and agreement are two different spheres, and there is no possibility of 
mistaking a principle of natural justice for one of conventional justice, just because they 
deal with different matters and are of different character. So, when I assume that 
convention intervenes in some respect in natural justice, I am not referring to the kind 
of convention which Aristotle is so keen to distinguish from nature. It might be 
objected to my thesis that, since nature is described by Aristotle as separate from 
convention, he has no intention of suggesting that natural justice be("omes 
'conventional' through human agreement in specific communities. 
24 See Aristotle, NE V, 1134b28-9. 
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However, I believe that Aristotle has this aspect of natural justice clearly in mind. A 
revealing passage is NE V, 1137a9-16, when he tries to explain that to act justly is very 
difficult: 
«They [people] think that to have recognized what is just and what is unjust involves no 
special accomplishmenes, on the grounds that it is not hard to understand the matters 
on which the laws utter (although it is not these that constitute what is just, except in an 
incidental sense): but how things are to be done, and how distributed, to be just -
knowing this, is more of a task than knowing what makes for health, since even in that 
case it's easy to know that it's a matter of honey and wine and hellebore and cautery 
and surgery, but knowing how to administer them with a view to producing health, and 
to whom and when, is no less a task than being a doctor». 
This passage suggests that actualising justice may present some difficulty, and 
human beings are the subjects who experience these difficulties. It is true that at NE 
1137a9-11 Aristotle says that people believe that 
«what is just and what is unjust involves no special accomplishment, on the grounds 
that it is not hard to understand the matters on which the laws utter». 
But, as he recognizes at NE V, 1137a12-13, the real difficulty lies in knowing 
«how things are to be done, and how distributed». 
25 'to yvwv<Xt 'to. 8tK<Xt<X K<Xt 'teX. &'OtK<X oUOev otOV't<X (Joqx)v £tv<Xt. 
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In my view, the difficulty is not with the kind of conventional justice Aristotle 
describes, but is connected with the indeterminacy characteristic of natural justice, and 
with human responsibility for applying principles of natural justice. In this pa.;sage, 
Aristotle shows his awareness of principles which are not immediately grasped, 
inasmuch as they do not rest on specific prescriptions, but require some way of being 
applied. It is worth noting that Aristotle mentions the idea of distribution, which, as I 
have suggested before, turns out to be different from those activities concerning 
otherwise indifferent actions and must comply with some constraints to be regarded as 
fair. It seems that, when Aristotle speaks of distribution in terms of an activity included 
in particular justice, he refers to the work of people committed to the making of laws 
rather than mere obedience to already established laws. 
It is true that how things are to be done should be a common concern, but the 
problem of distribution introduced by Aristotle seems to be more a prerogative of 
people in power, since it requires some competence. This is confirmed by the fact that 
at NE V, 1137a12-17 he compares knowledge of how to act justly to technical skills 
like medicine: 
«but how things are to be done, and how distributed, to be just-knowing this is more of 
a task than knowing what makes for health, since even in that case it's easy to know 
that it's a matter of honey and wine and hellebore and cautery and surgery, but knowing 
how to administer them with a view to producing health, and to whom and when, is no 
less a task than being a doctor». 
This passage is revealing insofar as it introduces the idea of just actions which are not a 
matter of obedience to unimportant decrees. 
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Therefore, to act justly is not only a matter of obedience to laws by all the members of 
the polis; rather it concerns the making of laws, and, I suggest, the actualisation of 
natural principles through convention and agreement. And this is difficult insofar as 
there is no determinate model of justice to resort to. That in Aristotle's view natural law 
is not a mere image to copy in the form of existing laws is claimed at Top. VI, 140a7-
18: 
«Sometimes a phrase is used neither homonymously, nor yet metaphorically, nor yet 
literally, as when the law is said to be the measure or image of the things that are by 
nature just. Such phrases are worse than metaphor; for metaphor does make what it 
signifies to some extent familiar because of the likeness involved (for those who use 
metaphors do so always in view of some likeness), whereas this kind of thing makes 
nothing familiar (for there is no likeness in virtue of which the law is a measure or 
image nor is the law ordinarily so called). So then, if a man says that the law is literally 
a measure or an image, he speaks falsely; for an image is something produced by 
imitation, and this is not found in the case of the law. If, on the other hand, he does not 
mean the term literally, it is clear that he has used an obscure expression, and one that is 
worse than any sort of metaphorical expression» 26. 
The Topics reveals a very important aspect of natural law: it is not an eternal law which 
men copy as though it were an image. Even more because, as we have seen in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, natural principles are indeterminate and as such cannot be copied 
in real life. 
26 The idea of law as an image (etOo~) of which human laws are just imitations is expressed at Plato, 
Pit., 300c4-6. 
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So far, I have said that, in order to be applied in an existing political partnership, natural 
law needs to be put into a conventional form. As a consequence of this, an element of 
human responsibility is involved to some degree in the realisation of natural justice in 
concrete political communities. Is this belief at odds with the Aristotelian claim at NE 
V, 1134b20 that natural justice does not depend on whether we accept it or not? I 
believe it is not, in that such a statement can be taken as referring to natural justice in 
general, i. e. before its being enacted in a convention. Human agency intervenes only at 
this stage, when these principles are being settled into a conventional form which fits 
the particular condition of each polis. 
7.4: Conclusions 
As we have seen, the great innovation represented by Aristotle's account of natural 
justice lies in its being made part of political justice; this suggests that the political 
community is the sphere in which it can be displayed. I have tried to explajn the 
distinction between natural and conventional justice as is drawn in Book V of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, and have suggested that, notwithstanding Aristotle's intention to 
keep them separate, in some way his theory of natural justice paves the way for the idea 
that conventionality encroaches on the realm of nature. 
As I have shown, two different kinds of convention might be identified; 
enactments established by human agreement may deal with either issues which are not 
neutral from an ethical point of view or with important principles of justice capable of 
spreading values of ethical excellence among the citizens. I considered the latter kind of 
convention as belonging to natural justice, although nowhere does Aristotle explicitly 
affirm that natural principles of justice are to be put into conventional form. Given the 
importance he attaches to natural justice as a component of political life, presumably 
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the natural justice he has in mind is realisable in existing political communities, and 
does not have to be taken as an isolated, unattainable ideal. 
I have assumed that natural principles of justice as they are conceived by 
Aristotle are general and indeterminate ones, which is the only way in which they can 
be taken as having the same dunamis everywhere; still, these assume different 
specifications once they have been settled into a conventional form. Compared to 
conventional enactments which might be established otherwise without threatening the 
stability of the political community, these principles, as I maintain, reflect a different 
form of justice, in so far as they represent a source of ethical values. 
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Chapter VIII: 
The Changeability of Natural Justice 
8.1: I ntroductio n 
As we have seen in the last chapter, the aspect of human agreement connected with the 
idea of conventionality is not confined to the sphere of non-ethical measures, but 
encompasses a broader sphere, consisting in the whole set of rules which determines 
the organisation of the political community, both ethical and non-ethical. It is likely that 
Aristotle's focus will be on the ethical worth of political constitutions established by 
human agreement rather than on non-ethical relevant issues. 
In this chapter I will explore a second aspect of natural justice, which, as I hope 
to argue, may contribute to illustrate its ethical nature: its changeability. The idea that 
natural justice is something changeable is expressed at NE V, 1134b24-33; 
changeability is a characteristic which might at first appear striking, considered that, in 
this context, it would be proper to a kind justice which is the same everywhere. The 
notion of natural justice seems to waver between the idea of an immutable, 
unchangeable justice, which has the same dunamis everywhere l , and a justice that is 
liable to change2. In the first section of this chapter I propose to explain in what respect 
natural justice may be regarded as immutable and in what sense it changes according to 
the differences existing among various political communities. My view is that natural 
justice is changeable insofar as the conditions for its instantiation are variable. 
1 See Aristotle, NE V, 1134b 19. 
2 See Aristotle, NE V, 1134b32-3. 
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My general intention is to investigate the role played by natural justice in the 
organization of any political community, and to see how its characteristic mut~bility 
contributes to explaining the way in which its actualisation in political life takes place, 
even in the ideal constitution. This attempt will lead me to cope with a difficulty that 
now emerges in Aristotle's description of natural justice: there is only one constitution 
which is the best everywhere 'by nature'. What does Aristotle mean when he says that a 
constitution is the best everywhere? And which constitution or constitutions correspond 
to the best 'by nature'? To these questions I will try to provide an answer in the second 
main section of this chapter, where I am going to show that the description of the best 
polis is left indeterminate, just like principles of natural justice before these are 
formulated according to the specific requirements of each polis. The idea that principles 
of natural justice have to be instantiated through convention is valid even for the ideal 
polis, which means that even the idea of a perfect polis needs to be reconciled with 
human agency. 
8.2: Natural Justice: Between Changeability and Unchangeability 
The idea of the actualisation of natural justice in concrete political communities brings 
us back to the issue of mutability of natural justice, on which I have only so far 
touched. Aristotle is anxious to correct the belief that only legal enactments established 
by human agreement are in process of change, whereas what is by nature is 
unchangeable3; in his view, there are laws by nature which, nevertheless, are not 
prevented from undergoing change and evolution 4 . The characteristic changeability of 
3 See Aristotle, NE Y, 1 1 34b24-7 . 
4 S~e NE Y, 1134b30-3, where Aristotle, while trying to mark a distinction between natural and legal 
arrangements, admits that they both are liable to change. 
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natural justice appears to contradict the ordinary belief (corresponding to the view held 
by most Greek intellectuals in the existing cultural tradition), according to which what 
is by nature is something immutable, not liable to modifications. Second, the idea that 
natural justice is changeable might seem at odds even with some authentically 
Aristotelian claims. For instance, in the Rhetoric Aristotle admits that natural law is 
immutable and of divine character5; indeed, even in the Nicomachean Ethics what is 
just by nature is said to have the same dunamis everywhere6 . These claims are difficult 
to reconcile with the idea of natural laws liable to change. 
This apparent contradiction has given rise to a variety of interpretations as to 
whether natural justice is changeable or not. Two leading interpretations of 
changeability of natural justice may be identified: a first tendency, which regards 
natural justice as substantially unchangeable, has been called a 'Platonising 
interpretation', whereas a second one, which we may call "historicist", suggests that 
natural justice changes according to the variation of political circumstances 7. The first 
interpretation tends to minimize the Aristotelian claim about the mutability of natural 
justice8, a claim which might suggest that such a kind of justice is liable to corruption 
as well as to improvements, and does not embody an ideal of perfection; such a reading 
of Aristotelian natural justice supports the character of immutability of natural justice at 
the expense of its alleged changeability, and in this respect it seems to abide by the 
Thomistic tradition of thought, according to which natural justice and law are 
5 See Rhet. I, 1375a31-3, where Aristotle, while explaining that sometimes a just decision is not the result 
of a strict observance of written laws, but is brought about by equity, claims that «the principles ot equity 
are permanent and changeless, and that the universal law does not change either, for it is the law of 
nature, whereas written laws often do change». 
6 See Aristotle, NE V, 1134b 18-19. 
7 See P. Destree, 2000, p. 223. 
8 See P. Destree, 2000, p. 223. 
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immutable and incorruptible, and their changeability is simply an effect of human 
incapacity to grasp the original dictates of the divine law9. 
As for the second interpretation, the "historicist", which stresses the aspect of 
mutability of natural justice, some of its exponents try to reconcile this feature with 
unchangeabilitylO, whereas others disavow the unchangeability of natural justice as a 
universal paradigm and take it as an open set of rules liable to continuous change, 
depending on particular political conditions 1 1. 
In my view, the puzzle of a natural justice which is changeable even if it is the 
same everywhere might be resolved if we think that the natural justice Aristotle 
describes is linked to the nature of humanity and the variety of its manifestations in 
political life. The place where this justice originates is not the realm of the gods, but the 
political community, conceived in general as the political expression of human reality, 
i. e. as the only sphere in which human beings actualise their potentialities; the human 
character of justice inevitably makes it liable to change. Changeability exhibits itself in 
the variety of political scenarios in which different kinds of justice are displayed, which 
seems to be an indication of how natural justice depends on different political frames. 
I claim that justice is changeable, to the extent that it displays itself in a variety of 
forms according to different political frames. My reading of changeability in terms of a 
variety of kinds of justice differs from that suggested by Destree, who believes that, 
given a shared understanding of what is just and what is unjust, the changeability of 
natural justice means a diversity in the interpretations that can be given of the idea itself 
9 See P. Destn!e, 2000, p. 224. See also B. Yack, 1993, pp. 141-2. 
10 See P. Destree, 2002, pp. 225-6. 
11 See P. Destree, 2002, pp. 228-9. See also B. Yack, 1993, p. 141. 
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of justice12 . In his claim, he seems to take over the suggestions provided by the 
Thomistic position, which, as I think, takes the changeability of natural justice as an 
expression of the (erroneous) conceptions that human beings have ofit13 . 
In my opinion, one may be right in assuming that natural justice is determined in 
different ways through human agreement, and it is also plausible that, according to 
what Aristotle claims at NE V, 1134b24-7, the changeability of natural justice is 
connected to the variety of kinds in which justice may display itself; still, it seems to 
me that variety of political constitutions is not so much a matter of interpretations of a 
general, indeterminate ideal (as both Destree and Yack seem to suggest) as of different 
applications of views of justice. I believe that, in Aristotle's thought, diversity of 
political constitutions does not stem from arbitrary views as to what justice is, i. e. from 
interpretations which do not take into account a polis' need for a suitable kind of 
justice; rather, the variety of constitutions is affected by the particular conditions of 
each political community, which make the establishment of norms of justice less 
arbitrary. 
When it comes to having a certain view as to what justice is, interpretations 
might be endless and not linked to the real situation of the polis. One might have a 
conception of the best constitution and its proper justice that is not realisable in an 
existing community, for instance one might imagine a constitution in which all the 
citizens are virtuous, or a wealthy polis where distributions of money and honours are 
satisfactory for its members. But when it comes to intervening in political reality, one 
should take existing factors into account. We have already looked at Pol. IV, 1296b13-
4, where Aristotle says that whoever possesses political science must consider what 
12 See P. Destree, 2000, p. 234. In his article Destree argues that, in order to escape a relativism of 
Protagorean kind, Aristotle defends the idea of a perfect regime which may provide a better interpretation 
of such a sense of justice. 
13 See P. Destree, 2000, p. 224. See also B. Yack, 1993, pp. 141-2. 
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kind of constitution is suitable to different populations. Another factor to consider 
might be the existence of rich and poor people: as he claims at Pol. IV, 1291b9-13, 
constitutions are established according to the prevalence of rich or poor people, or, as 
he says at Pol. IV, 1296bI3-34, according to a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative factors, such as freedom, wealth and education with abundance of 
population. 
Aristotle's insistence on the conditions that encourage the establishment of one 
constitution rather than another shows that justice is not simply a matter of 
interpretations. An example is provided at Pol. III, 1288a7-19, where he wonders what 
kind of people is apt to live under a determinate kind of constitution. Again, as he says 
when he speaks of the origin of different constitutions at Pol. III, 1285a15-27, some of 
them like monarchies arise because there are well-inclined subjects, and others come 
into being because of the specific nature and skills of their populations and 
geographical conditions l4 . 
As we have seen, on the one hand natural justice consists of indeterminate 
principles and has the same dunamis everywhere, without depending on human 
decisions to accept it or notl5 ; on the other hand, principles of natural justice must be 
settled into a conventional form and presuppose human initiative to carry them through, 
as happens with those conventional decrees mentioned by Aristotle at NE V, 1134b21-4 
and NE V, 1135al-3. I believe that this implied aspect of natural justice, i.e. its drawing 
on human agreement and its being put into effect in a conventional form, makes it 
liable to change. Without the aspect of changeability, natural justice would be only a 
transcendent ideal unable to operate concretely in existing political communities. 
14 See Aristotle, Pol. VII, 1327b22-35. 
See also Pol. VI, 1321a5-15. 
15 See Aristotle, NE V, 1134b19-20. 
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Convention, in that case, turns out to be the form in which natural justice as!...umes 
different forms and, consequently, changes. That natural justice is treated as an 
indeterminate set of rules and values to be specified in determinate contexts would 
prove that, since the inner conditions of any political community are affected by 
various kind of contingencies (e.g. wars, inner rebellions, unrest, a sudden 
accumulation of wealth or an impoverishment of the people), natural justice must adapt 
to circumstances and change its shape when required by the particular situation. Natural 
justice turns out to be an open set of rules in so far as it is indeterminate; it is up to 
lawgivers to realise legislative measures capable of taking account of political changes. 
That at the beginning of Book V of the Politics I6 he claims that, although a 
variety of constitutions can be found, everyone agrees upon what is just in general, i.e. 
upon the need to preserve proportional equality, seems to fit the idea that natural 
justice, conceived in its indeterminate character, is the same everywhere. 
Notwithstanding the variety of political constitutions, all of them cling to the same idea 
of justice, even imperfect communities; even corrupt constitutions like democracies and 
oligarchies are expression of natural justice in some way, inasmuch as they contain 
some element of justice; this is confirmed by Pol. V, 1301a36, where Aristotle says that 
the various forms of constitution possess some element of justice. This shows that, 
when justice is taken in general terms, and is not regarded in its specified forms, justice 
remains the same for every community, and in this respect it is unchangeable. 
At the same time, natural justice seems to change while being applied In 
particular political forms. Given all this, we see how an element of human 
responsibility is involved in the concept of changeability of natural justice. Human 
intervention may actualise principles of justice more or less well according to 
circumstances; still, natural justice itself, in its general lines, remains an incorruptible 
16 See Aristotle, Pol. V, 1301a26-39. 
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source of values towards the realisation of ethical excellence in the polis. Nature 
modifies itself through a conventional' strategy', i.e. through adoption of conventional 
forms, the formulation of which depends on human decision. Natural laws, I have 
already said, are flexible, open and changeable. Notwithstanding their changeability, 
their character of immutability springs from their capability of being otherwise, i.e. 
from their being indeterminate rules which may be established in a variety of 
conventional enactments. 
We come now to a controversial passage of Aristotle's argument in which an 
analogy is drawn between natural/conventional justice and right/left hands. His 
argument runs as follows. At NE V, 1134b30-3, which I have quoted in the last chapter 
with reference to the idea that natural and conventional justice are easy to distinguish, 
Aristotle says: 
«It is clear enough what sort of arrangement, among those that can also be otherwise 
than they are, is by nature, and what sort is, rather, legal and the result of agreement, 
given that both sorts alike are changeable». 
We might expect that the analogy which he draws immediately after will confirm what 
he has just said. At NE V, 1134b33-5 he goes on by explaining that 
«the same distinction will fit in the case of other things; for the right hand is superior by 
nature, and yet it is possible that everyone should become ambidextrous». 
The sense of the analogy is quite difficult to grasp fully. The analogy seems to 
mean that, just as in the case of ambidexterity it is clear enough the use of which hand 
is by nature, in the same way natural and conventional arrangements are easily 
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distinguishable from each other, and nothing prevents a constitution form having 
bothl7 ; however, what seems to me quite unclear is the reason why Aristotle insists on 
the superiority of the right hand over the leftl8. Should we apply tnis belief to the case 
of natural and conventional justice, natural justice would be regarded as 'superior' in 
some way to the conventional, which would be openly at odds with my view that nature 
and convention are not competing standards of justice. 
I think that the Aristotelian claim about the superiority of the right hand over the 
left is not to be interpreted as part of the analogy, i.e. as entailing that natural justice is 
superior to the conventional; rather, the analogy may simply be understood at a more 
general level, i. e. as showing that natural justice does not stop being natural justice 
only because one might learn how to use conventions. Natural justice, as I have also 
tried to show in the last chapter, is not superior to the conventional; as I claim, the only 
reason why natural justice might 'prevail' is that, besides its being changeable, it is at 
the same time the same everywhere, unlike the conventions which have value o~ly in 
particular constitutions. Only in this respect, as I think, we might say that natural justice 
is 'superior', but I do not believe that such a superiority is of ethical kind, given that-as 
I have tried to show in the last chapter-the two kinds of justice are not comparable. 
In the next section I want to explore further the notion of natural justice and try to 
show that natural justice expresses itself into conventions even when the polis at stake 
is the best one. In that case, as I am going to show, the natural justice typical of the 
ideal constitution will be superior to natural justice when it is actualised in the form of 
less perfect communities. 
17 See Broadie's commentary to the Nicomachean Ethics in S. Broadie and C.J. Rowe, 2002, at p. 348. 
Cf. MM I, 1194b33-9, where, with reference to the example of left and right hands, it is said that change 
of use does not abolish the natural distinction between the left and the right. 
18 On the superiority of the right hand, cf. MM I, 1194b3 3 -9, quoted in the footnote above. 
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8.3: Which Constitution is The Best 'By Nature'? 
According to what has been said so far, natural and conventional justice do not seem to 
be opposite spheres of justice; nor does Aristotle stress the superiority of natural justice 
over the conventional when he draws his strict distinction between natural and 
conventional principles. Although he describes each kind of justice in relation ~o the 
other, he does not make any comparison between the two, nor does he seem to provide 
a common ground on which the two can be compared. As I have suggested, we are not 
entitled to speak of a supposed superiority of natural justice over the conventional, 
when conventional justice is understood as a set of decrees which might be devised in 
any way without compromising the stability of the polis. 
Nevertheless, as I am now going to show, to speak of superiority 'by nature' of 
some kind of justice over another seems to be perfectly legitimate when the principles 
of justice at stake are instantiations of natural justice in various conventional forms. In 
other words, if the kind of convention is concerned with principles of ethical relevance, 
principles of this kind will be better instantiated in some constitutions rather than in 
others. 
At NE V, 1134b35-1135a3 Aristotle mentions those just arrangements based on 
agreement with a view to what is advantageous, and he compares them to units of 
measure; as he suggests 
«measures of wine and corn are not everywhere of equal size, but larger where people 
buy. Smaller where they sell» 19. 
19 Aristotle, NE V, 1135al-3. 
219 
The passage which mostly concerns us is NE V, 1135a3-5, which is related to the one 
just mentioned: 
. 
1.e. 
«Similarly, just arrangements established not by nature but by human beings are not the 
same everywhere, since even political constitutions are not the same everywhere, 
although only one is everywhere the best by nature». 
It seems to me that, in these lines, Aristotle is only apparently speaking of the 
same kind of conventions as those mentioned in the previous passage. That the b~olo)C; 
at NE V, 1135 a3 does not introduce the same kind of conventions might be confirmed 
by the idea that, had Aristotle intended to refer to the first kind of convention.) (i. e. 
those conventions which do not concern ethical aspects of political life ) he would rather 
have used the expression yap, just to mean that those kinds of conventions are not the 
same everywhere. 
By contrast, I believe that the kind of conventions introduced at NE V, 1135a3-5 
belong to the group of those human agreements in the form of which principles of 
natural justice are instantiated. Just like the other kinds of conventions, they are 
established by human beings; still, as I claim, they are 'natural' insofar as they are 
established with a view to the actualisation of principles inherent to human nature, e.g. 
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the principle according to which every political community should attempt to realise 
the well-being of its citizens, or the principle that justice is to be practised, both in a 
distributive and in a rectificatory form, by both rulers and ruled for the sake of the 
stability of the polis. 
The passage at issue seems also to mark a shift to a new issue, i. e. that there is a 
constitution which is superior by nature to others. In my view, that Aristotle refers to a 
constitution which is superior by nature in the context of the discussion of natural 
justice does not mean that natural justice itself is an exclusive prerogative of the best 
constitution, presumably the ideal one. In other words, that the ideal constitution is 
allegedly superior by nature does not mean that existing constitutions do not possess 
natural justice~ by contrast, the ideal one will be superior to the existing ones insofar as 
in the ideal the principles of natural justice are better instantiated than in existing, 
imperfect communities. 
In other words, in order to establish a comparison between the best constitution 
and the others, one should presuppose that they are judged on the basis of a single 
standard applicable to all of them, and such a standard might be the quality of 
instantiation of principles of natural justice into conventions, which is common to all 
constitutions. The best constitution, in that case, would turn out to be that in which 
natural justice is actualised in the best way, rather than being the only constitution in 
which natural justice displays itself. Aristotle is not saying that a constitution, 
presumably the ideal one, is superior to conventional constitutions established by 
human agreement, but rather that, among those constitutions established by human 
agreement, one might be found which is the best by nature. In that case, even the best 
constitution would be instantiated through human convention; moreover, this makes me 
think that there might be constitutions in which principles of natural justice are 
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established less well, e.g. in some kind of existing constitution, according to the way in 
which such principles are applied. 
Weare left with the task of understanding which constitution corresponds to the 
best one. The Politics may help us to understand the idea of a best constitution 'by 
nature' as a 'human' product. In Books VII and VIII Aristotle engages in a description 
of the best constitution; its superiority stems from its capacity to secure the most 
desirable way of life, whose principal ingredient is virtuous activity20. Presumably, its 
justice is a justice of values, capable of shaping individual dispositions of character in 
the best way possible and enabling people to engage in fair transactions with their 
fellows. 
As it seems, this kind of justice best reflects the ideal of justice expressed in the 
Nicomachean Ethics at the beginning of Book V, described as a disposition of character 
that prescribes the whole of virtue21 . It follows that this kind of justice is the outcome of 
human action and also presupposes some agreement between citizens as to how to 
regulate their lives in the community. It might be wondered, then, just what is the 
difference between justice in the ideal community and justice in force in the other 
constitutions, given that they both involve human agency, or, in other words, what 
makes the ideal community superior to the others. 
A plausible answer to this question might be that, In relation to the best 
constitution, the other constitutions appear as forms of government which, 
notwithstanding human efforts, do not manage to reach its level. Among then, we 
might include those corrupt constitutions described by Aristotle in Books IV, V, VI 
(e.g. oligarchy and democracy), which, although not established with a view to the 
common happiness and ethical excellence as the best constitution is, nevertheless 
20See Aristotle, Pol., VII, 1324a22-5. 
21 See Aristotle, NE V, 1129b19-33. 
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present some aspect of justice22, and, because of this, are liable to ethical assessment 
and comparable to the best one. The inferiority of deviant constitutions like oligarchy 
and democracy to the best one would consist either in their being based on an 
inappropriate idea of what is just23 (whereas the best constitutions promotes justice 
hap/os) or in their agreeing on what is just, i.e. proportional equality, without managing 
. ·24 to attrun It . 
So far, I have talked about only deviant constitutions as distinguished from the 
best constitution. Such constitutions, we have seen, contain some element of justice, 
although they fail to realise the perfect justice, i.e. justice that promotes complete 
ethical excellence among the citizens, and consequently common utility, achieved when 
distributions of honours and wealth are based on true proportional equality. 
Nevertheless, if we compare the ideal constitution exclusively with corrupt ones, we 
might think that the ideal is separate from all existing constitutions. 
However, what I claim is that, in Aristotle's thought, the best constitution is not 
separate from existing political constitutions25 ; on the contrary, it may be realised more 
22 With regard to fonns of government like democracy and oligarchy, at Pol. V, 1301a36-9 Aristotle says 
that all these fonns of government have a kind of justice, but, in the light of an absolute standard, they 
are faulty. 
23 See Aristotle, Pol. III, 1280a7-10. Before describing which characters are proper of oligarchies and 
democracies, that are usually taken as examples of deviant constitutions, he claims that all men cling to 
some kind of justice, but their conceptions are imperfect and fail at expressing the whole idea of justice. 
24 See Aristotle, Pol. V, 1301a26-8. As for concrete examples of constitutions that fail to attain the full 
idea of justice, see democracies and oligarchies as they are described at Pol. V, 130 la28-36. 
25 See G. Huxley, 1985. At p. 149 of his article, Huxley points out that the citizens of the best 
constitution «cannot simply be classified in accordance with any existing constitutional fonn». On the 
relationships between the ideal and actual constitutions see C.J. Rowe, 2000, pp. 367: «Aristotle [ ... ] 
clearly says that writing about the 'best absolutely' [constitution) and saying what is of 'practical use' are 
not only compatible, but are actually both to be properly regarded as parts of the business of political 
philosophy. There is no sign of his supposing that the second somehow replaces the first. Indeed, they are 
for Aristotle in practice as well as in theory complementary, insofar as the ideal serves as a standard for 
judging the actual». 
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or less well in the form of conventional laws. Reference to the right forms of 
government may help us to understand that the best constitution is not a detached ideal 
from some kind of existing constitutions, i.e. monarchy, aristocracy and, to some 
extent, as I am going to show in the last chapter of my thesis, even polity. 
In this respect, an indicative passage is Pol. III, 1288a32-b2. At the beginning of 
the passage, with regard to the best kind of constitution, Aristotle says that, among the 
three types of right constitution, i.e. aristocracy, monarchy and polity, the best of these 
will be the one which is administered by the best people; he speaks in general terms, 
without mentioning any of them in particular as 'the best' : 
«This is the type in which there is a single man, or a whole family, or a number of 
persons, surpassing all others in goodness [and therefore entitled to rule], but where 
ruled as well as rulers are fitted to play their part in the attainment of the most desirable 
mode of life»26. 
Only in the following lines, after explaining that in the best constitution the 
goodness of the good man and that of the good citizens must be the same (I am going to 
deal with this issue in the next chapter), does Aristotle introduce aristocracy and 
kingship as existing forms of government which present the same features of the best 
constitution: 
«It clearly follows that just the same method, and just the same means, by which a man 
achieves goodness, should also be used to achieve the creation of a state on the pattern 
of aristocracy or kingship; and thus the training and habits of action which make a good 
26 Aristotle, Pol. llr, 1288a34-7. 
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man will be generally the same as the training and habits of action which make a good 
statesman or a good king» 27. 
In this passage, Aristotle describes the best constitution by reference to already 
existing forms of government, and not in ideal terms, as detached from political reality. 
In fact, with reference to aristocracy and monarchy, Aristotle claims that 
«the inquiry into the perfect state is the same thing as the discussion of the two forms 
thus named, since both imply a principle of excellence provided with external 
means»28. 
Aristotle is not referring here to the best constitution under particular conditions, but to 
the best hap/os, and he is careful not to mention polity, which, as I am going to show in 
the last chapter of my thesis, is regarded as the best constitution realisable in specific 
conditions. Unlike polity, monarchy and aristocracy are mentioned as examples of the 
best constitution hap/os; but, like polity, monarchy and aristocracy are concrete forms 
of government. 
This raises questions on the nature of the best constitution, and the relationship 
between aristocracy/kinship and the ideal constitution described in Books VII-\1111 of 
the Politics, i.e. a constitution which manages to attain in a full way the happiness of 
the whole of the polis thanks to the complete goodness of its members. In the light of 
such a constitution, which is capable of guaranteeing the best way of life for all the 
27 Aristotle, Pol. ITI, 1288a39-b2. 
28 Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1289a31-3. 
225 
citizens, none of the existing constitutions seems to attain such a perfect ideal, not even 
monarchies and aristocracies29 . 
My personal view is that there is no qualitative difference between the ideal 
constitution depicted in Books VII-VIII and the best constitutions described in Book 
III. I believe that the first kind of best constitution might be an orientative ideal, which, 
although not fully achievable, might nevertheless be nearly attainable in existing 
communities. In that case, the ideal constitution might be realised in existing political 
conditions to some extent, even though some actualisations of the ideal do not manage 
to realise its perfection. In other words, the ideal constitution might be realised more or 
less well in existing political communities in so far as these endeavour to attain ieo, 
which would mean that the best constitution by nature is not an ideal not actualisable in 
existing political forms. 
It might be objected that Books vn and VIII of the Politics are treated as 
separate from the books dealing with existing constitutions and concern a purely ideal 
construction31 , with no reference to existing constitutions. To such an objection it might 
be replied that in Books VII and VIII Aristotle is confining himself to stressing the 
general, prescriptive aspect of the ideal constitution, i.e. a set of characteristics which 
may be found in existing constitutions of the right kind. When Aristotle deals with 
existing political communities, he commits himself to describing them in the way they 
are. 
29 See C.J. Rowe, 1991, p. 60. 
30 See M.l. Finley, 1975, pp. 180-1, quoted in C.J. Rowe, 1991, p. 60. 
31 See W. Jaeger, 1948, p. 273, quoted by C.l Rowe, 1991, p. 58: «In brief, it is that Books II, III, and 
VIII- which he calls the "Utopian" books-were originally "united and independent," and that Aristotle 
later inserted the "purely empirical" books IV-VI, which were now to form the foundation of the 
discussion of the best constitution». See also J. Ferguson, 1975, whose view on the issue is reported at p. 
60 of Rowe's article: «Ferguson, on the other hand, seems to identify Utopianism with "building castles 
in clouds," and it is in this sense, I suppose, that he declares that "Aristotle was not a Utopian"». See also 
R. Stark, 1965. 
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By contrast, when he illustrates the ideal constitutions in Books VII and Vel, he 
expounds the values at whose realisation the ideal polis aims, i.e. values which are fully 
attained in the ideal constitution. Such a constitution prescribes a kind of happiness and 
a practice of ethical arete which right constitutions, aristocratic or monarchic, seem to 
be able to comply with32 , although not fully. In that case, the ideal constitution 
described in Books VII-VIII would be the criterion in the light of which constitutions 
appear good or bad, and, we might suppose, also an orientative ideal which shows how 
existing constitutions should be improved. 
Given that also in the already mentioned Pol. III 1288a33-b2 Aristotle describes 
the best constitution as a general, indeterminate political condition in which the best 
men are in power33, the characteristic indeterminacy that dominates the description of 
the best constitution haplos, both in Book III and in Books VII -VIII, makes room for 
the possibility of having it actualised to some extent in different political constitutions. 
Rather than referring to a character of perfection in comparison to which existing 
communities appear corrupt, its indeterminacy might pave the way for the idea that the 
best constitution by nature may be realised in different ways in different conventional 
forms, i.e. in existing political communities, to a higher or lower extent. In that case, 
when Aristotle claims that only one constitution is best by nature, he seems to refer to 
an indeterminate idea of a constitution, which can be actualised in a plurality of forms 
according to the particular conditions of each polis. 
We have seen so far what the best constitution by nature is in Aristotle's thought; 
that only one political constitution is the best by nature everywhere seems to be related 
to the idea that natural justice possesses the same dunamis everywhere, i.e. it has the 
same validity in any political community, and not to a supposed unattainable perfection 
32 See R. Bodeiis, 2004, pp. 134-5. 
33 See J. J. Mulhern, 1972, p. 26l. 
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(although, as we have seen, existing constitutions will not probably be able to achieve 
the same degree of ethical excellence and happiness as that proper to the ideal 
constitution described in Books VII-VIII). The best constitution by nature is the one 
that paradigmatically instantiates the indeterminate principles of natural justice-but, 
insofar as 'the best constitution' may itself take different forms, it too displays-
appropriately-the sanie indeterminacy as the natural justice it ideally exemplifies. 
The superiority of such a constitution depends on its capacity to express ethical 
values better than the others and to contribute to the promotion of ethical arete among 
the citizens. In that case, the best constitution by nature will be the one in which natural 
justice is, or would be, in force at its best level. 
In my view, the expression 'kata phusin he ariste' at NE V, 1135a5 means that 
the best regime is the same for each polis, and there is no need here to suppose, as 
Mulhern does, that according to Aristotle each polis has an individual best level to 
reach34. My objection to the reading proposed by Mulhern is that it does not account for 
the idea that natural justice has a universal character, just like the constitution that 
embodies it at its highest level, and that an ideal, just insofar as it is an ideal, would 
prescribe to members of different communities the same, general principles of natural 
justice, like the pursuit of arete and fairness in human transactions as ingredients of the 
common good. 
Natural justice is not a transcendent ideal of justice consisting in a sheer image of 
how a polis should be run, but it may be actualised in existing enactments established 
by human beings and be displayed in a variety of constitutions. Its ideal nature is 
connected to its being an indeterminate set of principles which can assume different 
roles and shapes according to the specific condition of each political community. It is 
only in existing political partnerships that natural justice comes into effect, although 
34 See J.1. Mulhern, 1972, p. 261. 
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only one constitution is best by nature, i. e. the one in which the aims of the state would 
arrive at a full-fledged realisation. 
8.4: Conclusions 
In this chapter, which was meant to be a development of the issues introduced in the 
previous one, I have examined the issue of the changeability of natural justice, and I 
tried to trace it back to the idea that it might be displayed in conventional forms thanks 
to human agency. Its changeability, then, would stem from the variety in which 
principles of natural justice are instantiated in different political communities. The 
specific condition of each polis and its needs will allow lawgivers to instantiate such 
principles in ways appropriate to the features of each of them. 
At the same time, natural justice seems to be unchangeable insofar as, before 
being instantiated in conventional forms, its principles prescribe just conduct which 
should be valid in any polis with a view to its stability and well-being. In this respect, 
as I believe, natural justice is to be taken as the same everywhere, independently of the 
specific requirements of each community. Principles like preservation of the common 
interest and norms capable of regulating interpersonal relationships of various kinds by 
the prescription of virtuous activities will not change, although the aim they pursue can 
be reached through variegated conventional strategies. 
When natural justice is taken to be changeable, its supposed changeability is not 
a matter of different interpretations as to what natural justice is, given that, in some 
cases, such views might not come about from observation of the actual situation of each 
political community and turn out to be inapplicable in specific political conditions. 
Rather, as I believe, Aristotle speaks of the changeability of natural justice with regard 
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to the variety of instantiations of its principles according to the socio-economical 
composition and the needs of each polis. 
In the second section of this chapter, then, I tried to account for the idea that there 
is a constitution which is the best by nature among the others. I hope to have shown that 
the best constitution in its ideal form, as it is described in Books VII-VIII of the 
Politics, should not be viewed as a constitution in the light of which all the other 
existing communities look defective. Rather, it seems to represent an ideal which is 
actualisable to some extent, which shows what an existing constitution may become 
through a correct application of principles of natural justice in the political life. 
Natural justice is not to be understood as an already established and 
unchangeable set of laws; simply, it is a form of justice which still needs to be made 
into convention and involves human responsibility; a justice, it might be suggested, 
which is still open and renewable whenever political conditions require a new or a 
modified set of laws. That natural justice is actualised in different manners according to 
variety of political constitutions will help us to understand that lawgivers will have to 
do with different political conditions and try to instantiate principles of natural justice 
in a consonant way. In the next chapters I will try to illustrate the condition of wise 
lawgivers who try to improve the conditions of bad communities with a view to the 
most achievable approximation to the best constitution. 
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Part V 
Political Phronesis in Action. The Power of the Wise 
Lawgiver. 
Time is neutral and does not change things. 
With courage and initiative, leaders change 
things. 
Jesse Jackson 
Chapter IX: 
Political Phronesis. Aims and Methods 
9.1: Introduction 
As we have seen in the last two chapters, universally valid principles of justice are 
variably instantiated by lawgivers according to the particular conditions of the polis 
which they rule~ it also seems that every form of political organisation will be affected 
by their possession or lack of wisdom. When it comes to wise lawgivers, their task is to 
deliberate well for the happiness of the whole of the state, so that it will be their 
responsibility to set up good ends for a collectivity of people, even for non-virtuous 
citizens who by themselves would never act with a view to the common interest and 
whose behaviour might be dictated from an erroneous conception of what is good. If 
some people have a bad conception as to what a good life is, they might be harmful 
towards themselves and commit injustice, in this way compromising the order of their 
community~ problems of this kind should be prevented by good rulers, whose project is 
to curb injustice and make the state healthy. 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the nature of political phronesis through 
an enquiry into the nature of the good ruler and his relationship with good citizens. In 
Book III of the Politics, phronesis is claimed to be the characteristic excellence of the 
spoudaios archon 1, i. e. the ruler who discharges his role in the political community 
well through exercise of ethical excellence with a view to the common good. As 
Aristotle tells us at Pol. Ill, 1277b25-30, possession of phronesis marks the difference 
1 See Aristotle, Pol. III, 1277a14-15. 
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between the good ruler and the good citizen, who only possesses an alethes doxa about 
the things deliberated on by the ruler. 
But Aristotle does not make it clear what the phronesis of the ruler consists of, 
and how the ruler himself displays it in political life. I propose to investigate the nature 
of the ruler's wisdom both through comparison with the excellence of the spoudaios 
citizen and in relation to Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics and Books IV -V of the 
Politics. I will start my analysis of political phronesis with an examination of the 
distinction between the arete of the good man and the arete of the good citizen drawn 
in Book III of the Politics. This distinction, introduced within the discussion of the 
nature of citizenship, paves the way for a second distinction, i.e. that between the 
excellence of the good ruler, who possesses phronesis, and the nature of the good 
citizen, who is spoudaios but not phronimos in the way that the ruler is. 
My thesis is that, unlike the excellence of the good citizen, which is affected by 
the quality of the polis where he lives and does not require complete excellence of 
character, the excellence of the good ruler is in a way independent of the variety of 
political constitutions, being relative to an absolute standard, i.e. the possession of 
phronesis. This would suggest that a phronimos ruler might retain his phronesis even if 
he held power in an imperfect community. On the other hand, the work of the good 
ruler is undeniably affected by the quality of the constitution he governs, given that the 
task of the ruler is not only to be good, but also to be loyal to his constitution and be 
capable of preserving it2. 
However, he might hold power in an imperfect consitution, whose system of 
justice fails to achieve complete ethical excellence, for instance a constitution whose 
dominant values are different from that of excellence of character. I suggest that, in 
Aristotle's view, there is some possibility of improving deviant constitutions which is 
2 See Aristotle, Pol. V, 1309a34-5. 
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compatible with their preservation; the employment of phronesis in such constitutions 
might display itself to some extent by way of the avoidance of internal conflicts and of 
the construction of a balance between parts of the polis. In other words, although the 
conditions of an imperfect polis put severe constraints on the exercise of wisdom, it 
would be possible for him to employ his phronesis even in imperfect communities, in 
case he had the opportunity to hold deliberative power in such constitutions. 
9.2: Excellence of the Ruler and Excellence of the Ruled 
The distinction between the excellence of the good ruler and the excellence of the good 
citizen is made in chapters iv and v of Book In of the Politics; in this section, Aristotle 
handles the issue of citizenship and wonders whether the excellence of a good man is to 
be regarded the same as the excellence of a good citizen. In order to answer this 
question, he tries to explain what 'citizen' means by providing a general definition of 
citizenship applicable to any kind of political community. 
Citizenship is not determined either by residence 1n a g1ven place3 or by 
entitlements concerning private law, e.g. rights to sue and be sued 4, but rather by 
participation in public offices. A citizen, as he claims at Pol. III, 1275a22-3, 
I.e. 
3 See Aristotle, Pol. III, 1275a7-8. 
4 See Aristotle, Pol. III, 1275a8-11. 
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«is one who permanently shares in the administration of justice and the holding of 
office». 
This definition of citizenship makes no reference to the ethical qualities of the 
individual~ it seems immediately clear that a citizen will be regarded as good only in 
relation to his capacity to petform his role in the polis well. When speaking of a 
. citizen' , Aristotle is not thinking of an individual who merely abides by the laws in 
force in the political community, which is a task that might be extended also to aliens 
and slaves, but is rather thinking of people who take part in political offices and operate 
in that capacity on the basis of the laws drafted by the lawgiver. 
In the Politics Aristotle embarks on a description of a wide variety of political 
communities, each having a particular kind of constitution where powers are distributed 
and combined according to factors like the nature of the population5, the size of the 
territory6 or social composition (e.g. predominance of the poor over the rich by virtue 
of their number or, vice versa, of the rich over the poor by virtue of their quality)? 
Given that the nature of citizenship is determined by participation in office, the 
excellence of a citizen will depend on the principles according to which offices are 
distributed in the constitution of the city where he lives. In other words, different 
constitutions will require different types of good citizen 8. In order to clarify this point, 
at Pol. Ill, 1276b21-2 Aristotle resorts to an analogy between the members of a polis 
and the members of a ship's company: 
«Just as a sailor is a member of an association, so too is a citizen». 
5 See Aristotle, Pol. VII, 1327b1S-41 and 132Sa35-b3. 
6 See Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1299a31-b13. 
7 See Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1296b13-34. 
8 See R.G. Mulgan, 1977, p. 57. 
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In any association whatever, the various members perform different functions. In a 
ship's company, for example, not all the sailors are doing the same work, but, on the 
contrary, they will have different duties according to their skills and also to the 
requirements of the context. As Aristotle goes on at Pol. III, 1276b22-4: 
«Sailors differ from one another in virtue of the different capacities in which they act: 
one is a rower, another a pilot, another a look-out man; and others again will have other 
names in the same sort of way». 
What all the members of a community have in common is not the specific role 
they hold in it, but their contribution towards the attainment of the goal the community 
strives for. In associations formed by a ship's company, for instance, all members will 
work towards providing a safe voyage, each of them performing his specific function: 
«This being the case, it is clear that the most accurate definition of the excellence of 
each sailor will be special to the man concerned; but it is also clear that a common 
definition of excellence will apply to all, inasmuch as safety in navigation is the 
common end which all must serve and the object at which each must aim» 9 . 
Although they have different tasks, the end to whose realisation they contribute is more 
general than the specific aims pursued by each of them. That is why a specific worker is 
called a sailor just like the others in a company, although their roles are different. 
The same is true of citizens: 
9 Aristotle, Pol. TIl, 1276b24-7. 
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«1(at1tEp aVOJlOtCOV OV'tCOV, +t crco'tl1Pta 'ti1~ 1(otvQ)vta~ ep'¥ov EO"'tt, 1(OtvQ)vta 
I 
ii 
I 
1.e. 
«Though they differ; the end which they all serve is safety in the working of their 
association; and this association consists in the constitution» 10. 
But things get complicated once we take into account that different political 
constitutions pursue different conceptions of goodness (i. e. ethical excellence, wealth or 
freedom), which presumably means that what determines the safety of a community 
will vary accordingly. 
The conclusion to which Aristotle wants to lead us is that the excellence of the 
citizen is an excellence relative to the constitution. Powers and offices are distributed 
on the basis of the values that are commonly thought to represent the common good of 
the polis. For instance, an oligarchic city, which identifies goodness with wealth, will 
accept as citizens only the possessors of an established amount of wealth, and assign to 
them offices in proportion to their acquisition of wealth. Or in forms of democracy, 
freedom and equality are landmark values to pursue, values which are also employed as 
a criterion for the assignment of political roles, i. e. in the designation of holders of 
political office. In that case, a citizen will be good if his service to the polis meets the 
needs of the polis itself, and, therefore, if he contributes to the preservation of its values 
and the realisation of its aims. 
10 Aristotle, Pol. ITI, 1276b28-30. 
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It is now clear how deeply belonging to a given city affects the quality of a citizen 11. In 
order to perform a role well, in magistracies or in the judicial field, general expertise 
will not be sufficient; each individual will be regarded as efficient only insofar as he 
makes a contribution towards the promotion of the values pursued by his commJnity. 
One person, for instance, might be a good citizen in an oligarchy, where deliberative 
power is held by people who make wealth their goal, if he had at his disposal the 
money needed to take part in political offices, and if his service provided a contribution 
to the attainment of wealth for both himself and the city. By contrast, a bad citizen in an 
oligarchy might be one who tried to work with reference to values like equality and 
freedom; in that case, the stability of the polis would be put at risk. But if such a man 
held a political role in a democracy, he would be regarded as a good citizen, in that he 
would preserve the aims of the constitution. 
A sign of the different criteria adopted by various constitutions is that people who 
are confined to working in inferior magistracies in a polis would be allowed to hold 
deliberative power in a polis of different kind. For example, an oligarchic ruler who 
governs with a view to his personal interest (by preserving at the same time the most 
prominent value of the polis, i.e. wealth), will be chosen by virtue of his wealth, but 
maybe he would not rule in the ideal polis, where only men of complete excellence are 
entitled to hold deliberative power. In the same way, a common citizen in an oligarchy 
might not possess the civic excellences needed to preserve virtuous aims and would 
therefore be a bad citizen in a right constitution, nor would a citizen in a democracy be 
a good citizen under an 0ligarchy12. 
11 See R. G. Mulgan, 1977, p. 57: «The virtue of the citizen is [ ... ] relative to the virtue of the constitution 
of which he is a member and may, if the constitution is a bad one, involve the pursuit of undesirable 
aims». 
12 See Aristotle, Pol. III, 1275a3-5. 
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That a constitution affects the quality of the good citizen is also proved by the fact that 
magistracies may vary depending on the quality of the constitution 13, given that the I 
I particular conditions of each community end up by affecting the number and the modes 
of organization of the magistracies; among such conditions, as I have said in the last 
chapter, are the size of the community or the number of the citizensl4. For instance, a 
big community will need centralised magistracies supported by local ones, like those 
established to guarantee the general order or those specialised in tax-collection, or, 
when it comes to small cities, people may hold more than a single magistracy, unlike in 
big ones15 . The conclusion to which we are led is that we cannot speak of a single 
excellence of the good citizen: 
«'tT,V apE'tT,V avuYKUtOV Eivut 'tou 1tOAt'tO'U 1tpo<; 'tT,V 1tOAt'tEt<xV. E't1tEP ouv 
1.e. 
«the excellence of the citizen must be an excellence relative to the constitution. It 
follows on this that if there are several different kinds of constitution there cannot be a 
f h d · . 16 single absolute excellence 0 t e goo cItIzen» . 
13 See Aristotle, Pol. III, 1299b20-30. 
14 On the issue of the number of citizens, see Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1299a31-bl0. 
15 With reference to the problem as to how many magistracies a state should have, see Aristotle, Pol. IV, 
1299b13-20. 
16 Aristotle, Pol. ITI, 1276b30-1. 
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The message Aristotle is trying to convey here is that the constitution provides the 
criterion of civic excellence, and at the same time the end towards which each citizen 
ought to work. This form of excellence seems to be of different kind from the 
excellence characterising a good man in absolute terms. The excellence of such a man, 
Aristotle states, is not in relation to the quality of the constitution, given that 
«the good 17 man is a man so called in virtue of a single absolute excellence» 18. 
As I am going to explain, the run of the Aristotelian argument is aimed at showing that 
the single, absolute excellence of character proper to the good man is the same as the 
excellence of the ruler, i.e. phronesis. As he claims at Pol. III, 1277b25-9, phronesis 
. 
l.e. 
«is the only form of goodness which is peculiar to the ruler», 
whereas 
«the form of goodness which is peculiar to subjects [ ... ] may be defined as right 
19 
opInIon ». 
17 ex.ya86c;. 
18 Aristotle, Pol. III, 1276b33-4. 
19 86~a ex.A"eflc;. 
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That Aristotle is referring to the excellence of a good man as a different matter from the 
excellence of the good citizen is made clear by his claim at Pol. III, 1276b35-6: 
«It is thus clear that it is possible to be a good20 citizen without possessing the 
excellence which is the quality of the good21 man». 
As we may notice, a single adjective, spoudaios, is attached to two different concepts: 
on the one hand, with reference to the good citizen, and, on the other, with reference to 
the good man. Still, their respective arete will not be the same in any context whatever, 
given that a person might be a good citizen in his community without being a good 
man, that is-in the light of what Aristotle says at Pol. III, 1277a15-6-without possessing 
phronesis. 
The analogy between the citizens and the members of a ship's company quoted at 
the beginning of this chapter may help us to understand better Aristotle's view on the 
relationships between the good man and the good citizen, and at the same time will 
contribute to explaining that the excellence of the good man is of a political quality. In 
a ship's company, although each member contributes to a safe voyage, not all the 
sailors are doing the same work. Among the members of the association, Aristotle 
identifies different roles and capacities22, some of which are more technical, wr.ereas 
others require a work of intellectual kind; the same holds of a political community, 
where roles are differentiated and some of them involve a deliberative capacity: a 
capacity which may pertain only to particular members of a good community, i.e. good 
rulers. The example of the ship's company suggests that, in general, those who hold 
more 'technical' offices in a political community are not required to display the 
20 C11tOU&iiOC;. 
21 C11tou&x.'ioC;. 
22 See Aristotle, Pol. III, 1276b22-4. 
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excellence needed by the rulers of the community itself, so that their respective 
excellences will turn out to be of different quality. 
Aristotle is speaking here in general terms, without any reference to a particular 
kind of community~ so it seems that, when he claims that the arete of the good man is 
not the same as that of the good citizen, the possible frame he might be referring to 
might be either the ideal community, in which-as I will argue in this chapter-all citizens 
seem to be good men, or any kind of imperfect polis whatever, in which not all the 
citizens possess the absolute excellence peculiar to the good man: the same excellence-
Aristotle will explain clearly in the following passages- characterizing a phronimos 
ruler. But he decides to face the issue of the relationships between the good man and 
the good citizen from the point of view of the ideal community. 
The idea of a perfect polis might suggest that every citizen possesses excellence 
in a complete sense and turns out to be a good man at the same time. But, as it seems, 
not even in the frame of the ideal polis is such an identity reasonable. As Aristotle 
explains at Pol. III, 1276b37-1277a1, any common citizen whatever does not possess 
excellence in a full sense; nor can excellence be the same for all the citizens, since even 
in the ideal polis roles and capacities are differentiated: 
«If it is impossible23 for a polis to be composed entirely and only of good men; if, none 
the less, each citizen of a polis must discharge well the function belonging to him; if his 
good discharge of his function involves, as it must, his excellence-then, as it is 
23 A textual problem is identified in Pol. III, 1276b38. Bemays alters the aOuvcx,'tov in et yap 
aOuvcx,'tOv E~ cutav'to)v 0'1tOUocx,to)v etvcx,t 1t6A.tv, and gives Ouvcx,'tOv. Still, even in that case, as 
Rackham suggests, the general sense of the sentence would be that, assuming the possibility of a perfect 
state, not all its members would be good men~ rather, they all might be spoudaioi citizens. See H. 
Rackham, 1977, additional note to 1276b38 at p. 275. 
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impossible for all the citizens to be alike, the excellence of a good citizen cannot be 
identical with that of a good man». 
In Kraut's view, two different problems may be identified in this passage: the 
first is to establish whether Aristotle agrees that it is really impossible for all the 
citizens of a polis to be good men; the second is to find out if he is saying that it is 
impossible for a city to consist entirely of excellent citizens or that it is impossible for a 
city to consist entirely of excellent men24 . As for the first question, Kraut answers that, 
in Aristotle's view, not all the citizens are good men in the ideal polis, although this 
would seem to contradict Books VII and VIII, where the ideal city is described as one 
in which all the citizens are excellent men and excellent citizens at the same time. He 
justifies his interpretation by saying that Book III and Books VII-VIII have different 
aims, and that in Book III, unlike in Books VII-VIII, Aristotle deals with ideal 
constitutions from the point of view of existing political communities, and 110t in 
absolute terms, without any reference to the real conditions of its citizens25 . As for the 
second question, Kraut answers that, in Aristotle's view, in the best city all citizens will 
be good citizens, but in no city will all the citizens be good men26 . 
My objection to both answers is that, since in Book III Aristotle is speaking of 
the ideal community, there is no need to suppose that he is doing so in a different way 
from Books VII-VIII; nor has he mentioned so far any kind of existing constitution in 
order to display a supposed alternative view of the ideal polis with respect to Books 
VII-VIII. My view of the passage is that Aristotle regards all the citizens of the ideal 
24 See R. Kraut, 2002, p. 365, footnote 11. 
25 See R. Kraut, 2002, pp. 365-6. 
26 See Kraut, 2002, p. 365, footnote ll~ Cf. H. Kelsen, 1977, pp. 176-7. Kelsen reads Aristotle's 
argument as entailing that «the virtue of the good man and the virtue of a good citizen are really united 
only in the person of the ruler, not in that of the subject». 
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community as potentially good men, even when they are not rulers. In the remainder of 
this section of the chapter I will try to make sense of my view by explaining in detail 
my reading of the passage. For now, I think it will be sufficient to say that, if not all the 
citizens of the ideal polis were good men, we would not be able to make sense of Pol. 
III, 1277a25-7, where Aristotle says that in the ideal constitution, a good citizen should 
be capable of both ruling and being ruled: 
«men hold in esteem the double capacity which consists in knowing both how to rule 
and how to obey, and they regard the excellence of a worthy citizen as consisting in a 
good exercise of this double capacity». 
By saying this, Aristotle implies that in the ideal polis a citizen requires the same 
qualities needed by the ruler to perform his leading role well; but this assumption seems 
to clash with the idea implied at the already mentioned Pol. III, 1276b37-1277al 
according to which not all the citizens can be good men in the ideal polis: 
«If it is impossible for a polis to be composed entirely and only of good men; if, none 
the less, each citizen of a polis must discharge well the function belonging to him; if his 
good discharge of his function involves, as it must, his excellence-then, as it is 
impossible for all the citizens to be alike, the excellence of a good citizen cannot be 
identical with that of a good man». 
Aristotle is suggesting here that not all the citizens will know how to rule. At a first 
glance, we might be tempted to conclude that Aristotle is contradicting himself in the 
argument in question; not only that, but the idea that the best polis is not made up 
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exclusively of good men seems to be at odds even with Books VII-VIII of the Politics, 
where in such a polis citizens are depicted as absolutely virtuous individuals. 
However, my impression is that Aristotle has a way to reconcile his two beliefs. 
My suggestion is that Pol. III, 1276b37-1277al is compatible with 1277a25-27 to the 
extent that in the first passage, after all, we might be dealing with the initial assumption 
of a dialectical argument, which would assume a different meaning in the light Jf the 
whole run of the discussion. When Aristotle says that that it is impossible that all 
should possess the goodness of the good man, at Pol. 1277a4-5 he adds the clause 
Kraut, who, as we have seen, thinks that not all the citizens in the ideal polis are good 
men for Aristotle, translates 
«if it is necessary that not all the citizens in the excellent city are good men», 
in accordance with Reeve's and Lord's translations27 . 
Barker's translation, which runs 'unless the citizens of a polis are necessarily all good 
men' 28, seems to me the most appropriate, in that, as I believe, this clause might 
27 See R. Kraut, 2002, p. 365, footnote 11; cf. translations of C.D.C Reeve, 1998, and C. Lord, 1984. 
28 Cf. Barker's translation of the whole passage: «the excellence of being a good citizen must belong to 
all citizens indifferently, because that is the condition necessary for the state being the best state; but the 
excellence of being a good man cannot possibly belong to all-unless, indeed, we hold that every citizen 
of a good state must also be a good man». Cf. tr. P. Pellegrin, 1993. 
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conceal an illustration of the conditions which make a polis the ideal one. As I 
maintain, in Aristotle's view the ideal polis is composed exclusively of good men. 
This, I suggest, is the real option chosen and developed by Aristotle, not only 
over this section of Book III, but also throughout the remainder of the Politics. In Book 
VII, for example, Aristotle engages in a discussion of the ideal state which will be 
extended to Book VIII, in which the emerging thesis is that the best constitution is the 
one in which the highest level of happiness is ensured for both single citizens and the 
city as a whole; since the happiness of the ideal state is held to be the same ?s the 
happiness of each citizen -just as happens in imperfect communities-29 and its goodness 
stems from the ethical excellence of the individual citizens, presumably not just a few 
excellent citizens will make the polis ideal, but each single citizen. 
An excellent state will be one in which the citizens are good men, as Aristotle 
seems to imply at Pol. VII, 1323b40-1324a2: 
«The best way of life, for individuals severally as well as for states collectively, is the 
life of goodness30 duly equipped with such a store of requisites [i.e. of external goods 
and of the goods of the body] as makes it possible to share in the activities of 
goodness31». 
That Aristotle has in mind not the goodness of just a few members of the polis, but 
rather of all the citizens is made explicit at Pol. VII, 1332a33-5: 
29 See Aristotle, Pol. VII, 1324a5-13. 
30 ~E'td Cx.pE'tnC;. 
31 Ka't' Cx.pE't"V 1tpa~EWv. 
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· 1.e. 
«A state is good in virtue of the goodness of the citizens who share in its government. 
In our state all the citizens have a share in the government». 
So, even though, as suggested by Kraut, the aims of Book III and Book VII differ in 
kind, there is no need to suppose a different approach to the ideal constitution. Even so 
more because, just as in the sentence just mentioned in Book VII, in Book III as well it 
is said that the virtue of the good citizen in the ideal polis involves participation to the 
ruling activity. 
But, if so, how is Pol. III, 1276b37-1277al to be understood? As we have already 
seen, in this passage Aristotle is apparently suggesting that not all the citizens can be 
good men, and that the excellence of the good citizen will not be the same as the 
excellence of the good man. I believe that there might be a case in which the ideal polis 
is in theory thought to be composed of excellent men, although not all of them are 
actually virtuous: that is, when there are citizens who are not yet virtuous, bllt are 
learning to become good men. Since, as I have already said before, the ideal polis is 
made up of human, not super-human beings, individuals will not possess inborn 
excellences, but, even in the ideal frame, they will take some time to acquire virtuous 
dispositions of character. This might find some confirmation in Book VII, where 
Aristotle, when dealing with the issue of political participation in the ideal community, 
implies that in the ideal polis, the age of the citizens is a relevant factor for the 
assignation of political offices. 
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At Pol. VII 1329a8-18, he explains that different political functions belong to different 
phases of one's life; activities like deliberation about matters of policy or of judgement 
over issues of justice, for example, require wisdom, which is possessed by mature 
individuals, whereas military acrivities will require strength, which is a task more 
suited to young people. Again, at Pol. VII, 1332b33-40, Aristotle says that some people 
are not suited to govern just because of their being too young, whereas some kind of 
older people will be appropriate for a ruling position by virtue of their age. Moreover, 
Aristotle's frequent insistence on the role of the state in the transmission of virtuous 
values, in Books VII-VIII of the Politics, confirms that some training to ethical 
excellence is needed to make a citizen good. On the other hand, an ideal polis, just qua 
ideal, will consist of good people only. As I am going to show later in this chapter, the 
activity of the spoudaios citizen in the ideal community might be a starting point for the 
acquisition of ruling skills; experience and training will be fundamental in the 
acquisition of political phronesis. 
As we have seen so far, the arete of the good citizen is regarded as different from 
the arete of the good man. The good man is spoudaios in virtue of a single, absolute 
excellence, whereas there might be various kinds of excellence of the good citizen, 
depending on the quality of the polis they will contribute to preserve by holding 
political office. In order to be good, a citizen does not need to be a good man, i.e. he 
does not need to be equipped with the whole of ethical excellence. However, the 
remainder of the Aristotelian argument shows that there is a possible case in whi\,;h the 
two excellences come to coincide: the case in which a good man is the ruler of the 
community. Again, as I have just suggested, when Aristotle says that it is impossible 
even for the ideal polis to be composed of virtuous men, it is only because some 
citizens might be not yet virtuous, which means that they might be on their way to 
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becomingphronimoi and agathoi, so that the ideal community, unlike the existing ones, 
will in a way, after all, be composed of good men only. 
~ly vie\\" is that, when Aristotle says that the two excellences coincide in the 
ideal community, he believes that even a good citizen might be good according to 
complete ethical excellence, and therefore be destined to rule. In order to argue for this 
thesis, I will examine and try to refute the position held by Develin, who in his article 
The good man and the good citizen in Aristotle's "Politics" 32 endeavours to show that 
excellence of the ruler and excellence of the ruled do not coincide, not even within an 
ideal frame. 
The general aim of Develin's article is to shed some light on the distinction 
between the good man and the good citizen in Aristotle's political thought by means of 
an examination of two adjectives employed in Book ill of the Politics: spoudaios and 
agathos. Develin tries to show that the adjectives spoudaios and agathos, ~s are 
employed by Aristotle, illustrate the distinctive excellences of respectively the good 
citizen and the good man, with a view to demonstrating that the two kinds of excellence 
do not generally coincide, not even in the ideal constitution, except in the case of a 
phronimos ruler. Develin's overall argument seems to suggest this: that the excellence 
of the good man and that of the good citizen coincide in the case of the ruler does not 
mean that any good citizen whatever will acquire the excellence proper to the ruler. To 
demonstrate his thesis, he claims to show that in no case-not even in the context of the 
ideal constitution- will the excellence of the spoudaios citizen be the same as the 
excellence of the spoudaios man. 
Now, Develin is surely right to stress the roles of good rulers and good common 
citizens should be different even in the ideal polis, whose well-being depends on a well-
32 R Develin, 1973, pp. 71-9. 
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balanced diversification of functions33 ; as a matter of fact, a man qua ruler will not 
display the same range of skills as a man qua common citizen, i.e. qua ruled. According 
to Develin, as I understand his argument, Aristotle's choice of the ideal constitution as 
a context for his discussion may be useful inasmuch as it would confirm that the 
excellence of the good citizen will not coincide in general with the excellence of the 
good man. In his view, Aristotle might be adopting the frame he does because he 
probably expects that, when we think of the citizens of the ideal constitution, we tend to 
imagine each of them as provided with complete ethical excellence; but, according to 
what he says, this does not seem to be the case: even in the ideal city there might be 
people who are not completely virtuous, although all of them possess civic excellence. 
Moreover, that idea, that the excellence of the good man is to be identified with the 
excellence of the good ruler and not with that of the good citizen would confirm that 
nowhere-not even in the ideal polis-can an identity between the arete of the good ruler 
and the arete of the good citizen generally be established. 
As a matter of fact, excellences differ in kind, and each of them contributes in 
some way to the well-being of the community. But this does not necessarily entail that 
a man will never possess more than one kind of excellence. It is obvious that, qua 
citizen, a person will act in the community in a different way from the same person qua 
ruler, since, as has been agreed, the task of being a good citizen does not require the 
exercise of complete ethical excellence required by the activity of ruling. However, this 
does not exclude that the same man is possessing both forms of excellences, although 
he cannot display them at the same time. 
If I am right in my account of Develin's view, I claim that it is misleading. 
Unlike him, I believe that Aristotle's reference to the context of the ideal city is nseful 
because it shows that a good citizen can be also a good man. The ideal polis will not be 
33 See R. Develin, 1973, p. 78. 
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the frame for irreconcilable excellences; rather, it will be the context chosen by 
Aristotle to explain that there might be a man in whom the two excellences end up by 
coinciding. The excellence of the good man/ruler differs from that of the good citizen; 
but the possession of one of the two excellences-I maintain-does not exclude the 
possession of the other in the ideal polis, in which-according to my account, as I have 
already explained-all the citizens are virtuous individuals from an ethical point of view. 
In other words, that the ruler in the ideal polis is a good man does not imply that 
common citizens will never be good men like him. 
I think that Develin fails to argue for his thesis in more than one respect. A first 
way in which I believe he goes wrong is that he takes it for granted that it is Aristotle's 
assumption that not even in the ideal polis are all the citizens virtuous men, and he does 
not seem to notice that this is at odds with Pol. III, 1277a25-7, where Aristotle says that 
a good citizen should be able to rule, not only to be ruled. Moreover, he seems to be 
wrong when he claims that not even in the ideal community do the excellence of the 
good citizen and that of the good man generally coincide, except in the case of the 
ruler. The idea that in the best polis the citizens should know how to rule beside;., how 
to be ruled shows that in this context each citizen is expected to become a ruler. A man 
qua citizen might differ from himself qua ruler in two different respects: either in so far 
as he is not yet a completely virtuous individual or inasmuch as he cannot possibly rule 
and be ruled at the same time. But if the citizens in the ideal community hold power in 
relays, they will know when to act as common citizens and when to employ their 
goodness in the ruling activity, just in virtue of their being good men. 
As Aristotle points out at Pol. III, 1277a28-33, the ruler and the citizen do not 
have to learn the same things, but the citizen must know both: 
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«Et ouv 'tnV llEV 'tau uyu80u UvopOC; 'tt8EllEV apXtK1lV, 'tnv OE 'tau 1tOAt'tO'U 
clll<?ro ... » ; 
the employment of the word 'all<?o'tEpU' suggests that the ruling excellence proper to 
the citizen must be the same as that of the ruler, and it is not the excellence required to 
hold any office whatever in the community. Again, as he goes on to say at Pol. III, 
1277 a3 3 -b 1, there may different kinds of authority: for instance, that of a maste~ over 
slaves, which does not require from him a skill at executing the technical jobs done by 
them; but when it comes to the authority according to which a man rules over free 
persons, he must learn to rule by being ruled. This is the so-called 'political' form of 
authority. Such a kind of governance, Aristotle says at Pol. III, 1277b10-13, 
«is the sort of rule which the ruler must begin to learn by being ruled and by obeying34 
-just as one learns to be a commander of cavalry by serving under another commander, 
or to be a general of infantry by serving under another general and by acting first as a 
colonel and, even before that, as captain. This is why it is a good saying that 'you 
cannot be a ruler unless you have first been ruled'». 
Provided that the citizens of the ideal community rule in relays, they must all learn how 
to become good men and start by holding some kind of political office. 
Develin is right when he implies that a man qua ruler needs to display his 
phronesis, and that such an excellence is different from that of the spoudaios citizen, 
but his account cannot explain for example how a ruler, once having quit his role, can 
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benefit from the rule of the people who have replaced him35, if they do not possess the 
same qualities. When a ruler stops governing, he will have to obey the new rulers, but, 
qua phronimos man, his ruling ability will be preserved, even when this is not 
exercised. Were Aristotle mainly interested in stressing a differentiation of excellences, 
as Develin seems to believe, it would be difficult to understand Aristotle's insistence on 
the point that in the ideal city the excellences of good man and good citizen may 
coincide. What Aristotle is most anxious to show is that possession of political 
phronesis is what entitles a man to hold power, even if for some of the time he will be a 
common citizen. 
A second respect in which his argument seems to be wrong is connected to the 
way in which he attempts to demonstrate that the arete of the common citizen and that 
of the good man are separate matters. In order to identify the nature of the different 
aretai at stake, he adopts a linguistic approach. He tries at first to track down the origin 
of the adjectives spoudaios and agathos, and he makes reference to Homer, Theognis, 
Xenophanes, Solon and Plato36; then he passes on to examine Aristotle's use of such 
adjectives, so as to demonstrate that -in Aristotle's view- a good citizen is distinctively 
spoudaios, but not agathos37. 
I think that Develin' s account on the origin of the adj ectives spoudaios and 
agathos provides insubstantial evidence for his theory, given that such an account is not 
employed by him in the explanation of the argument at Book III. Even though he says 
that the adjective agathos, employed by Homer with reference to military excellence, 
acquires in later authors an ethical connotation, still this does not explain the supposed 
difference between agathos and spoudaios, nor does it exclude that spoudaios too can 
35 See Aristotle, Pol. III, 1279a3-8. 
36 See R. Develin, 1973, pp. 73-5. 
37 See R. Develin, 1973, pp. 75ff. 
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be used in relation to the ethical sphere~ even more because, as Develin himself SayS at 
p. 75 of his article, they both refer to the sphere of human action: 
«The o1tou8a'ioc; man, in the same way as the uya86c;, shows himself in action, 
using an apE'tn guided by 1tpOatpEOtc;», 
although he points out immediately after having said this that the two adjectives are not 
synonimous. He tries to demonstrate that spoudaios has a different sphere of meaning 
from agathos, but the evidences he provides are not decisive for his argument. He 
quotes the passages of some Aristotelian works others than the Politics, so as to show 
that the adjective spoudaios does not allude at the same sphere of meaning entailed by 
agathos. 
According to Develin, passages of the Poetics like 1451 b5ff, where poetry is 
described as atrov8az61:epa than history38, or 1449b24, in which Aristotle defines 
tragedy as J.LiJ.L1]C5Z~ 1!pd;em~ C51!ov8aia~, would reveal that C51!ov8aTJ:)C; is not 
employed with reference to an ethical sphere; the same would be true for Met. 11, 
1021b23-4, where he says that things which have attained their end, if their 1:EAO~ is 
C51!ov8aio~ are called 1:eAeia, or NE VII, 1152b21 (not 1152a21, as he says) where 
we are told that not all f]8ollai are C51!ov8aiar9. 
Still, all these examples display only a restricted part of the ways in which 
spoudaios is used by Aristotle, and leave aside a fundamental sphere in which it is 
employed: the ethical. In the passages quoted by Develin, spoudaios is never used 
directly in relation to human beings; but we can find innumerable examples in which 
38 See R. Develin, 1973, p. 76. 
39 See R. Develin, 1973, p. 76. 
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spoudaios is applied to men and qualifies them as phronimoi and agathoi. In the present 
discussion I will mention only a few-but significant-cases which show that spoudaios 
may have to do with excellence of character. For instance, at NE III, 1113a32-3 the 
spoudaios man is thought of as discriminating correctly in every set of circumstances, 
which seems to be a capacity typical of a phronimos individual. In a more explicit way, 
at NE Vll, 1 1 52a7-8, in order to explain that it is not possible for the same person at the 
same time to be wise and un-self-controlled, Aristotle says that one is spoudaios in 
character insofar as he is at the same time phronimos. Again, at NE IX, 1166all-13, he 
claims that arete and spoudaios (who, therefore, must be a person of excellence) can be 
taken as a measure for every sort of case, and in the same Book, at NE IX, 1170a8-10, 
the spoudaios man, just in so far as he is spoudaios, 
«delights in actions in accordance with excellence, and is disgusted by those flowing 
from badness». 
The examples I have quoted show that Develin is not right to say that spoudaios 
In not synonimous of agathos. Even in the Politics, which is the subject of our 
discussion, spoudaios is sometimes used to express an ideal of excellence. For instance, 
at Pol. VII, 1332a32-3, Aristotle tells us that the spoudaia polis, i.e. the virtuous state, 
is the product of episteme and proairesis, and, as he goes on, the goodness of the state 
stems from individual excellence 40, which means that the spoudaioi individuals must be 
agathoi in order to make their polis excellent. In that case, a spoudaios citizen cannot 
be different from an agathos one. 
Again, Develin is not right in claiming that agathos is the natural contrary of 
kakos, spoudaios of phaulos; even though, on some occasions, agathos is mentioned by 
40 Cf. footnote 19 of this chapter. 
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Aristotle in relation to kakos to designate opposite things, and, in the same respect, 
spoudaios is cited in relation to phaulos41 , nowhere does he say that agathos is by 
definition the 'natural' contrary of kakos, nor that phaulos is the 'natural' contrary of 
spoudaios. And, even if we admitted that he is right in thinking so, this would not show 
that spoudaios and agathos have a different sphere of meaning. In his account of the 
two adjectives, Develin implies that Aristotle is using agathos exclusively with 
reference to the good man/ruler, but not with reference to the good citizen; but, given 
what I have just said, this might not be true. Not least because Book III of the Politics 
contains a controversial passage in which Aristotle says that a citizen who takes part in 
politics must be wise. 
The passage at issue is Pol. III, 1277a14-16: 
«<I>a~Ev 0" 'tov apxov'ta 'tov O"noUOatov uya80v Elvat Kat <l>p6vt~ov, 'tov oE 
nOAt'ttKOV Cx.vaYKatOV ElVat <l>p6vt~ov»; 
in this passage a textual problem might be identified. Unlike Barker, who translates: 
«We call a good ruler a 'good' and 'prudent' man, and we say of the statesman that he 
ought to be 'prudent'», 
Rackham translates 
«N ow we say that a good ruler is virtuous and wise, and that a citizen taking part in 
politics must be wise», 
41 At p. 76 of his article, footnotes 23 and 24, Develin cites as evidences of his claim passages of 
RhetoriC, Categories, Nicomachean Ethics and Poetics. 
255 
which might be plausible if we assume, as I do, that in the ideal polis every citizen may 
rule in virtue of his possession of ethical excellence and phronesis. In that case, 
Develin's assumption would be definitively wrong. 
Finally, a respect in which I believe that he fails to argue for his thesis is that, 
although he is right to say that-in Aristotle's opinion-a man qua ruler will not be the 
same as a man qua common citizen, he does not investigate the consequences of such a 
belief, which I think constitute Aristotle's main concern. In my view, the distinction 
drawn by Aristotle between the two kinds of excellence is only the starting point for 
what I believe is his principal intention: to show that whoever possesses phronesis and 
ethical excellence can be a good ruler. 
Before we go on to the next section of this chapter and shed some light on the 
nature of political phronesis, a few considerations of a different kind should be entered. 
Since the excellence of the good man is the phronesis peculiar to the good ruler, his 
task involves an activity of ruling over his fellow-citizens, who must apply his orders in 
relation to political activity with a view to the well-being of the communitj. As 
Aristotle suggests at Pol. III, 1277b25-31, phronesis is the arete peculiar to the ruler, 
and it is connected to his capacity to make decisions relating to the good of the polis, 
i. e. to his deliberative power; the other citizens, by contrast, have only an alethes doxa, 
i. e. a correct opinion, presumably with regard to the things established by the ruler, and 
their work is based on decisions already made by the man who possesses authentic 
political phronesis. 
But when we refer to the ideal polis, where all the citizens are virtuous and must 
rule in relays, how can we say that they have only an alethes doxa? My answer is that, 
when they are simple citizens, they do not need to engage in the kind of reflection for 
which the ruler employs his phronesis; so that they will rely on the decisions of the 
good ruler, even though they would be able to govern according to phronesis. When 
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they are called to rule, they will have to display their phronesis, and mere correct 
opinion will not be sufficient. 
A second point is that, in the ideal polis, the ruler's respect for its values is surely 
compatible with his exercise of political phronesis where rulers are chosen on the basis 
of their phronesis and citizens are educated to excellence of character. By contrast, a 
ruler in charge of a corrupt polis, whose government forwards the search e.g. for self-
interest rather than the general good, will not be good, although his fellow-citIzens, 
having absorbed the same values and the aims pursued by the constitution, might regard 
him as a good ruler. What Aristotle is trying to tell us is that a ruler must be judged 
only on the basis of his possession or lack or phronesis, and not according to the values 
conveyed by any polis whatever; values which, in the case of deviant constitutions, 
might tum out to be deleterious for the ethical growth of the citizens and political 
stability. 
That Aristotle speaks of political phronesis in relation to the ideal community 
might suggest that only in the best polis will the ruler be independent of the values of 
the political community and judged on the basis of his phronesis, whereas, were he a 
ruler in a less perfect community, he would be severely constrained by the values in 
force. However, Aristotle does not seem to introduce the ideal constitution as the only 
form of political community where the identity between the good man and the good 
ruler can be established. In my view, that the excellence of a good ruler is not 
dependent on the quality of the constitution where he exercises his power applies even 
to the case of the ideal constitution. 
A question might be raised: will the identity between the good man and the good 
ruler survive in non-perfect political communities? The attempt to answer this question 
will be the object of the following section of this chapter. 
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9.3: Goodness oltlle Ruler and Corrupt Communities 
Phronesis has been introduced so far as a quality whose possession marks the 
difference between a good ruler and a good citizen. We have seen that only the good 
ruler possesses phronesis, whereas the good citizen may have a kind of alethes doxa, 
i.e. a right opinion about the things established by the lawgiver with a view to goodness 
of the community. Given what I have said in chapter II of this thesis, phronesis is the 
excellence involved in good deliberation. The issue of euboulia is treated in book VI in 
absolute terms, presumably with respect to individual goals, and without any reference 
to particular, restrictive conditions 42. 
When it comes to political phronesis, it seems that good deliberation on the well-
being of the polis involves possession of the political science, which, as Aristotle 
explains in Book IV of the PolitiCS, is a science enabling a lawgiver to deliberate well 
on the basis of knowledge of the best constitution. 
But the account of political science provided at the beginning of Book IV of the 
Politics shows that the person who truly possesses political science should also know 
how to deliberate in imperfect communities, by knowing what sort of constitution will 
better adapt to each of them either specifically or in general43 . The capacity typical of 
the lawgiver who possesses authentic political science consists in his power to master 
both the knowledge of the ideal constitution, which is superior by nature, and 
knowledge of existing ones, which may be more or less defective in relation to the 
ideal. But since, as it seems, realising the best constitution in communities characterised 
by unfavourable conditions is almost impossible, a good lawgiver will endeavour to 
42 See NE VI, 1141b12-15, where Aristotle speaks of the good deliberator without qualification. 
43 See Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1288b22-39. 
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realise the best constitution in determinate conditions44, without this depriving him of 
the knowledge of how the ideal constitution should be. 
F or instance, a given constitution might be bad and in need of being modified, 
but the citizens might be reluctant to cope with political change, so that lawgivers are 
compelled to adopt measures easily acceptable by them45 , notwithstanding their 
awareness that different laws might make the city better. Another reason why lawgivers 
do not often attempt to realise the ideal polis in existing communities is that, in 
Aristotle's view, the lawgivers' task is not to change the basic structure of a political 
constitution, but to respect the constitution in force46 . Thus, besides the science of the 
best constitution, it is also necessary for a lawgiver to know which constitutions are 
more realisable than others and which kinds of laws are appropriate to each of them. 
Political science presupposes the capacity to see how constitutions must be 
organised; as Aristotle says at Pol. IV, 1297b37-1298a3, every form of constitution 
presents three entities of a different kind: the first is the body that deliberates about the 
common interest; the second is the body of magistracies; the third is judiciary power. 
The task of the good lawgiver is to consider what is most advantageous for each office 
and how such offices should be organised in relation to the ends of the polis. But the 
deliberative power of the phronimos ruler is also concerned with concrete matters, like 
issues of war and peace for example, or the making and breaking of alliances, or the 
enactment of specific laws47 . Given all this, it seems that the phronesis of the ruler must 
engage the good man in the enacting of both general and particular plans; all things that 
44 See Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1288b25-8. 
45 See Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1289al-5, where it is said that any change of govenunent which has to be 
introduced should meet people's consent, and also that «it is a difficult matter to reform an old 
constitution as it is to construct a new one». 
46 See Aristotle, Pol. V, 1309a33-5. Cf. Pol. VI, 1319b33-6, where it is said that the task of the legislator 
is not so much to set up a constitution ex novo, but rather to ensure its preservation. 
47 See Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1298a3-7. 
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mere alethes doxa, i.e. a correct opinion about what is good, would not enable one 
citizen to do. Political science, then, presupposes the capacity to devise ways of 
actualising either the best justice possible or the utmost degree of justice and goodness 
realisable within imperfect communities. In the same way, we might suppose, 
phronesis is the intellectual disposition by virtue of which the good ruler might be 
conceived of operating in communities other than the best. 
Having said this, we might go back to the question I formulated at the end of the 
first section of this chapter: will the identity of the good man and the good ruler by 
virtue of phronesis stand even in the context of a non-perfect community? I have 
already expressed my view that the identity between the good man and the good citizen 
as ruler, although established within the context of the ideal community, is not 
exclusively valid for the ideal community, just because the goodness of the good ruler 
depends on phronesis and not on the values prescribed by any polis whatever. On the 
contrary, we have seen, he is anxious to differentiate the dependence of the good citizen 
on the quality of the polis from the excellence of the ruler. 
The question about the identity between the good man and the good ruler in 
imperfect communities might be formulated also in the following way: can a good ruler 
be good in absolute terms in an imperfect polis? When he deals with the issue of the 
preservation of constitutions in Book V of the Politics, Aristotle explains that three 
qualifications are needed of those who hold deliberative power. At Pol. V, 1309a34-7 (I 
have mentioned part of this passage in footnote 44 of this section), he says: 
«1tpcO'tOV J..lEV cj>tAtaV 1tpOC; 'tTtV KaSEO''tcDO'av 1tOA1'tElav, E1tEl'ta OuVaJ..llv 
I 
I 
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1.e. 
«The first is loyalty to the established constitution; the second is a high degree of 
capacity for the duties of the office. The third is the quality of goodness and justice, in 
the particular form which suits the nature of each constitution». 
In the ideal constitution, all these requirements are perfectly compatible, since the 
loyalty of the skilful lawgiver would be towards a constitution whose properties and 
conditions enable him to actualise perfect goodness and justice, the same goodness and 
justice that contribute to making him a virtuous man in a complete sense. This is 
possible insofar as, in such a constitution, the criterion for the designation of rulers is 
ethical and intellectual excellence, i.e. qualities possessed by the good man. Moreover, 
it seems that even good citizens who do not possess complete excellence of character 
will be able to recognize who might be a good and just ruler. But when it comes to non-
ideal communities, would these requirements still be compatible? 
It seems that in right (although non-ideal) constitutions, which operate with a 
view to the common interest, the good ruler might work to reproduce the best kind of 
justice possible, and remain at the same time loyal to the values pursued by such 
communities. That the goodness of a ruler depends on his phronesis, and not on 
external conditions like the quality of the polis, seems to imply that he might intervene 
in right constitutions by ameliorating their system of justice, and not merely preserve it 
in exactly the way it is. This might happen, for example, in some forms of monarchy or 
aristocracy, whose good approaches that of the ideal constitution. But when it comes to 
deviant constitutions, the loyalty of the good lawgiver to the constitution would 
correspond to loyalty to a corrupt system, and this might not be easily reconcilable with 
his supposed political skills and inner goodness. 
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I will now try to investigate the relationships between the good ruler in absolute terms, 
and the good ruler in deviant communities. The first question we should ask is the 
following: will a man acquire complete excellence of character in a corrupt polis? Only 
once having ascertained that such a man may become good will we ask if such an 
individual will be able to rule a deviant community. It seems that, although the values 
conveyed by any comlnunity undeniably end up affecting its citizens' education, a 
citizen might become good even in a bad community, provided that he possesses a 
natural inclination to ethical excellence and receives a private training for it. 
That is what is suggested in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle 
claims that only in a few places has the lawgiver given careful attention to the correct 
upbringing of his fellow-citizens48, and at NE X, 11SOa30-2 says that 
«if things are neglected on the communal level, then it would seem appropriate for each 
to contribute towards his own children's and friends' acquisition of excellence, af'\d for 
him to have the capacity to do so, or at any rate to decide to do it», 
although in the following two lines of this passage he acknowledges that the best thing 
would be an education supervised through establishment of good laws. 
These passages, which I have mentioned in chapter II with reference to the issue 
of education of individuals to ethical excellence, show also that, when laws lack this 
capacity, a training provided by someone like a father might in some cases make an 
individual equally virtuous; for, as he claims at NE X, 11SOb3-6, 
«the things a father says, and the habits he imposes, have the same force in a household 
as legal provisions and customs in a city; or even more force, because of the bonds of 
48 Cf. Aristotle, NE X, 1180a24-9. 
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kinship and beneficience; for offspring are naturally predisposed to feel affection for 
and to be obedient to fathers». 
Moreover, as he adds at NE X, 1 180a7-1 1, the education prescribed by a father might 
also be less general and more suited to the character of his son than a general education 
provided by the community. 
These examples suggest that an individual might be brought up well even in a 
corrupt constitution. However, to say that a good man may exist in a deviant polis does 
not amount to saying that he can rule it; my question is: how might his goodness be 
employed in the service of the political community by improving it? In order to answer 
this question, let us move to the Aristotelian distinction between correct and deviant 
constitutions drawn at Pol. III, 1279a17-22. He calls 'right' those constitution that aim 
at the common advantage and are thought to be right according to an absolute standard 
of justice, whereas deviant constitutions are those that pursue exclusively the ruler' s (or 
rulers') own advantage, and are taken to be perversions of the right forms. Since power 
may be held by one person or the few or the many, a constitution will be correct when 
either the one, or the few, or the many govern with a view to the common interest49 . 
Now, power with a view to the common advantage presupposes the employment 
of a degree of ethical excellence, which is inseparable from phronesis50, given that 
phronesis consists in the ability to find the means to good ends and constitutes a 
fundamental component in the process of deliberation for the good51 ; this seems to be 
the case of constitutions like monarchy and aristocracy, where the best people are in 
charge of deliberative power, whereas polity, although aimed at the common interest, 
seems to be based on a particular kind of virtue, i.e. military excellence, and not on 
49 See Aristotle, Pol. III, 1279a25-30. 
50 See Aristotle, NE VI, 1144b30-4. 
51 See Aristotle, NE VI, 1140a25-33~ NE VI, 1142b29-34. 
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complete excellence of character52 . By contrast, when Aristotle speaks of deviant 
constitutions, he does not seem to admit the possibility of a phronimos ruler, given that 
to be phronimos means to pursue the common good and justice, whereas a community 
is deviant when its rulers govern in view of their own interest and fail to actualise the 
well-being of all its citizens. 
Now, had we to figure out a 'wise' version of a deviant community, we would 
have to think of a different kind of constitution, i. e. its right counterpart, and not of an 
improved form of the corrupt constitution. An example of the stark distinction between 
right and deviant constitutions is given at Pol. IV, 1289b5-11, where Aristotle claims 
that, contrary to what one might believe, it is not possible to speak of a right form of 
oligarchy; on the contrary, he says, deviations are all wrong and it is not correct to say 
that one oligarchy it is better than another; rather, we may say that it is less bad. The 
same holds of democracy; although Aristotle describes various forms of it, he still ranks 
them all with the group of deviant constitutions. 
As we can see, in his identification of right and deviant constitutions, Aristotle 
applies a rigid taxonomy, which apparently does not leave any room for a kind of 
constitution that, although deviant, is governed by phronimoi rulers. Equally, if a good 
man had the opportunity to hold deliberative power in a deviant constitution, he would 
not easily be able to change it into a right one, for instance an oligarchy into a 
monarchy, given that, in this way, he would jeopardize the stability of the community 
and meet with popular dissent. 
However, as I believe, there is one possible case in which a wise ruler may hold 
power in a bad community without changing its constitutional form. On such a 
possibility Aristotle does not pronounce, and we may only conjecture about what his 
thought on the issue might have been; still, if we assume that the excellence of the good 
52 See Aristotle, Pol. III, 1279a33-b5. 
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ruler does not depend on the quality of the city he governs, but on phronesis as an 
absolute standard, such a possibility might well seem plausible. This possibility is that 
of a community whose main values are not those of ethical excellence, but nevertheless 
are pursued through some degree of ethical excellence; in other words, a constitution in 
which phronesis is exercised with a view to the preservation of general stability and 
avoidance of conflicts that might end up by provoking a change in the constitution, 
even when such a constitution does not aim at the achievement of ethical excellence of 
its members. 
At Pol. III, 1283a14-18 it is said that the claim to office must be based on 
superiority in those things that constitute the being of the state, and that, therefore, it is 
reasonable for the well-born, the free and the wealthy to lay claim to power. We see 
that, beside the search for either private or common interest, a second criterion for the 
distinction between different communities is the specificity of the values they pursue; 
the same values which are employed as criteria for the designation of a political leader. 
Excellence of character, Aristotle explains, is indispensable for the administration of 
the state, but, on the other hand, wealth and freedom are indispensable for the state's 
existence 53. 
Values like wealth and freedom are not harmful in themselves; what makes them 
bad is the wrong use an individual makes of them, especially when the individual at 
issue is a political ruler. On the other hand, it is true that such values, unlike ethical 
excellence, are not based on any kind of intermediacy, and they run the risk of causing 
greed and conflicting ambitions. Maybe that is why Aristotle never speaks of virtuous 
oligarchies or democracies. The possibility that Aristotle does not introduce is that of a 
virtuous ruler who governs wisely in a polis where ethical excellence is not the supreme 
value to pursue, and still remains loyal to the constitution in force. 
53 See Aristotle, Pol. III, 1283a19-23. 
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I suggest that, even in such a community, a wise ruler might use his phronesis to some 
extent; for instance, by adopting political measures capable of preserving the stability 
of the polis. This would confirm that the excellence of the good ruler, although it 
cannot be completely displayed in a deviant constitution, is not dependent on the 
quality of the polis. Such a ruler might be a good man, and be allowed to exercise 
deliberative power in constitutions like oligarchies or democracies on the basis of his 
wealth or free status. The nature of the community would surely affect his government 
and limit his power to establish a suitable system of justice; nevertheless, were he a 
good ruler in possession of phronesis and political science, he might work in an 
imperfect community by finding the best solutions towards its preservation. 
Aristotle himself, when dealing with the issue of the preservation of political 
communities, provides some suggestions for making deviant constitutions safer. For 
instance, at Pol. V, 1308a31-S he says that the good ruler only can avoid quarrels and 
seditions among the notables by means of a suitable legislation, since 
«Ordinary men cannot see the beginning of troubles ahead; it requires the genuine 
statesman» 54 . 
Again, a good ruler should be able to curb ambitions, and guarantee that no one be 
advanced by the state out of all proportion to others. With reference to both demccracy 
and oligarchy, at Pol. V, 1308bll-19 he explains that 
«it is a better policy to award small honours over a period of time than to give great 
honours rapidly [ ... ] It is also good policy to aim at providing, by means of appropriate 
legislation, against the risk of any man gaining a position of superiority by the strength 
54 Aristotle, Pol. V, 1308a33-5. 
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of his wealth or connexions. Failing that, men who gain such a position should be 
removed from it by being sent out of the country». 
Other measures that contribute to the preservation of the polis, Aristotle suggests, 
are the introduction of a magistracy designed to supervise those who do not live in 
harmony with their polis and abide by different values, or to assign magistracies to 
opposite social groupings (e.g. the wealthy and the poor) so as to prevent the 
flourishing of a particular section55 . All these prudential devices aim at preserving some 
proportional equality within the community. Still, as Aristotle himself recognizes, to 
promote stability in a democracy or in an oligarchy does not necessarily amount to 
making it respectively more democratic or oligarchic. As he says at Pol. VI, 1319b38-
13 20a5, once again with reference to the enquiry into the ways of preserving a polis, 
«Legislators should [therefore] direct their attention to the causes which lead to the 
preservation and the destruction of constitutions-a theme which has already been 
treated-and on that basis they should devote their effort to the construction of stability. 
They must be on their guard against all the elements of destruction; they must leave 
their state with a body of laws, customary as well as enacted, which will include, above 
everything else, all the elements of preservation; they must believe that the true policy, 
for democracy and oligarchy alike, is not one which ensures the greatest possible 
amount of either, but one which will ensure the longest possible life for both»56. 
55 See Aristotle, Pol. V, 1308b25-31. 
56 Jl1l VOJ.1t~EtV 'tOm' Eivat cSllJlO'ttKOV JlllcS' oAtyapXtKOV 0 1tOtr,crEt 't1lv 1tOAtV o'tt J.1<lAtcr'ta 
cSllJ.10Kpa 'tEtcr6a t fl OAt yapx Etcr6a 1. 
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In other words, a democratic or oligarchic measure will be a measure that contributes to 
the stability of the polis, rather than one which will make the community democratic or 
oligarchic in the highest degree. In my view, this consideration might suggest that the 
lawgiver, while enacting such a measure in a deviant community, will not absorb the 
character of the polis he rules, but he will only confine himself to avoiding dangerous 
conflicts in the polis. Given all this, it might be objected that the good ruler's duty to 
preserve his constitution will make him completely dependent on the quality of the city, 
just as it happens in the case of common citizens; still, it might be replied that, when 
Aristotle refers to the importance of preserving a constitution, the ruler's capacity to 
contribute to its safety is not due simply to obedience to the existing laws. A simple 
orthe doxa will not be sufficient to fulfil the lawgiver's task. 
9.4: Conclusions 
To sum up what has been said in this chapter, in the first section I tried to illustrate the 
distinction drawn by Aristotle at Pol. III, 1276b16-1277a16 between the arete of the 
good man and the arete of the good citizen; the difference, as we have seen, is 
introduced so as to provide an answer to the following question: can the excellence of 
the good citizen coincide with the excellence of the good man? I tried to show that 
Aristotle's insistence that the goodness of the citizen is relative to the quality of the 
polis where he holds office, whereas the goodness of the ruler relies on phronesis, 
which is an absolute standard, suggests that wisdom of a good ruler will not depend on 
the constitution where he exercises deliberative power. 
I have argued for my thesis by analysing Aristotle's discussion in relation to the 
ideal community, and I maintained that, in his view, all the citizens of the ideal 
community are good men, besides being good citizens; I suggested that, when Aristotle 
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says that in the ideal polis not all the citizens can be virtuous, this is only because there 
might be people who have not yet achieved full ethical excellence, e.g. in the case of 
young people, without this meaning that only the rulers possess excellence of character. 
Rather, in the best community every citizen seems to be entitled to rule, in virtue of his 
possession of ethical excellence and phronesis; in other words, the only people \\' :10 do 
not possess it in the ideal context are those who are not yet agathoi and phronimoi, but 
are on their way to learn how to become good men. This would show that, no matter 
what role a man holds in the ideal polis, it is only possession of ethical excellence that 
enables them to hold power. 
In the second section of this chapter I tried to clarify what the phronesis of the 
ruler consists in. Unlike in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, where the issue of 
deliberation is treated only with reference to the ideal constitution, in Book IV of the 
Politics Aristotle seems to suggest that those who possess political science should know 
how to deliberate both in the best constitution and in communities whose particular 
conditions may affect the ruler's display of complete excellence of character; in that 
case, the phronesis of the good ruler would enable him to actualise goodness and justice 
even in an imperfect community, as far as conditions allow it. 
With reference to the idea of phronesis as an absolute standard of goodness, I 
took up the view that the good ruler is not affected by the quality of the polis in the 
same way as the common citizen is. As a matter of fact, a deviant constitution will put 
serious constraints on his work, even more because the task of a good lawgiver is not 
normally to set up a constitution ex novo, but to preserve the constitution in force; in 
this respect, the work of the ruler will undeniably be influenced by the aims pursued by 
the constitution where he exercises deliberative power. Still, his capacity to preserve his 
community is not of the same kind as that of common citizens, who have only an orthe 
doxa, if they have that, in an imperfect constitution, and not authentic phronesis. 
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The general aim of this chapter is to show that phronesis does not depend on the quality 
of the constitution under which its possessor lives, and allows a good ruler both to 
preserve the justice in force in any polis and to promote reforms with a view to its 
safety. In the case of right constitutions, he will make laws not only with a view to the 
preservation of the common interest, but also in view of improvements in the 
community in terms of good and justice; in the case of deviant constitutions, the 
phronesis of the good ruler will enable him to deliberate well on how preservation of 
such constitutions is possible. 
The idea of a ruler who is good both in absolute terms and in relation to 
imperfect constitutions paves the way for the idea that exercise of phronesis can be 
made compatible to some degree even with values like wealth and free status, and that 
forms of government like oligarchies and democracies can contain some justice and can 
be run with a view to the common interest, although they cannot be regarded as right 
forms of government. 
I 
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Chapter X: 
Wisdom in An Imperfect Community. 
Polity and the Power of the Many. 
10.1: Introduction 
In the last chapter I tried to explain how a phronimos individual in the ideal sense may 
be involved in the ruling of an imperfect political community, even when the values 
conveyed by it are different from ethical excellence. However, the picture of a virtuous 
man in action in a non-virtuous polis raises considerable difficulties. The first is 
connected to the idea that the task of a good ruler is to preserve the status quo of the 
community in which he lives; in order to guarantee the maintenance of the constitution, 
a good lawgiver will act with a view to its stability by finding the means towarJs the 
promotion of the common interest. If so, how can we think of a good lawgiver as ruling 
in a deviant constitution without changing it, and still think that he is good? 
A further difficulty lies in the scarce possibilities of having a substantial number 
of outstandingly virtuous men in a deviant constitution, where the education of citizens 
to ethical excellence is not regarded as an aim to pursue. Should a man of perfect 
excellence exist in a corrupt polis and hold power, his phronesis, probably, would not 
be sufficient for the establishment of any degree of stability in the city, especially if the 
constitution is governed by more than a few people and not all of them are equipped 
with excellence of character. 
The difficulties I have just introduced might raise the following question: is there 
any non-ideal constitution in which 
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1) phronesis can be displayed on the lawgiver's part without his being at odds with 
the nature of the constitution to be preserved? 
2) justice and the common interest can be pursued even if not all the rulers possess 
complete excellence of character? 
I believe that, in the context of Aristotle's thought, such a constitution is realisable, and 
furthermore it can be identified with polity. In this chapter I will try to highlight the 
anomalous character of a constitution which, although taken as one of the three right 
constitutions, stems from two kinds of deviant constitution, i.e. democracy and 
oligarchy; a constitution in which those who share in political power are not necessarily 
good from an ethical point of view and, nevertheless, manage to create the conditions 
for a good political community. 
In the Politics, Aristotle provides us with various clues for an understanding of 
the nature of polity1; in Book III it is described as the right counterpart of democracy2, 
as a form of rule by the plethos3 and, all the same, a constitution whose sovereignty is 
held by those who possess arms4, whereas in Book IV it seems to be treated in close 
relation to the power of the middle class, i.e. an intermediate class between the rich, 
who are in power in oligarchies, and the poor, in power in democracies5. But, above all, 
polity is a right kind of constitution, whose rulers aim at the common interest, although 
their excellence is not the complete excellence of character which makes aristocracies 
and monarchies good. 
1 See G. Huxley, 1985, pp. 142-3~ Cf. H. Kelsen, 1977, pp. 188-91. 
2 See Aristotle, Pol. III, 1279b6, where democracy is described as a deviation from polity. 
3 See Aristotle, Pol. III, 1279a37-9. 
4 See Aristotle, Pol. III, 1279b2-4. 
5 See Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1290bI7-20. 
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The aim of this chapter is to collect these pieces of information and try to re-construct 
the Aristotelian idea of polity as a right constitution on the basis of the evidence 
available to us. My suggestion is that, in Aristotle's view, a kind of polity verging 
towards aristocracy is the best kind of constitution for the majority of the existing 
communities. In order to argue for my thesis, I will analyse the polity from the point of 
view of the wise lawgiver who operates in non-ideal conditions; I suggest that his task 
consists in allotting power to the middle class and in preventing political factions from 
acquiring excessive power, so as to foster the advantage of all the members of the 
political association and not exclusively of single factions. 
In the first section of this chapter I will try to make sense of the notion of military 
excellence introduced by Aristotle in his account of polity. I propose that excellence in 
the military field is not the specific kind of virtue employed by the plethos in the ruling 
of a polity; rather, it might offer the social and economical conditions enabling 
individuals to take part in political activity and, above all, it might contribute in some 
way to the development of a concern for the interest of the community. But polity, 
rather than being the outcome of the activity of the military class, seems to be most of 
all the result of the activity of a wise lawgiver who aims at promoting the common 
interest. I will suggest that, besides its resemblance to democracy, polity might in some 
cases be regarded as very close to aristocracy thanks to the intervention of a phronimos 
ruler. 
In the second section I will then go on to speak of the contribution offered by the 
middle class to the stability of the community, from the point of view of a wise 
lawgiver who employs them in the actualisation of political friendship. My idea is that 
the kind of political friendship subsisting in a polity-in the way in which a wise 
lawgiver would foster it-might contribute to making the constitution right, i.e. oriented 
towards the common interest; were different social classes in conflict with each ')ther, 
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the excellence of a good ruler per se would not be sufficient for the establishment of 
some degree of goodness in the polis. The kind of justice from which such a friendship 
would come about might not be so much the outcome of a virtuous disposition of 
character on the citizens' part as the result of mere avoidance of pleonexia; justice as 
equality, rather than justice as the whole of ethical excellence, seems to be the kind of 
justice proper to the members of the middle class. Still, notwithstanding the imperfect 
character of such a kind of justice, the resulting political friendship might be the best 
kind applicable to the majority of existing states. 
10.2: Military Excellence and the Lawgiver's Wisdom: Their Function 
in the Polity 
Among the forms of government-right and deviant-described in the Politics, polity 
seems to be a kind of constitution about which Aristotle seems to display a particular 
concern 
6
. It is first introduced in Book II, where he engages in an investigation of the 
best kind of political community through an enquiry into both existing constitutions and 
constitutions propounded by famous thinkers7 . At Pol. II, 1265b26-9, with reference to 
the best political constitution drawn by Plato in the Laws, Aristotle says that the best 
constitution in Plato's view is neither a democracy nor an oligarchy, but rather an 
intermediate form between them, which is called a polity, where the government is 
constituted from the class that bears arms. His comment on the Platonic ideal 
constitution is the following: 
6 See R.G. Mulgan, 1977, p. 76-7. As he points out at p. 77, polity «is a constitution which has rarely if 
ever existed in its true fonn and is an abstract ideal which serves as a standard for the deviant forms of 
oligarchy and democracy. He does, however, describe the constitutions of certain cities as polities, on the 
grounds, presumably, that they are sufficiently close to the ideal polity to deserve the name». 
7 See Aristotle, Pol. II, 1260b27-36. 
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<df Plato's view in constructing this constitution is that it represents the form which is 
most readily attainable by most states, he may very well be right; but if he regards it as 
the form which comes next in merit to his first, or ideal, form of constitution [i.e. that in 
the Republic], he is mistaken: one might commend more highly the constitution of 
Sparta, or some other form of a more aristocratic character [than that depicted in the 
LawS]»8. 
Two relevant points can be drawn from this passage. The first is that such a 
constitution may be understood as the form of government suited to most states and the 
most readily realisable; the second is that-in Aristotle's view-it seems to be far from 
the virtue which is typical of an aristocracy, since a constitution should be run 
according to ethical excellence in order to be really the best. In this respect, polity, 
although included among the constitutions aiming at the common interest of their 
citizens, seems to diverge from the pattern of monarchy and aristocracy, whose rulers 
are held to be men of outstanding virtue. 
These points will be developed by Aristotle in Books III-VI of the Politics. In the 
Politics, the idea of polity as a right constitution is introduced for the first time in Book 
III, where Aristotle says that, like the other right constitutions, it aims at the common 
interest and not merely at the advantage of single parts of the community. In the same 
context, he highlights his idea that the virtue which characterizes the rulers of a polity 
cannot be the same complete excellence of character as that proper to outstanding men; 
since a plethos, not just a few individuals, is in power, is seems unlikely to suppose that 
all of them are ethically good men. At Pol. III, 1279a37-b4 he says: 
8 Aristotle, Pol. II, 1265b29-33. 
275 
I 
I 
I 
«when the masses govern the state with a view to the common interest, the name used 
for this species is the generic name common to all constitutions (or polities )-the name 
of "Polity'. There is a good reason for the usage. It is possible for one man, or a few, to 
be of outstanding excellence: but when it comes to a large number, we can hardly 
expect a fine edge of all the varieties of excellence. What we can expect particularly is 
the military kind of excellence, which is the kind that shows itself in a mass. This is the 
reason why the defence forces are the most sovereign body under this constitution, and 
those who possess arms are the persons who enjoy constitutional rights». 
That military excellence is the kind of merit proper to a plethos seems to be 
confirmed at Pol. TIl, 1288alO-15, where Aristotle says that 
«The society appropriate to government of the constitutional type [i. e. the polity] is one 
in which there naturally exist a body of persons possessing military capacity9, who can 
rule and be ruled under a system of law which distributes offices among the wealthy in 
proportion to merit». 
A problem in this passage is that offices are distributed among the wealthy in 
proportion to axia. That the wealthy are those eligible for political activity makes the 
polity close to oligarchy, and, we may suppose, even to aristocracy, where the people in 
power belong to noble and rich families; that in a polity the rulers are appointed on the 
9 A textual problem might be identified in regard to the adjective polemikon~ Ross, unlike Barker, 
Newman, Tricot, Gigon et al., reads politikon instead of polemikon; I accept the reading and translation 
proposed by the latter group of scholars, which seems to take up the concept of military excellence 
introduced at Pol. III, 1279a37-b5; moreover, polemikon, as referring to a virtue of the plethos, seems to 
me to be more appropriate than po litikon , which would refer to a supposed political skill of the masses~ 
but the concept of political ability is mainly employed by Aristotle with reference to wise lawgivers, and 
not in relation to a plethos. 
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basis of some kind ofaxia suggests that, as in aristocracy, some merit is required. Still, 
I am not sure what kind of merit is in question. Is Aristotle talking of merit in military 
activity? We may immediately exclude that it corresponds to complete ethical arete, 
since, when he speaks of constitutions in which the rulers are outstanding m('n, he 
makes reference to monarchy and aristocracy but not to polity. For instance, at Pol. III, 
1288a15-9, he says: 
«When it happens that the whole of a family, or even a single person, is of merit lO so 
outstanding as to surpass that of all the rest, it is only just that this family should be 
vested with kingship and absolute sovereignity, or that this single person should 
become king». 
As we can see, Aristotle here refers to a family or a single person of outstanding 
excellence, but he does not mention a plethos or a group of people bigger than a single 
family. Another piece of evidence is at Pol. III, 1288a32-b3, where he says that, among 
the three types of right constitution, the best must be the one administered by the best 
people, which is the type in which the rulers, as well as the ruled, contribute to the most 
desirable kind of life: 
«It clearly follows just the same method, and just the same means, by which a man 
achieves goodness, should also be used to achieve the creation of a state on the pattern 
of aristocracy or kingship!! [i.e. on a pattern which makes the goodness of the good 
citizen coincide with that of the good man]; and thus the training and habits of action 
10 KCX/t' apE'tilv. 
11 <j>aVEpOV o'tt 'tOV au'tov 'tp61tOV Kat Ota 'tWV amwv aV1lP 'tE y'tVE'tat ()1tOUOato~ Kat 
1tOAtV ()1.)(J't1lO'EtEV 6.v 'tt~ aptO''toKpa'toullEVl1V 11 J3aO'tAEOOllEVl1V. 
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which make a good man will be generally the same as the training and habits of action 
which make a good statesman or a good king»12. 
Here again Aristotle makes no reference to polity, but he identifies virtuous people with 
the rulers and the ruled of an aristocracy or of a kingship. 
Polity is a constitution in which the power is entrusted to a wider number of 
people than in the monarchy or in the aristocracy; it is this plurality that has the 
deliberative power over the most important issues in the polis, and they are a mass who 
acts with a view to the common interest. Again, by using the expression kat'axian with 
reference to the rulers of a polity, Aristotle seems to distinguish the kind of merit 
required by the polity from the merit according to which power is accorded to people in 
monarchies or aristocracies. For the latter kinds of constitution, Aristotle adopts the 
phrase kat 'are ten 13 . 
So, having excluded that Aristotle confers the same value on monarchy-
aristocracy and polity14, it might seem that the kind of excellence involved in the ruling 
of a polity is military excellence15 ; as we have seen before, he points out that it consists 
of a particular sort of arete, although different from the complete ethical arete of the 
best constitutions. On the other hand, it might be objected that, in order to run a city, 
worth in battle or capacity to lead an army is not sufficient; strategic skills in the 
military field is not of the same kind as the Aristotelian political phronesis, which 
12 Aristotle, Pol. III, 1288a39-b2. 
13 See Aristotle, Pol. III, 1288a8-12: « J3acJtAEU'tOV J.1Ev ouv 'to 'tototh6v EO''tt reA 1180C; () 1t£<pUKE 
<p£PEtV y£voC; U1tEP£XOV Ka1:'ap£1:TJlI 1tpOC; trYEJ.1oVtaV 1tOAt'ttK1lV, aptO''toKpa'ttKOV OE () 
1tE<pUKE <pePEtV 1tA:l18oc; apXE0'8at OUVcX.J.1EVOV 'tTlV 'trov EAEuBEpwV apX1lv ureo 'trov 
Ka1:'ap£1:1]l1 trYEJ.10VtKroV 1tpOC; 1tOAt'ttKTtV <XpX1lV». W.T. Bluhm, 1962, p. 751. 
14 For a different view see W.T. Bluhm, 1962, p. 75l. Bluhm claims that the alleged superiC'rity of 
monarchy and aristocracy should not be taken seriously. 
15 See H. Kelsen, 1977, p. 188. 
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presupposes complete excellence of character; for instance, we cannot think of the 
political expedients devised by a good lawgiver as being of the same nature as the 
tactics of generals. 
Moreover, that a plethas and not just a few men are admitted to the ruling of a 
state by virtue of their military excellence may suggest that by 'military excellence' 
Aristotle is not referring exclusively to excellence in the highest military positions, 
which is not proper to a mass but just to some individuals. In that case, people 
possessing military excellence in general might lack strategic understanding, even in 
the military sphere; therefore, it seems to me that military excellence employed in the 
political field does not necessarily entail the possession of an outstanding strategic 
ability. 
Given all this, that Aristotle mentions military excellence as the excellence 
proper to the plethas in charge of a polity does not necessarily mean that it is such an 
excellence what makes the polity good. If so, why does Aristotle introduce military 
excellence? What is its role in the ruling of a polity? It seems to me that, unlike the 
excellence employed by aristocrats or by a king in the ruling activity, military 
excellence might simply be an accidental element in the process of acquisiti0n of 
political power, and not the specific excellence employed in the rule of the polis. It is 
true that in Pol. IV, 1291 a 1 Off. Aristotle, when criticizing Plato for confining the power 
of the military class to matters of war, insists on the political relevance of such a class 
by associating it to the classes that playa role in deliberative and judicial justice; these 
classes, he suggests, are superior to the classes which contribute to the necessities of 
life, just as the soul has a position of superiority in relation to the body16. 
However, it seems to me that the participation of the military class in political life 
is due not to a supposed political intelligence; some historical conditions might have 
16 See Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1291a24-8. 
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encouraged its acquisition of political power and made it impossible to prevent its 
members from having a share in political activity. For instance, at Pol. IV, 1297b16-24, 
Aristotle says that the earliest form of constitution among the Greeks after kingship was 
made up of those who were soldiers; in the original form cavalry was predominant, but 
when those who wore heavy armour became stronger, more persons claimed 
participation in political affairs. An example of the power of such class is given in the 
previous lines, i.e. at Pol. IV, 1297b14-16, where Aristotle speaks of the citizen-body 
of Male a, composed by people who served or were serving as heavy-armed soldiers. 
Furthermore, the importance accorded by Aristotle to those having m]itary 
excellence may also be of a socio-economical kind1? People who possess arms and 
take part in military activities seem to belong to the middle class, i.e. the class which-as 
I will show in the next section of this chapter-Aristotle thinks capable of providing a 
great contribution to the well-being of the community, although it is not composed of 
excellent individuals. Not even in that case would military excellence be employed in 
the exercise of deliberative power or in the administration of justice; once again, it 
would turn out to be an accidental element and not the excellence exercised in political 
activity. 
However, besides these factors, it seems to me that the main reason why Aristotle 
would insist on military excellence as a quality of the rulers of a polity is not of a 
historical or an economical nature. People equipped with military expertise, if they hold 
political power, might develop a strong concern for the state, in the same way in which 
they might have developed a spirit of cooperation in the military association; 
experience in a military community might raise the awareness of the one's role and 
responsibilities in any kind of association, even the political one, and favour the 
17 See H. Kelsen, 1977, p. 188. Kelsen stresses the contribution provided by the notion of 'property 
qualification' towards a fuller understanding of the nature of polity. Cf. W. Oncken, 1875, p. 272. 
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preservation of the association through mutual cooperation. Furthermore, the j 1 1stice 
underlying a military organization and the kind of friendship which might spring from 
team-work might help them to abide more easily by the established rules, and also to 
operate together with a view to a shared aim. 
Friendship among comrades, better than mere justice as passive obedience to the 
prescriptions given by military leaders, seems to promote concern for one's fellows and 
develop shared values such as loyalty to the association, mutual support and 
responsibility for the safety of the community, i.e. values which are also at the basis of 
Aristotle's ideal polis. Given the smaller size of the military association with respect to 
the political, it seems that the members of the former will have the opportunity to know 
each other and to develop more intimate relationships than the citizens belonging to the 
same polis; furthermore, it seems that they will realise more rapidly the risks for safety 
of the community entailed by inner conflict. But if such people achieve political power, 
they will probably put their experience at service of the political community, by 
insisting on the values of cooperation between the rulers and the ruled, and on the need 
for a convergence of aims with a view to public order and stability. 
Again, it seems that military excellence is connected in some way with 
Aristotle's search for a constitution suited to the majority of the states and provided 
with at least some degree of ethical excellence; courage, i. e. the disposition of character 
which seems to be the most necessary to the members of the military association, is 
stressed in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics as an excellence of character included in 
the idea of universal justice, and it is introduced by Aristotle as an example of justice as 
allotrion agathon, i.e. as a good in relation to other people. As we have already seen 
(cf. chapter 4 of this thesis), at NE V, 1129b19-21 courage is described as the 
excellence whose possession will prevent comrades from abandoning their position in 
the military association; such an account of courage might in a way stress the 
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importance of cooperation needed in any form of collective organization~ the same 
cooperation, I suggest, is needed in a political community between fellow citizens to 
the establishment of justice as an allotrion agathon. 
In this respect, as I think, we might speak of the contribution that military 
excellence might make towards the running of a political community. Experience in a 
military association might develop the same values of political friendship and 
organization suited to a good political community, and the excellence required is one of 
the excellence needed to live a life, both in the private and in the public sphere. At the 
same time, military excellence does not necessarily presuppose the complete ethical 
excellence proper to virtuous statesmen. Given that the group of people in power in 
such a consitution is a plethos, and no complete excellence of character is required of 
them for being accepted in the chief political positions, a polity might be regarded as 
similar to a democratic form of government, as Aristotle on more than one occasion 
acknowledges 18, rather than to a right constitution. 
Military excellence might be proper to people lacking political vision, i.e. people 
who might be incapable of deliberating in political affairs with a view to the common 
interest, although experience in a military association may develop virtuous habits like 
obedience to the rulers and cooperation in political activity. My idea is that, in a good 
polity, the merit according to which the ruling activity is exercised is not the military 
virtue of the plethos, but the virtue of outstanding men who may belong to it, that is, 
men of authentic phronesis capable of directing the class of people possessing arms 
toward goodness and justice in the polis. In the next section I will try to examine the 
different contributions provided by both excellent lawgivers and common people in the 
attainment of a polity which approaches the aristocratic form of government. My view 
is that a good polity can be realised not only on the basis of citizens of good quality, but 
18 See Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1290a17-18; IV, 1293b35; V, 1302a13-15; V, 1307a15-17. 
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also and especially through political measures which can be devised only by virtuous 
lawgivers. Such lawgivers cannot construct a constitution ex novo, but they need to 
operate on existing conditions and improve them. 
As I have said so far, concern for the common interest on the rulers' part is what 
makes a polity right~ moreover, it seems that the common interest is the aspect Aristotle 
wants to emphasize when he insists on military excellence as the excellence proper to 
the rulers of such a constitution. In other words, his thought is that those who possess 
military experience should have developed a sense of friendship and of cooperation 
towards shared goals. In this respect, we have seen, a polity might be seen as a right 
constitution. But Polity is commonly thought of as being a constitution resulting from 
some sort of combination of oligarchy and democracy, i.e. constitutions which per se 
are held to be bad. Both oligarchy and democracy, as we have already seen, are 
constitutions which do not aim at the common interest. In Pol. III 1279b4-6 they are 
regarded, together with tyranny, as constitutions resulting from deviations of the right 
forms of government, i.e. aristocracy, polity and kingship~ as Aristotle explains, 
tyranny is a monarchy which pursues the exclusive interest of the single ruler, whereas 
oligarchy aims at the interest of the rich and democracy at that of the poor19. 
As he points out at Pol. IV, 1290a30-b3, it is not the number of people in power 
which shapes the kind of constitution; a democracy will be a constitution in which the 
free men are sovereign rather than some unspecified few individuals, whereas an 
oligarchy will be the a constitution ruled by the rich. We may also say that the values 
pursued by them will affect the values in force in the polis they rule. In any kind of 
extreme democracy, the poor are in possession of deliberative power, and they will try 
to pursue their own interest, presumably at the expense of the rich. In the same way, in 
oligarchies the rich will try to attain their private interests and augment their wealth, 
19 See Aristotle, Pol. III, 1279b6-10 
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maybe by increasing the wealth of the state they govern, but maybe at the expenses of 
the poorest classes. 
It is evident that such constitutions are liable to recriminations by opposing 
factions, and their stability is seriously compromised. When it comes to the polity, 
which is said to be a constitution made up of both oligarchic and democratic elements, 
we might think of it as a deeply corrupt constitution20 . But, on the face of it, Aristotle 
describes the polity as a kind of constitution whose democratic and oligarchic features 
are not negative per se, or leading to the interest of a restricted part of the community; 
and surely this is what we might expect, if the interests of the few and the many are 
balanced21 . 
That Aristotle engages in the discussion of the polity only after having described 
democracy and oligarchy suggests that such a constitution cannot be understood 
without knowing what democracy and oligarchy are22; again, that before describing 
these constitutions he dwells on the importance of socio-economical factors for the 
establishment of a constitution, like the existence of rich and poor classes23, might 
indicate that polity can be understood fully by reference to the way in which these 
classes are combined in the constitution. 
At Pol. IV, 1294a22-3, Aristotle tells us that the polity is a kind of constitution 
which attempts to combine the rich and the poor, presumably with a view to the 
common interest, to be achieved through the realisation of a balance capable of 
preventing one class to predominate at the expenses of the other. My view is that such a 
20 See H. Keisen, 1977, p. 189. Kelsen's view is that, generally, in such a mixed constitution, the 
democratic character is predominant. 
21 On the idea of polity as the succesful outcome of a mixture between two deviant constitutions see C.J. 
Rowe, 2000, pp. 378-84. 
22 See Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1293b32-4. 
23 See Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1289b27-40. 
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balance is not realised by the many with their military excellence, but, rather, by a wise 
ruler who aims at producing a good constitution out of existing political conditions. 
Given that people equipped with military excellence do not necessarily possess 
complete ethical excellence, it seems that their virtue will not be the same as that of 
aristocratic rulers. 
But at Pol. IV, 1294a24-5 polity is described in the light of the aristocratic 
constitution, which blends three different factors: freedom, wealth and virtue. It is true, 
as Aristotle explains, that some kinds of polity are embellished with the higher title of 
'aristocracies', only insofar as they incline more towards oligarchy, whereas in 'real' 
aristocracies the distribution of political offices is made according to arete24 and not 
exclusively according to wealth, which is the criterion according to which oligarchies 
are instituted; however, Aristotle's warning not to confuse polity with aristocracy does 
not prevent him from saying that 
q,U VEPOV», 
1.e. 
«aristocracies and 'polities' are not far removed from one anothen)25. 
24 See Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1294a9-10. 
25 See Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1294a28-9. See R. Weil, 1977, p. 206. Weil points out that in Book III of the 
Politics, from 1286b8 onwards, polity appears as a constitution akin to aristocracy. See also C.J. Rowe, 
2000, p. 384. 
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Polity is not far from aristocracy when it manages to balance the weight of the rich and 
of the poor/free~ the ideal balance is expressed at Pol. IV, 1294b14-16, where Aristotle 
says that 
l.e. 
«a good criterion of a proper mixture of democracy and oligarchy that a mixed 
constitution should be able to be described indifferently as either». 
The mixture of democracy and oligarchy would not seem to stem from the initiative of 
one of the two groups, who in democracies and oligarchies show themselves as prone to 
pursue their exclusive class-interest; rather, such a 'compromise' seems to be the 
outcome of a lawgiver or more lawgivers super partes, whose aim is to establish the 
common interest in the community and not to favour a restricted group of people at the 
expense of the others, which would be a source of instability26. In other words, this 
would be the task of a person possessing political, not military, wisdom. 
As we have already seen, in Book IV, where the tasks proper to the man of 
political science are introduced, Aristotle explains that such a man will possess 
26 For a different suggestion see S.R.L. Clark, 1975, pp. 104-5. At p. 105 Clark says that polity can arise 
«only where there is a middle class large enough to prevent the domination of the state by great 
individuals or by mob rule (Pol. IV, 1296a23f.). This does not mean that the best state is one ruled 
exclusively by the middle classes: rather that where the middle class, generally the most inclined to obey 
the logos (Pol. IV, 1295b5f.), is strong enough it can compel rich and poor alike to live in harmony, can 
adopt institutions which combine elements from the self-interest of both opposing groups (Pol. IV, 
1294a35f., 1297a38f.)>>. 
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knowledge not only about the best constitution in absolute terms, but also abo-..!t the 
constitution most suited to each state and to the majority of the states27. As he will 
come across existing political conditions, his task will be not so much to frame a 
constitution from the beginning as to reform an existing one28 . When Aristotle speaks 
of the possessors of political science, he might be referring both to persons who are 
merely interested in reflecting on political issues and to lawgivers who are or would 
like to be actively involved in political life; I think that the latter kind of people are the 
ones which he is addressing in particular. 
I propose that the description of polity is particularly useful to showing how a 
good lawgiver should operate in order to produce a good constitution out of existing 
political conditions. In that case, the polity might be the constitution resulting from an 
activity of transformation of oligarchies or democracies undertaken by a hypothetical 
wise lawgiver. His excellence might be the one which makes a polity similar to an 
aristocracy. Should the polity be considered exclusively in terms of rule by the many, 
no similarity would be found between aristocracy and polity. It seems that some kind of 
political phronesis is involved in the ruling of a constitution, i. e. a kind of phronesis not 
possessed by the multitude. 
From Pol. IV, 1294a35 on, Aristotle proceeds to illustrate possible ways of 
establishing a mixture between democracy and oligarchy in view of the creation of a 
polity. Oligarchies are modified through the introduction of democratic features, 
democracies by means of some measures of an oligarchical nature. As Aristotle says, 
there are three different principles on which men may determine a well-balanced 
mixture of oligarchy and democracy. The first is to adopt both democratic and 
oligarchical rules. For instance, with regard to the rules for sitting in the law courts, in 
27 See Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1288b22-37. 
28 See Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1289a3-7. 
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oligarchies fines are instituted for the rich if they do not sit in the courts, but the poor 
do not receive any pay for taking part in the administration of justice; by contrast, in 
democracies the poor are paid for sitting, and the rich are not fined if they do not sit. 
One might combine both of these rules by using a common or middle term between 
either, and in this respect such a method would be characteristic of a 'polity,29. 
A second possible way of combining the prescriptions of both constitutions is to 
take a mean between the two different rules. Democracies, for instance, require no 
property qualification at all or a small one for attendance at the assembly; by constrast, 
oligarchies require a high qualification. In that case, a good lawgiver might find a mean 
between the two, and grant membership of the assembly on the basis of a middle 
property-qualification3o . As we will see later, this measure will favour the middle class, 
i. e. a significant class in the establishment of a stable polity. 
The third way of combination is to combine elements from both constitutions, 
and to take some features from oligarchical rule and others from democratic. With 
regard to the third way of mixture, Aristotle stresses that it is appropriate to a polity as 
well as to an aristocracy. At Pol. IV, 1294b7-12 he says: 
«In the appointment of magistrates, for example, the use of the lot is regarded as 
democratic, and the use of the vote as oligarchical. Again, it is considered to be 
democratic that a property qualification should not be required, and oligarchical that it 
should be. Here, accordingly, the mode appropriate to an aristocracy or a 'polity' is to 
take one element from one form of constitution and another from the other-tha~ is to 
say, to take from oligarchy the ruler that magistrates should be appointed by vote, and 
from democracy the rule that no property qualification should be required». 
29 See Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1294a35-bl. 
30 See Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1294b2-6. 
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If so, a good polity can be made similar to an aristocracy thanks to a wise set of 
lneasures established by the lawgivers with a view to a long-lasting stability in the 
polis. This might find a confirmation in Book V of the Politics, in which Aristotle 
debates the causes of change of constitutions and some possible ways in which these 
can be preserved~ in this context, polities and aristocracies are associated as kinds of 
constitutions which can be easily corrupted after a deviation from the concept of justice 
established by them31 . Deviations from such correct constitutions take place when 
democracy and oligarchy are not well-blended, i. e. when oligarchies and democracies 
are not mixed with ethical arete, as Aristotle says at Pol. V, 1307a7-12: 
«The actual downfall of aristocracies, and also of 'polities', is chiefly due to some 
deviation from justice in the constitution itself. In either case the origin of the downfall 
is a failure to combine different elements properly. In 'polities' the elements are 
democracy and oligarchy: in aristocracies they are both of these and the further elp,ment 
of merit; but even in the latter the real difficulty is that of combining the first two 
elements, which are the only elements that most of the so-called aristocracies (as well 
as 'polities') actually attempt to combine». 
But, in Aristotle's view, polity seems in some respect to be even better than 
aristocracy. When it comes to the difference between aristocracies and polities, we 
might expect that it is just the absence of ethical arete in the mixture of democratic and 
oligarchical elements that makes a polity different from an aristocracy; as we have seen 
in the previous section, rule according to ethical arete seems to be an exclusive 
prerogative of constitutions like monarchy and aristocracy. However, this does not 
seem to reflect Aristotle's thought; the real difference, as he says at Pol. V, 1307a12-
31 See Aristotle, Pol. V, 1307a7-8. 
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20, is that the constitutions inclining more towards oligarchy, i. e. those which are 
usually called 'aristocracies', are less stable than those in which the most numerous 
group is stronger, for instance in polities inclining towards democracy. 
This might suggest that in some cases, the polity can be better than an 
aristocracy with specific regard to its stability. In particular, at Pol. V, 1307a17-27 he 
says that the greater number is usually the stronger, and men are more satisfied when 
they possess an equal amount, whereas the owners of wealth, in case they are given 
political power, seek to behave insolently and to gain money. In particular, among the 
measures that a lawgiver should adopt in order to preserve a constitution, an important 
one is not to raise any citizen too much beyond due proportion, but rather to try to 
assign small honours of long tenure, since not every men can bear a good fortune 
without getting corrupted by it32 . 
All these suggestions show that a degree of proportional equality is to be 
established among the citizens in order to prevent one part from dominating the other 
and undermining the common advantage. The political measures cited above seem to 
relate to an activity of correction or prevention of extreme political conditions, which 
might be proper both to aristocracies and polities; nevertheless, at Pol. IV, 1293b 1-7 
Aristotle is clear in saying that the real aristocracy is the constitution which has been 
treated in Book III: 
«The only constitution which can with strict justice be called an aristocracy is one 
where the members are not merely 'good' in relation to some standard or other, but are 
absolutely 'the best' in point of moral quality33. Only in such a constitution can the 
32 See Aristotle, Pol. V, 1308bll-5. 
33 a1tA-roc; KU't 6.PE'tllv. 
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good man and the good citizen be absolutely identified; in all others goodness is only 
goodness relatively to the particular constitution and its particular standard». 
On the other side, as he admits at Pol. IV, 1293b7-12, 
«there are some further forms of constitution, which differ enough both from 
oligarchies and from the so-called 'polity' to be also called aristocracies [even though 
they do not attain the true standard of aristocracy.] This is the case when elections to 
office are based not only on wealth but also on moral desert34 . Constitutions of this type 
differ from both of the forms just mentioned [i.e. oligarchy and 'polity']; and they thus 
come to be called aristocracies». 
As we can see, Aristotle distinguishes this kind of constitution from polity (as 
well as from oligarchy), apparently because ethical arete is an important element in the 
process of electing magistrates and the ~ighest offices; but it seems to me that such a 
kind of constitution is very close to polity, and, maybe, be even regarded as a polity of 
higher, aristocratic kind. As a polity, ethical excellence does not seem to be infu::ed in 
the citizens, but, just as in a polity where it is not possible to distinguish the oligarchical 
from the democratic element, the weight of different political classes is balanced 
through the activity of expert lawgivers. 
As Aristotle goes on at Pol. IV, 1293b12-14, 
«even in states which do not make the encouragement of goodness a matter of public 
policy, there may still be found individuals who are of good repute and esteemed to be 
of high quality». 
34 01tOU ye J.1 t, J.16vov 1tAOU'ttVOTlV aAAa Kat apt<J'ttvOTlV atpouv'tat 'ta~ 6.pxa~. 
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He might be referring to individuals ~apable of leading the constitution towards a good 
mixture of different classes and their power without caring particularly for the ethical 
education of the citizens, in a polity as well as in this particular kind of 'aristocracy' . 
Examples of the latter constitution are offered by Aristotle at Pol. IV, 1293b15ff.: the 
Cart4aginian constitution, for example, pays regard to all the three factors involved in 
an aristocracy, i.e. wealth, goodness and numbers, whereas the Spartan pays regard 
only to goodness and numbers, and it is based on a mixture of the democratic and the 
aristocratic principle35 . These two kinds of constitution, as Aristotle says, can be taken 
as forms of aristocracy in addition to the 'real' aristocracy, i.e. the best one. 
When Aristotle engages in his attempt to find out the best kind of constitution 
suitable to the majority of states, the form of government he hopes to find is a form of 
polity approaching an aristocracy rather than a democracy. That is what-in my view-is 
suggested at Pol. IV, 1289b15-17: 
«we must [also] examIne whether, besides this general type, there is any other 
constitution to be found, of a more aristocratic and well-constructed character but 
suitable, none the less, for adoption in most states». 
Later on, at Pol. IV, 1295a31-5, after putting forward his willingness to investigate the 
most suitable constitution for the majority of states, he will claim: 
«The 'aristocracies', so called, of which we have just been treating, [will not serve us 
for this purpose: they] either lie, at one extreme, beyond the reach of most states, or 
they approach, at the other, so closely to the constitution called 'polity' that they need 
not be considered separately and must be treated as identical with it». 
35 See Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1293b17-9. 
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Once we have ascertained that polity, at its best level, can be taken as a form of 
aristocracy, it seems to me that, when Aristotle describes polity as the ruling of people 
equipped with military excellence, it is not this kind of arete which makes it a 
constitution of aristocratic kind, but the arete of the wise lawgiver which manages both 
to balance the oligarchical and the democratic elements of the polis and to correct a 
deviant constitution if one class overpowers the others. 
I believe that military excellence is a kind of merit which enables the members of 
the middle class to have access to political offices, but it is not sufficient to realise such 
a mixture. Rather, such people will take part in the ruling activity under the guide of a 
wise lawgiver, or, alternatively, by obeying the principles of the constitution 
established by him. The polity has been analysed so far as concerns the outcome of the 
activity of an hypothetical wise lawgiver, but a problem is still left unsolved: what is 
the power of the plethos in the ruling of the polity? In the next section of this chapter I 
am going to analyse the contribution provided by the mass to polity and its supposed 
deliberative power. 
10.3: The Power of the Middle Class: its Contribution to Political 
Friendship 
In Book IV of the Politics, Aristotle engages in a description of the constitution which 
might be regarded as the best relative to existing circumstances for the majority of 
states, i.e. a constitution in which persons do not possess outstanding virtue in the way 
that, for instance the rulers of an aristocracy or of a monarchy d036. He does not give a 
36 See Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1295a25-31: «We have now to consider what is the best constitution and the 
best way of life for the majority of states and men. In doing so we shall not employ, [for the purpose of 
measuring 'the best'] , a standard of excellence above the reach of ordinary men, or a standard of 
education requiring exceptional endowments and equipment, or the standard of a constitution which 
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specific name to this sort of constitution, but, rather, he confines himself to illustrating 
some conditions which might be easily realisable by most states. However, he seems to 
have a form of polity in mind when, in this context, he questions himself over the 
constitution most suited to the majority of states and of men, not in relation to a 
superior excellence. 
Aristotle believes that the government of the middle class may constitute the best 
form of the state, in so far as it lies in an intermediate condition between the few rich 
and the mass of the poor37, and its members are not inclined to greed and riots. People 
belonging to the middle class, just in virtue of their moderate possessions, will be more 
inclined to obey to reason, unlike those who possess an excessive fortune and will 
therefore be less prone to obey the dictates of reason38 . As Aristotle makes explicit at 
Pol. IV, 1295b4-6, moderation and the mean are always the best option to go for, even 
in the possession of the good things of fortune like wealth. 
Members of the middle class are less inclined to indulge in ambition, and also 
more willing to obey than those who enjoy too many advantages, like strength and 
wealth39; on the other hand, those who suffer from the opposite extreme of lack of any 
advantage do not advocate any entitlement to power as if they were just slaves 40. But 
the main reason why the government of the middle class is the most appropriate (0 the 
majority of states is that it better promotes the spirit of friendship needed for the 
attains an ideal height. We shall only be concerned with the sort of life which most men are able to share 
and the sort of constitution which it is possible for most states to enjoy». 
37 See W.T. Bluhm, 1962, pp. 747-8. Bluhm maintains that Aristotle identifies «in the actual constitution 
called "Polity" the chief structural principles of the ideal order» (p. 744). 
38 See R. Kraut, 2002, p. 439. However, at pp. 441 Kraut points out that, although Aristotle is «far more 
interested in contrasting the decency of the middle class with the deficiencies of the masses and 
traditional elites», the difference between a man of middling resources and a fully realized human being 
should not be underestimated. 
39 See Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1295b12-6. 
40 See Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1295b18-21. 
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stability of a political community. At Pol. IV, 1295b23-7, in relation to a state in which 
the ruled, because of their ignorance as to how to rule, stand to the rulers just as slaves 
to masters, Aristotle explains: 
«Nothing could be farther removed from the spirit of friendship or the temper of a 
political community. Community depends on friendship; and when there is enmity 
instead of friendship, men will not even share the same path41 . A state aims at being, as 
far as it can be, a society composed of equals and peers [who, as such, can be friends 
and associates]; and the middle class, more than any other, has this sort of 
composition» . 
The middle classes, besides contributing with their friendship to the security of 
the community, enjoy the greatest security themselves; unlike the poor, they do not 
covet the goods of others, nor do other people covet their possession, since they do not 
possess huge fortunes. This will prevent them both from plotting against other classes 
and from plotting against themselves42 . In this context, Aristotle is stressing the positive 
effects of political friendship on the stability of a polis with a predominance of the 
middle classes; such a kind of friendship will be likely to prevent dangerous conflicts 
which might damage the common interest of the polis. 
When he refers to the issue of political friendship in the middle class, he does not 
make any reference to the correspondence between justice and friendship which he tries 
41 t, yap KOtVO.lVto, 4>tAtK6v, obOE yap bOo\) j30UAOV'to,t KOtVroV£'iv 'tole; EXepo'ie;. 
42 See Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1295b29-33. For a comment of this passage, see G. Huxley, 1985, pp. 140-l. 
Huxley points out that polity, although being described here as the best constitution in virtue of its 
characteristic mesotes, does not attain to the good life for the citizens~ rather, its main aim seems to be 
avoidance of stasis. If so, how can polity be taken as the best constitution? Huxley's solution to this 
problem is that «Aristotle's best state is not a fanciful construction but a practical proposal making use of 
his empirical knowledge of existing states and linked with his ethical thought» 
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to establish in Books VIn-IX of the Nicomachean Ethics-but he might have done. In 
these Books, he claims that friendship is proportional to the degree of justice subsisting 
between friends43~ if so, given the importance he attaches to the political friendship 
subsisting in a community ruled by the middle class, we could reach the conclusion that 
a high level of justice might be found in such a constitution. However, if we consider 
that the best friendship possible will be friendship according to ethical excellence, we 
might conclude that the friendship subsisting in a constitution with a predominance of 
the middle classes, as in a well-balanced polity, is not the best kind of friendship 
attainable in absolute terms. 
Certainly, it will never be the same, perfect, friendship as that subsisting between 
virtuous citizens in an ideal community. But what Aristotle is doing here is to 
investigate the best constitution for the majority of existing states, i.e. for imperfect 
political communities, so that it might be reasonable to assume that friendship in a 
polity is the best kind of friendship attainable in non-ideal communities. However, as 
far as political friendship is concerned, a problem is left unsolved: given that in a polity 
not all the citizens will be completely virtuous people and ethical excellence is not one 
of the ideals pursued by the community, we might think that this kind of political 
friendship, which is not based on complete excellence of character, will turn out to be 
less strong than in aristocracies or monarchies, whose rulers employ their ethical 
excellence and phronesis at the service of the common interest. In other words, in 
aristocracies and monarchies, whose citizens are supposedly educated to ethical 
excellence, friendship should be stronger than in a polity just insofar as it would be a 
friendship based on ethical arete. 
My solution to this problem is that, in the Politics, political friendship needs to be 
investigated in relation to the existence of different classes, especially the rich and the 
43 See Aristotle, NE VIII, 1159b26-31~ cf. NE VIII, 1159b25-6 and NE VIII, 1161b6-8. 
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poor. In existing political conditions, a wide middle class might promote more stability 
and friendship than a polis in which the rulers govern according to virtue and the 
subjects are not virtuous. Furthermore, as Aristotle suggests at Pol. V, 1307a12-20 (a 
passage at which I have made some allusions at pp. 288-9 of this chapter), a polity 
might be more stable than a constitution which inclines more towards oligarchy, just in 
virtue of the greater number of people who take part in political activity. Given that at 
Pol. V, 1306a23ff. Aristotle describes aristocracies as extremely close to oligarchies, it 
seems plausible to hypothesize that a polity might be characterised by a higher stability 
than some kinds of aristocracies; as he explains, both in aristocracies and in oligarchies 
factions may arise because only a few men have a share in the political honours, so that 
some of the many, who might think of themselves as equal to the few, might start 
revolutions. In this respect, the friendship existing in some aristocracies will not be 
stable. 
The type of justice to which political friendship might be proportional in a polity 
is not necessarily a justice of a universal kind, i.e. that kind of conformity to a law that 
prescribes actions according the whole of ethical excellence; rather, it might be 
particular justice, described by Aristotle in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics, that is, 
justice as equal-mindedness and avoidance of pleoneXia. Friendship as absence of 
pleonexia might by confirmed by the fact that the members of the middle class will not 
aspire to equal the fortune of the rich, nor will the other classes covet their substance as 
the poor covet that of the rich44 . Moreover, rich and poor will never join together to 
fight against the middle class: neither class will ever accept to form alliances with the 
other, but they will keep distrusting each other45 . As Aristotle makes it clear, pleonexia 
is a vice which is likely to be developed among those who cultivate their wealth as a 
44 See Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1295b29-32. 
45 See Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1297a2-5. 
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supreme value to pursue, whereas those who have moderate possessions might develop 
themselves a spirit of temperance, indispensable for the establishment of justice in 
interpersonal relationships, both in the private and in the political sphere. 
But another form of pleonexia might concern also honours; some people might 
think themselves equal to the rulers in virtue of their being free-born people and aim at 
power, when they actually lack the expertise needed to perform their role well under a 
correct constitution. Those who regard themselves as unequal in some respect might 
extend their feeling of inequality to the sphere of political honours, like wealthy people 
in an aristocracy for example; in this respect, such people lacking ethical excellence 
might be pleonekteis, trigger political changes towards the worse and so compromise 
the political friendship existing in their community46. Without a substantial middle 
class, even in an aristocratic constitution there might be a class of poor citizens willing 
to improve their condition. In such a constitution, political friendship may be at risk. In 
this respect, as I think, political friendship based on equal-mindedness, although not 
relying on complete excellence of character on the citizens' part, might secure a long-
lasting stability. 
As we have seen, Aristotle believes that a moderate possession of good fortune is 
the basis for the acquisition of moderation. We might even take moderate amounts as a 
starting point for the acquisition of other virtuous habits; for instance, wise lawgivers 
like Solon, Lycurgus and Charondas belonged to the middle class47, and it also seems 
appropriate to identify them with the good lawgivers introduced by Aristotle at NE 
VIII, 1155a23-4, where he says that lawgivers should try to promote this sort of 
46 See Aristotle, Pol. III, 1280a 9-14, where he explains that all men refer to some kind of justice, but in 
many cases they do not express the principle of absolute justice. Cf. also Pol. III, 1282bI4-23, where he 
points out that all agree that justice is some sort of equality, but there is a general confusion as to the 
respects in which one is equal or not. 
47 See Aristotle, Pol. IV, 1296a18-22. 
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political friendship, even more than justice (i.e., as I understand it, a justice conceived 
as mere obedience to laws~ cf. chapters V and VI of this thesis). The importance of the 
lawgiver in the ruling of a political community is stressed at Pol. IV 1296b34ff., where 
Aristotle insists on the idea that the lawgiver should always pay regard to the middle 
class. That the good lawgiver needs such a class for the avoidance of inner conflicts in 
the community is stressed also in in Book VI, where, with reference to the different 
kinds of democracy, he says that the truly democratic statesman needs to make sure that 
the mass is not too poor~ for this reason, he claims, democracy is corrupt48 . 
That is also the reason why measures should be adopted to ensure a lasting 
prosperity; Aristotle suggests that the proper policy would be to collect any surplus 
revenue into a fund, and then to distribute this fund in block grants to the poor, so as to 
enable them to purchase a plot of land or, alternatively, to provide them with the 
necessary conditions to engage in commerce or agriculture 49. Again, involvement of the 
needy in public activity might be useful to develop a spirit of friendship, e.g. by 
providing the poor with payment for their attendance at the obligatory meetings of the 
assembly50. Examples of such measures can be found at Chartage and Tarentl.du; in 
Tarentum, for instance, the rulers try to win the goodwill of the masses by including 
them in the magistracies; one class with appointments made by election, and the other 
with appointments made by lot, so that 
«the latter will give the people a share in office, while the former will help to ensure a 
better administration» 51. 
48 See Aristotle, Pol. VI, 1320a32-5. 
49 See Aristotle, Pol. VI, 1320a35-bl. 
50 See Aristotle, Pol. VI, 1320b2-4. 
51 Aristotle, Pol. VI, 1320b13-14 
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Similar measures might be taken in oligarchies, where a similar correction is needed; 
property qualifications must be balanced and persons owning the qualifying property 
must be allowed to take a share in government; still, even in that case, as Aristotle says 
at Pol. VI, 1320b24-30, the people to share in the government must constantly be 
brought in from the better class of the common people52 . 
Aristotle is not suggesting that any kind of people should be involved in political 
activity, and this might be another element of resemblance to an aristocracy, although 
such people will not be completely virtuous like aristocratic rulers. Aristotle's 
insistence on a demos of good quality to take part in magistracies and various political 
offices seems to be implicit in his idea that the best form of democracy is of a rural 
kind, since people without political experience, although in theory they have the 
possibility of taking part in government, rather devote themselves to agriculture or 
activities of the same kind53 . In that case, we can see in a new light Aristotle's 
suggestion that the poor should be provided with the money necessary to purchase a 
parcel of land; it might be a way not only of enhancing their conditions and avoiding 
extreme poverty, which is a cause of rebellion, but it might also be a way of excluding 
them from the political offices that require expertise and responsibility. 
Given all this, even if Aristotle is keen on stressing the need for the inclusion of 
the mass in public offices in view of the stability of the polis, he still maintains that it is 
the most suitable people who should participate actively in political life. As he suggests 
at Pol. VI, 1319b12-17, such inclusion 
«should stop at the point at which the masses just exceed the combined strength of the 
notables and the middle class. It should never go beyond this point. Any greater 
52 EK 'to\) ileA -twvoC; 8i1Jlou. 
53 See Aristotle, Pol. VI, 1318b 11-27. 
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proportion will at once disturb the balance of the constitution; and it will also incite the 
notables to chafe still more against democracy». 
This belief seems to be consistent with the idea expressed in Book IV, 1297a5-7, 
according to which 
. «A neutral arbitrator54 always gives the best ground for confidence; and 'the man in the 
middle' is such an arbitrator. The better, and the more equitable, the mixture in a 
'polity', the more durable will it be». 
The contribution provided by the middle class to the well-being of the polis, in my 
opinion, should not overshadow the role played by a just lawgiver, who is in charge of 
balancing the weights of various social classes in the life of the community. In the 
construction of a polity, the role of a wise lawgiver seems to be indispensable, both for 
the stability of the polis, and, as I am going to show in the remainder this chapter, for 
the making of collective decisions in which the many take part. 
In Book III of the Politics55 Aristotle engages in a discussion on the possible 
reasons why the rule by the plethos might be of a good quality. Polity is not explicitly 
mentioned in the discussion, but it seems reasonable to suppose that the kind of 
political participation he describes in this context is that of the middle class or very 
close to it56 . Apparently, the ideas he displays in this section might be identified with 
the belief held by the supporters of democracy that any mass whatever is entitled to 
54 b otat'tT'J'ti]c;. 
55 See Aristotle, Pol. III, 1281a39-1282a41. 
56 See W.T. Bluhm, 1962, pp. 746-7. Bluhm believes that «Aristotle shows himself particularly well-
disposed towards the "Many", though not on the basis of their own claim (numbers and free birth) but on 
the ground of a claim which he puts forward for them». 
301 
participate in political offices, as though any citizen possessed some kind of political 
competence. 
On the face of it, I think that Aristotle might appropriate some common beliefs 
about the mass and its quality, and make them consonant to his own thought. As I 
believe, some points in his argument seem to show his reluctance to accept an 
indiscriminate power of the mass, as some supporters of democracy might. He starts his 
argument by claiming the defensibility of the idea that the people at large should be 
sovereign rather than the few best; at Pol. III, 1281a42-b3 he explains that 
«Each of them [ the Many] by himself may not be of a good quality; but when they all 
come together it is possible that they may surpass-collectively and as a body, although 
not individually-the quality of the few best. Feasts to which many contribute may excel 
those provided at one man's expense57». 
Here, he takes the power of the many as a 'feast to which many contribute'; at Pol. III, 
1281 b4-7 he justifies his claim by saying that 
«when there are many [who contribute to the process of deliberation], each can bring 
his share of goodness and moral prudence; and when all meet together the people may 
thus become something in the nature of a single person, who-as he has many feet, many 
hands, and many senses-may also have many qualities of character and intelligence». 
Is Aristotle speaking in favour of a collective phronesis, i. e. a kind of wisdom made of 
individual contributions provided by non-wise people? It seems plausible that the many 
as a collectivity might be a political force of good quality and, maybe, that individual 
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defects in deliberative and judicial power might be corrected by interaction with other 
fellow-citizens, for instance in collective discussions; still, the negative conception 
Aristotle has of democracies might lead us to believe that this cannot be his real belief , 
unless some further specification is made. 
Given what I have said in the previous sections of this chapter, it seems that a 
mass can be in power and contribute to the well-being of the political community only 
if a wise lawgiver guides its members; in other words, the mass would give rise to a 
good form of government only if it abides by the prescriptions of a good lawgiver who 
acts in view of the happiness of the polis. It is true that, in some respect, the many are 
better judges than the few; for instance, 
«some appreciate one part, some another, and all together appreciate all» 58, 
which might suggest that a single or just a few lawgivers may express limited 
judgements on political issues and need some kind of confrontation with other members 
of the polis. Given that people might have different skills and sphere of competence, 
advice of different kinds might be given by single members of a collectivity, and 
contribute in this way to a good running of the community; in some cases, we might 
suppose, they might be as a whole even better than a single good man. 
In my opinion, this might be a belief held by common people, and it seems quite 
strange to suppose that it reflects Aristotle's real thought, especially because, at Pol. III, 
1281b16-21, he points out that it is doubtful if all the masses can correspond to such a 
description. If so, what kind of body of citizens should properly exercise sovereignty? 
And again what are the matters over which the individual that compose a mass should 
, , 
be sovereign? Aristotle's answer seems to be that it should not be a body of citizens 
58 Aristotle, Pol. III, 1281b9-10. 
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without any goodness, but, even in this case, it would be dangerous for men who do not 
have competence in political affairs to share in the highest offices, which may lead 
them into error and wrongdoing; on the other hand, to exclude such people from 
political power would cause dissent within the community, which might provoke its 
ruin, as Aristotle suggests at Pol. III, 1281 b25-30. 
Aristotle's conclusions underline, on the one hand, the need for competent people 
to be in charge of the highest offices, and, on the other, the necessity to allow the many 
to have some share in the government to avoid rebellions, with a view to the 
preservation of the political order. What Aristotle is saying here seems to be in tune 
with my idea that, in Aristotle's view, a good lawgiver is indispensable for the running 
of a community, although some contribution by the many is needed. Aristotle does not 
seem to believe in the power of collective decision; rather, to let such people share in 
the deliberative and judicial functions is 'the alternative left,59, as he explains at Pol. 
III, 1281 b31. This is why legislators like Solon gave the people only the functions of 
electing the magistrates to office and of demanding an account at the end of their tenure 
of office, but did not entitle them to holding office themselves in their individual 
. 60 
capaCIty . 
That Aristotle mentions Solon, well-known for being a WIse man, may be 
indicative of his idea that there should be a lawgiver who involves the citizens in 
participation in political affairs61 ; however, what is most important in Aristotle's 
argument is that such people, although having these powers, do not have the power to 
hold office themselves as individuals, i.e. without being magistrates themselves. Which 
means that, even though citizens are accorded some functions in the community, still 
59 This is Barker's translation of the Greek AEt1tE'tcx.t. 
60 See Aristotle, Pol. III, 1281b32-34. 
61 On the Aristotelian portrait of Solon see R. Weil, 1977, pp. 204-6~ cf. M. Chambers, 1961, pp. 24-30. 
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they do not hold the highest responsibilities, and they are not allowed to deliberate on 
issues like the way of establishing a constitution, presumably because they do not 
possess phronesis and do not seem to be able to make important political decisions. 
I think that what Aristotle is trying to argue is that the many should have power 
In a community mainly for the sake of its stability and, as the remainder of the 
Aristotelian argument seems to suggest, their decisions as a collectivity may be good 
only under the supervision of a wise lawgiver like Solon. Only in this case, it seems, 
will a collectivity of non-virtuous men be oriented towards making the right decisions. 
At Pol. III, 1281b34-8 he introduces an analogy in order to show that a cooperation 
between the people and the wise lawgiver might be more effective than the work of the 
lawgiver, taken in itself, for the well-being of the community: 
«When they all meet together, the people display a good enough gift of perception, and 
combined with the better class they are of service to the state Gust as impure food, 
when it is mixed with pure, makes the whole concoction more nutritious than a small 
amount of the pure would be); but each of them is imperfect in the judgements he forms 
by himself». 
Provided that the analogy established by Aristotle between the single individuals 
of a mass and food betrays his real thought, we might draw two suggestions from it. 
The first is that pure food does not lose its pure nature by mixing with the impure, 
which may suggest that the truly wise man will not get corrupted by his working with 
less-virtuous citizens. The second is that the impure food, once mixed with the pure, 
contributes to making the whole more nourishing rather than corrupting it. I suggest 
that Aristotle may hold this analogy to be true, on the condition that the pure element in 
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a mixture is the main agent from a qualitative point of view, and also on condition that 
the impure is not 'too impure', as a poisoning substance, for instance, might be. 
In that case, according to the analogy, a mass consisting of a few virtuous people 
mixed with non-virtuous ones would turn out to be good thanks to the leading rule of 
one or more good rulers, provided that the quality of the many is not too bad. This 
seems to be confirmed by the idea expressed at line 36, that the many, combined with 
the better class, are at service of the state. If so, the combination with the better class 
might be the aspect which makes Aristotle say that the government of the plethos is 
admissible in some respect. Only the guide of a wise or more wise lawgivers will make 
it good and orient it towards a constitution of good quality. The main reason why he 
believes the masses are important, then, seems to be that they are pivotal for the 
stability of the constitution in which they live. Aristotle seems to suggest that, even 
though in some constitutions the many have deliberative power over the most important 
issues, their decisions should not be made without the guidance of a good lawgiver, or 
without the indications provided by the laws established by him. 
10.4: Conclusions 
To sum up what has been said in this chapter, I have tried to reconstruct the Aristotelian 
idea of polity by examining the contributions provided by both the plethos and an 
hypothetical lawgiver engaged in the actualisation of such a constitution. I have chosen 
to assume as a starting point for my analysis the work of a wise lawgiver who attempts 
to exercise his phronesis in imperfect existing communities, like oligarchies, 
democracies or constitutions inclining towards one of them; polity might be seen as the 
result of the lawgiver's efforts to correct a deviant constitution, by trying to prese:-ve at 
the same time some of its values with a view to the common interest. The contribution 
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given by the plethos to the polity has not been analysed per se, but, rather, as a device 
employed by the lawgiver in order to guarantee a long-lasting stability and political 
friendship in the community. 
I think that the interpretation of the polity as 'government of the plethos' or 
'government of the middle class', or 'government of the military class' does not clarify 
what this form of government actually is, unless the role of the lawgiver and his 
wisdom are stressed with reference to its realisation. My view is that polity is the kind 
of constitution which Aristotle has in mind when he thinks of the best constitution for 
the majority of states, i.e. a constitution in which the middle classes manage to 
counterbalance the opposite political forces exerted by the wealthy and the poor. In 
such a constitution, as I believe, we may find the phronesis of a wise man in action, 
which displays itself in the attempt to avoid inherent conflicts between the rich and the 
poor. The kind of Aristotelian polity I have tried to outline is close not so much to 
democracy as to aristocracy. 
I have tried to stress the passages in which Aristotle explicitly admits the tight 
resemblance between the two. Polity should not be interpreted exclusively as a correct 
form of democracy, because the oligarchical aspect too is included in the activity of 
correction, and especially because some kind of excellence is involved in the process of 
correction. In my view, military excellence does not seem to be the excellence 
employed in the ruling of a polity; rather, I think it might be the excellence that allows 
the middle class to attain political relevance in the polis and to claim some share of 
honour. The real excellence which makes a polity a good constitution seems to be the 
excellence of the lawgiver, whose aim is to promote friendship within the community. 
The kind of friendship proper to a polity seems to be different from friendship 
according to ethical excellence, since its members are not trained to that kind of arete; 
nevertheless, the power of the middle class as a balancing factor might make a political 
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friendship of this kind more stable than friendship in constitutions whose rulers govern 
with a view to the ethical excellence of the ruled. 
Finally, as for the power of collective decisions, I believe Aristotle admits the 
role of the mass in deliberative and judicial power only as long as such a role is 
supervised by wise lawgivers; only if decisions are well-directed, can the plethos 
provide effective contributions to the well-being of the community, and make any 
judgement issued by a lawgiver more complete. 
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Conclusions 
Justice and virtue in general are 
necessarily a kind of power. 
To say that power as such is evil or 
corrupting would therefore amount 
to saying that virtue is evil or 
corrupting. 
While some men are corrupted by 
wielding power, others are improved 
by it: "power will show a man". 
Leo Strauss 
We have finally come to the end of this itinerary through some of the ethical and 
political issues treated by Aristotle in his works. I have attempted to investigate the role 
of wisdom in the exercise of the ruling activity and in the cultivation of goods such as 
ethical excellence, justice and friendship in political communities. My main concern in 
this work was to stress the ethical dimension of political expertise as it is conceived by 
Aristotle, and the way in which such an expertise affects the life of the citizens and the 
well-being of the polis. 
Now I am going to make some conclusive considerations on what has been said 
so far. The aim of political expertise is to make citizens happy. As it seems to me, in the 
Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle is not suggesting that the happiness of each individual is 
simply compatible to the happiness of the whole of the community; indeed, what he is 
saying at NE I, 1 094b7 -8 is that the highest good is the same both for the community 
and for each of its members. Given that expert lawgivers work with a view to making 
citizens ethically good, activity according to ethical excellence will be an indispensable 
component of their happiness, even when some people prefer a life entirely devo~ed to 
intellectual activity. 
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In the present work I did not stress the role of sophia in the political community, nor 
did I suggest that in Aristotle's thought political expertise should playa decisive role in 
the promotion of intellectual activity; however, I believe that this might be a plausible 
suggestion, given that Aristotle assumes that the happiness of the community, i.e. the 
object of political expertise, is the same as the happiness of all its members, not all of 
whom taking an ethical life preferable to one devoted to intellectual activity. As I think, 
in order to promote complete happiness for each citizen, the polis will not neglect the 
importance of sophia. Still, it seems to me that in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle's 
main focus is the ethical aspect of individual and public happiness, in that virtuous 
activity, justice and friendship will assure the well-functioning of the polis. 
Given the role of ethical excellence in the promotion of happiness and the need to 
make citizens ethically good, wisdom of virtuous lawgivers will work in the polis with 
a view to developing virtuous habits. Virtuous activity involves the capacity to engage 
in good deliberation, which, in its turn, requires the orthos logos according to which a 
person will act in the way one should and in the required circumstances. Such a kind of 
rationality, alongside ethical excellence, will come about from habit and experience 
both in the private and in the public life. 
Education to ethical excellence and wisdom may be provided not only by people 
intimately linked to the 'still non-virtuous' individuals, like a father for example, but 
also by wise laws, i. e. laws enjoining activity according to ethical excellence, or by 
examples of good conduct offered by la\\~. ms that obedience to good laws 
represents a path towards not only the,lcvdopment of the orthos logos proper to a 
virtuous individual, but also the achievement of justice in the polis. 
When at NE V, 1129a33 Aristotle reports the commonly held view that the just is 
what is lawful, he seems to accept it, still without attempting to reduce justice to 
obedience to any law whatever; by contrast, justice will coincide with obedience to law 
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when such a law enjoins virtuous activity and is established according to the art of a 
virtuous lawgiver, with a view to promoting the advantage and the happiness of the 
whole of the community. As it seems, the Aristotelian idea of justice is not the outcome 
of an uncritical obedience to law. That Aristotle starts his account of justice by defining 
it as a disposition of character l suggests that just actions will come about from the 
corresponding state of character rather than from of obedience to law per se; not least 
because one might stick to law without being intrinsically just, e.g. simply out of fear of 
punishment or out of shame. 
We have seen in which respect justice, which is taken by Aristotle as a 
disposition of character, differs from the other ethical excellences: unlike the latter, 
which do not necessarily involve other people, justice is always connected to one's 
actions in relation to one's fellows. I have tried to show that, when Aristotle speaks of 
justice in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics, it is political justice that he has in his 
mind, and not merely justice in private relationships. 
In this book Aristotle distinguishes two senses in which justice can be taken: 
justice as including the whole of the ethical excellences, i. e. 'universal' justice, and 
justice as isotes, i.e. 'particular' justice. As we have seen, Aristotle seems to speak of 
particular justice in two different senses, although deeply connected to each other; the 
first is isotes as an hexis, i.e. as an individual disposition according to which one is not 
committed to get more than is due to one, presumably in a political community; the 
second is isotes as a kind of structure on which political life is grounded. 
My view is that particular justice conceived in the first sense makes isotes a 
proper ethical excellence, although differing from the others insofar as cannot be 
practised by an agent without any relation to other individuals. I have also suggested 
that particular justice as isotes is not simply a part of universal justice, in the same way 
1 See Aristotle, NE V, 1129a6-7. 
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as each of the ethical excellences is; rather, particular justice seems to be at the busis of 
universal justice, given that one will not exercise the ethical excellences belonging to 
universal justice without being isos to one's fellows in the community. In other words, 
just actions in the universal sense can be taken as acts of isotes in the community, 
aimed at establishing a right proportion of goods to be distributed and preserved for 
each citizen. 
Now, it seems that, in a virtuous community, justice so conceived will not consist 
exclusively of a network of laws set up by the wisdom of political experts; rather, the 
individual contribution of the citizens will be required for the establishment of full 
justice in the community. In this respect, wisdom of rulers will not be sufficient to 
secure the order and the stability proper to a good political community; involvement of 
citizens will be indispensable for the actualisation of full justice in the community. 
The need to educate people to justice seems to be confirmed by Aristotle's 
insistence that wise rulers should promote friendship among the citizens. As it seems to 
me, Aristotle takes political friendship as a real form of friendship, insofar as it is 
grounded in reciprocity, which displays itself in the form of mutual well-wishing, and 
also in the awareness of the established relationship. On the other hand, the bonds of 
friendship subsisting between people who do not know each other will inevitably differ 
from those typical of intimate friendships. The way in which friendship between 
fellow-citizens will display itself is, as I believe, in the form of activity according to 
justice, which will replace the form of intimate love typical of friends according to 
ethical excellence. 
I believe that Aristotle's distinction between friendship grounded in utility and 
friendship grounded in ethical excellence may mirror different levels of justice; to 
justice conceived as an ethical disposition will correspond a kind of political friendship 
based on ethical excellence, whereas to mere 'legal' justice a kind of friendship 
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grounded in utility. I also think that, in Aristotle's thought, the relationship between 
justice and political friendship is not only one of correspondence. Given that political 
friendship will not stem from the same kind of intimate sharing between friends who 
know each other well and spend their lives together, it seems that just actions towards 
one's fellows will establish friendly feelings, although more 'impersonal'. 
Friendship, although promoted by political experts, will not be realised in the 
polis without the active contribution of citizens. What Aristotle intends to show is that 
friendship is a stronger form of involvement of citizens in political life than mere 
'legal' justice. 
When Aristotle discusses the notion of justice in the Nicomachean Ethics, he 
does not seem to be referring to a specific kind of polis; its principles are rather 
universal, i.e. applicable to any community which aims at the happiness of its members. 
The universal validity of justice is expressed by the notion of to phusikon dikaiull, i.e. 
that kind of justice whose principles are the same everywhere, independently of the 
difference of political context. As we have seen, natural justice is not detached from 
convention in Aristotle's thought; besides those conventional enactments which 
pronounce on neutral issues, there are also laws which, if established in a different way, 
might compromise the well-being and the goodness of political communities, like 
enactments on the distribution of honours and wealth, or decrees aimed at rectificating 
unjust actions; in other words, political measures which would fail to attain full justice 
if not properly established. 
The concept of conventional law is not illustrated by reference to these kinds of 
agreements; which, as I propose, suggests that they are considered as principles of 
natural justice. If my suggestion is plausible, not only will these kinds of conventional 
enactments be connected in some way to natural justice, but, even more, they will be 
themselves examples of the instantiation of natural justice in political life. Such 
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principles will be universally valid before being put into convention; which is what 
allows us to take universal justice as 'the same everywhere'. Equally, natural principles 
will be instantiated in a different way according to the conditions and the needs of each 
community, and that would be the respect in which natural justice, although being the 
same everywhere, is changeable; a changeability which, as I have proposed, is not only 
a matter of different interpretations of the notion of natural justice, but, rather, of 
different applications of indeterminate principles of natural justice according to the 
specific condition of each community. If so, that natural justice is universally valid 
before being put into convention may encourage us to think that it is an indeterminate 
notion, but not that it as an unattainable idea. 
Aristotle's notion of universal justice sheds a new light on the relationship 
between real and ideal constitutions; the notion of 'best constitution' turns out to 
represent an ideal realisable (although only to some extent) in real political 
constitutions. This will be the task of the true political expert, who, unlike any common 
citizen in any polis whatever, possesses authentic phronesis. Phronesis, which, as we 
have seen, is the excellence proper to good men, seems also to be the absolute standard 
according to which a ruler will be taken as virtuous; in this respect, his excellence will 
vary from that of a common citizen, whose goodness relies on his capacity to contribute 
to the safety of the constitution to which he belongs. 
As I read Aristotle's arguments at Pol. III, 1276b16-1277b32, only in the ideal 
community will any citizen whatever be equipped with ethical excellence and 
phronesis, and be capable of ruling well; in that case, those who are good citizens will 
also be good men. But, in my view, wise lawgivers will not be found exclusively in the 
ideal state. That the phronesis of a good ruler is treated as an excellence which does not 
depend on the quality of the constitution in which he rules may pave the way for the 
possibility that a good ruler may govern in a deviant constitution. Even more, I think 
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that such a ruler will be allowed to some extent to improve the conditions of his 
community, without necessarily changing the values promoted by defective 
constitutions~ values which, as it seems, are constitutive of the happiness of each polis 
(e.g. money or freedom). 
Polity is the example of a good constitution consisting in a mixture of the 
characteristic features of two deviant constitutions: democracy and oligarchy; I have 
tried to show that polity might stem from an activity of correction, undertaken by 
political experts, of the deviant forms of government mentioned above. I take polity as 
the constitution that mostly expresses a display of wisdom by political experts in 
existing, imperfect political conditions. The wisdom of people in power might express 
itself in the rulers' attempt to avoid conflicts between different social groups and in 
their willingness to establish some degree of friendship in the political community. In 
this respect, the friendship which wise rulers will try to establish in the polity might not 
be grounded in complete excellence of character, but, presumably, in some form of 
isotes. 
To conclude, Aristotle believes that the intervention of wise rulers in the life of 
the polis plays a crucial role in the realisation of its happiness; however, the role of the 
ruled in such a realisation should not be downplayed. Activity according to ethical 
excellence on both the rulers' and the ruled: s part will contribute to making justice and 
friendship in the polis of higher quality. 
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